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3FOREWORD
A dvances in science and technology can yield significant societal benefits and drive economic growth. The challenge for society is to channel evidence about innovative technologies and their risks to improve decision making in 
the area of regulation and policy making.  
My annual report sets out my response as Chief Scientific Adviser to the 
challenges faced by decision makers when determining policy.  It considers the 
different perspectives through which risk is viewed by members of the public, 
business and policy-makers. The report also seeks to understand the bases for 
individual and collective decisions on when and how to innovate. 
 To produce my report I have drawn on the expertise of a broad range of experts 
and academics, who have set out the evidence about the challenges faced by policy 
makers and regulators.  I have also sought and included notable case studies which 
illustrate the perspectives in the core of the report.  This volume comprises that 
body of evidence and associated case studies.
 I am indebted to the authors of this volume for their contribution. The chapters 
and case studies represent the authors’ personal views rather than those of the 
Government Office for Science but their wide ranging perspectives have provided 
important evidence for this project, and so have helped me develop the themes and 
conclusions of my own report.
 
Mark Walport
Government Chief Scientific Adviser
November 2014
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SECTION 1: INNOVATION AND RISK
Innovation involves more than just 
physical products. Some 78% of the UK 
economy is in services, where innovation plays 
a key role.
Technological improvements will increase 
productivity by as much as 25% and will generate 
a predicted $3.7 to $10.8 trillion for the world 
economy by 2025.
East Asian economies such as Japan, Korea 
and China experienced major economic growth 
in the second half of the twentieth century, driven 
partly by ‘catch-up innovation’. Twenty years ago, there 
were fewer than 3 million 
people with internet 
access; now there are 
nearly 2.5 billion.
The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system 
in Bogota, Colombia is a good example 
of (city) government-led institutional 
innovation.
1950s to 1980s
1960s to 1980s
1978 to present
JAPAN
SOUTH KOREA
CHINA
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The African continent has twice as many mobile 
phones as the United States.
Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunisations (GAVI) and the Global Fund have 
worked to prevent 5.5 million and 6.5 million 
deaths respectively since their inception.
As digital access 
increases, it is estimated 
that four billion people 
will be online by 2020, 
using up to 50 trillion 
gigabytes of data.
There were 200 million people 
over the age of 60 in 1950. Today, 
that number has grown to nearly 800 
million. By 2050, it is projected to stand 
at 2 billion. 
When Iceland’s 
Eyjafjallajökull volcano 
erupted in 2010 it caused several 
of the largest global airports 
to shut down, resulting in an 
estimated $5 billion in losses.
Industrial processes will need to make 
technological changes in order to meet domestic 
and regional targets on carbon emissions 
reductions. The European  
Union aims to reduce carbon 
emissions by 80% by 2050 from 
1990 levels. 
Students are not only attaining higher 
levels of education, they are also moving to 
access this education. Growing numbers of people 
will have access to the best academic institutions.
12
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CHAPTER 1 INNOVATION, RISK AND 
GOVERNMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND 
PRINCIPLES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
1
The interplay between innovation and risk, and the social interactions 
between public and private sectors, are critical in fostering innovation 
and determining its effectiveness.
Rodney Boyd, Reuben Finighan,
Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern 
(London School of Economics and 
Political Science)
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INTRODUCTION
In today’s globalized, rapidly-changing world, innovation is 
becoming ever more important as changes in technology, 
skills and knowledge increasingly affect countries’ 
competitiveness externally and the well-being of their 
people internally. In the UK, innovation will continue to be 
a key source, perhaps the key source, of economic growth. 
However, competition is becoming ever more fierce, vital 
global resources are dwindling, and environmental problems 
are mounting, making innovation an ever-present challenge. 
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the UK is 
falling behind many of its major trade competitors when it 
comes to research and development, which is closely linked 
to innovation (see Table 1).
In shaping growth, innovation touches on all sectors and 
institutions. It is sometimes portrayed as the process of 
going from research laboratory to physical product, but 
that is much too narrow a view, particularly in advanced 
countries where the service sector is 70-80% of the 
economy.  We can hope to sustain economic growth, and 
continue improving quality of life, by changing the way we 
do things. But doing things differently involves embracing 
risk and uncertainty — risk of failure is an intrinsic aspect 
of innovation — and numerous market failures constrain 
potential innovation. Yet policies to foster innovation can 
be hard to get right and interpreting evidence about what 
works can be difficult; governments can fail, too. 
Nevertheless, through good theory, rigorous analysis and 
rich examples, we have learnt much that can provide useful 
guidance. By examining some important lessons and insights 
from economics and other social sciences, this chapter looks 
at the interplay between innovation and risk, and how social 
interactions between public and private actors are critical in 
fostering innovation and determining its effectiveness. 
Part A is conceptual in nature. It contains an overview 
of the defining characteristics of innovation, and its 
relationship to economic growth and to risk. In Part B, we 
discuss insights into innovation from the social sciences, 
providing real-world examples as much as possible. Finally, 
in Part C, we set out some broad recommendations for UK 
government policy that draw on the insights discussed. From 
our analysis, we identify pillars or foundations for first-class 
‘innovation infrastructure’: a high-quality, merit-based system 
of education and training; substantial investment in basic 
research; a system of government-managed incentives that 
promote innovation via markets and entrepreneurship; and 
setting and investing in national innovation priorities.  We 
also suggest associated policymaking guidelines.
A. INNOVATION, GROWTH AND RISK
(i) Defining Innovation
Innovation is about changing the way we do things. It is 
about pushing the frontier of what we know in the hope 
of generating new and useful ideas, and then putting them 
into practice. Successful innovation raises productivity and 
living standards, expanding the range of goods and services 
available for individuals and society as a whole, and allowing 
us to live longer, healthier lives. 
Joseph Schumpeter provides a classic definition of 
innovation as the development of new ideas (which he called 
“inventions”) into products and processes, which are then 
spread across the market in a process he called diffusion2. 
Innovation, as we shall use the term, encompasses the full 
chain from basic research to the diffusion of ideas, goods 
or services across an economy. Schumpeter envisaged 
this occurring in a linear way, in the sense of a distinct 
time sequence. In reality, these different stages overlap 
and interweave, as parts of a complex system that feeds 
back to and influences future developments3. Nonetheless, 
this model provides one starting point for thinking about 
innovation.
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Some additional features of the definition and scope of 
nni ovation, as we understand it, are as follows4:
• Innovation is more than invention alone. Some of the 
greatest innovators imitate, borrow or adapt new ideas 
from other people, firms or places. The ideas that are put 
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to work may not be individually original. Innovation is 
about putting new ideas into practice, not just creating or 
inventing them.
• Innovation is also more than just physical products, 
and takes place over all sectors of activity. As an 
example, 78% of the UK economy is services5, and 
many traditional products and associated industries are 
becoming turned into services (e.g. recorded music; 
private vehicle transport). 
• Not all innovation is about making breakthroughs. 
Incremental innovation is the making of small improvements 
to existing technologies and practices. Such innovation 
often occurs through the process of practice, and while 
it is sometimes predictable in the short term it can 
lead to immense changes in the long term6. Radical (or 
“breakthrough”) innovation is making breakthroughs that 
change the way we do things altogether. It tends to 
result from basic research, and tends to be much more 
unpredictable7.
• Not all innovations change market structures 
or displace market leaders. From the perspective 
of markets, innovation can be sustaining — with little 
impact on existing market structure — or disruptive — 
where new markets are created and/or existing markets 
disrupted8.
• Innovation both creates and destroys, and the 
distribution of gains and losses is often uneven. 
Because innovation is a key driver of growth, and usually 
meets some human need or desire, innovation is generally 
seen as socially valuable. Yet as Schumpeter noted, 
innovation is also a process of “creative destruction” 
where old ways of doing things are destroyed and replaced 
by new ones.  While innovations (particularly disruptive 
ones) often bring widespread, longer-term benefits, they 
often also entail concentrated economic costs on some 
groups (for example, electric light disrupted candle-
makers)9. If change is poorly managed, this may generate 
social costs, such as long-term unemployment. That 
said, over time innovation in general has increased living 
standards greatly10.
(ii) Innovation and economic growth
Many of the greatest and longest-lasting periods of 
economic growth have been driven by innovation. In the 
20th century, the major growth periods occurred in rich 
countries in the post-World War 2 period until the late 
1960s, and in East Asia – most notably in Japan (1950s to 
1980s) and Korea (1960s to 1980s), and more recently 
in China (1978 to the present). In rich countries, this was 
driven in part by innovations in the mass production system, 
automobiles and widespread electrification11, but also by 
recovery from the great recession and World War 2. In 
East Asia much of the growth occurred through “catch-up 
innovation” driven in large part by a managed transition 
toward open economies and market-oriented institutions.
Innovation has the further distinction of being relatively 
limitless in its potential to generate growth12.  As the other 
avenues of growth – increasing savings, capital, labour or 
other inputs – become exhausted in modern economies, 
innovation increasingly becomes the dominant driver of 
long-term growth13. 
Some of the returns from innovation can be appropriated 
by the innovator, but new knowledge also “spills over” into 
the wider economy to be used by other individuals, firms 
and governments. There is “a consensus on the centrality 
of knowledge spillovers to innovation, and innovation to 
growth”14. New ideas begin to drive growth as they diffuse, 
become applied, and drive new innovations, throughout an 
economy15. 
Yet spillovers expose private innovators to risks, including 
being unable to appropriate much of the returns from their 
innovation, which in turn reduces their underlying incentives 
to innovate. Thus there is a tension between increasing the 
private appropriability of knowledge (e.g. through patent 
protection) and increasing its public diffusion (e.g. through 
promoting openness). There are various ways in which 
governments can manage this tension — from establishing 
and enforcing patent rights to offering innovation prizes 
— many of which are addressed in Part B. The preferred 
approach will depend in part upon the broader conceptual 
framework within which one conceives of innovation and 
the role of government.
In the economics literature on innovation, two main 
conceptual frameworks are dominant: the ‘market failure’ 
framework; and the ‘innovation systems’ framework. 
Analysis in terms of market failures suggests innovation 
investment is and will remain “too low” because of several 
well-characterized market failures16:
• Spillovers in R&D mean that private firms (and 
individual countries) are unable to capture the full 
value of their investments in a competitive market. 
Indeed, innovation studies suggest that the social returns 
to private R&D are often much larger than the (already 
large) private returns17. This means in such cases firms will 
undervalue such investments — and so be motivated to 
underinvest relative to what might be good for society 
as a whole. Fostering positive spillovers is a “primary 
justification for government R&D-support policies”18.
• Key externalities, like congestion, environment 
and CO2 emissions, may not be properly priced 
or regulated in the market. Firms thus undervalue 
innovations that would address such externalities. For 
this reason, energy innovation has been called “a tale of 
two market failures” — i.e. it is undervalued due to both 
spillovers and the lack of adequate CO2 pricing19.
• Imperfections in risk-sharing institutions and 
capital markets hamper the extent to which 
innovation and innovative approaches can diffuse. 
Risk of failure is an 
intrinsic aspect of 
innovation.
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Investors face additional risks when investing in a variety 
of new situations — e.g. new technologies, new policy 
environments. Some of these risks can be mitigated by 
policy (see Part B), but the nature of capital markets, 
in which lenders also have to be persuaded of the yet 
undemonstrated prospects, mean it is impossible to cover 
them all.
• Behaviour different from that embodied in the 
standard “rational” representation of individuals in 
economic models can limit innovation. Our tendency 
to focus on the short-term, to dislike risk and uncertainty, 
and to stick with the status quo can lead to “innovation 
neglect” in public and private institutions alike (see Part B). 
• The development of human capital and associated 
markets is restricted by its own spillovers. The 
education of individuals provides social benefits, by 
providing human capital upon which public and private 
sectors, and society as a whole20, can draw. These benefits 
are not fully captured by the educated individual, or by 
schools or firms that may educate that individual, so 
markets tend to provide less education than is socially 
efficient21. 
• Sustained support for incumbent technologies. 
Most energy sectors, for instance, have been historically 
designed for fossil fuel use, thus development of low-/
zero-carbon sources of energy may be slowed and many 
aspects of the energy system may need to change in 
addition to the sources. Existing institutions, infrastructure 
and policies that support certain sectors, can result in 
sector inertia that provides “barriers to entry for new 
technologies”22.
It is not just markets that fail. Governments, with good 
intentions or otherwise, having different competencies and 
facing diverse pressures, can also fail.  Attempts to pick 
winners sometimes lead to second-guessing markets and 
wasted resources23.  A poorly designed policy, or one that 
does not carry credibility, can present a greater threat to 
innovation than the market failures it was supposed to 
resolve24. Reasons for government failure include:
• asymmetric information;
• lack of experience or competence in business or science;
• rent-seeking or lobbying by private actors;
• short-term time horizons driven by electoral cycles.
The ‘systems of innovation’ approach focuses on how 
firms of different types, government actors and other 
economic agents, are embedded in ‘systems of innovation’ 
(sectoral, regional, national), or ‘innovation ecosystems’25. 
The approach emphasizes the importance of interactions 
between actors in such systems (which are often non-linear, 
involving important feedback loops), and how knowledge is 
diffused throughout the economy26. In distinction from the 
‘market failures’ approach, the innovation systems literature 
focuses on the importance of both market and non-market 
actors, relationships and norms in determining innovation 
behaviour. This expands the possible scope of useful state 
intervention27, but at the same time provides further 
possible sources of government failure. Poor government 
policy may, for example, override existing norms (such as 
those for openness among academic researchers) and result 
in unexpected negative effects on innovation28. 
Both frameworks bring valuable insights to our 
understanding of innovation and how it can be fostered 
to promote growth. From here on, we focus more on the 
market failure framework because it has a longer-standing 
literature, but we draw on both.
(iii) Innovation, risks and incentives
There is significant potential for policy to boost innovation, 
and thereby boost economic growth. To design policy 
that effectively and efficiently fosters innovation, we must 
understand how actors along the innovation chain respond 
to the risks and incentives they face.
“Risk” and “uncertainty” in economic analyses are often 
used interchangeably but the American economist Frank 
Knight distinguished them along the following lines29: 
• “Risk” can be thought of as measurable and 
quantifiable in terms of probabilities, and is 
most useful for describing investment in predictable 
advances further along the innovation chain. Intel’s 
investments in chip technology, for example, produce 
incremental improvements that are predicted years in 
advance according to Intel’s “tick-tock” model of chip 
improvement30, where improvements are reliable enough 
that the metaphor of a clock fits.
• “Uncertainty” can be thought of as that which is 
not easily measurable in terms of probabilities, where 
we may even be unsure of what possibilities exist. This 
can be the case in complex, chaotic systems composed 
of many interacting elements — and along the innovation 
chain, “all of the actors operate under conditions of 
uncertainty”31. This applies especially in early phases of the 
chain, and in innovation over the long term. Policymakers 
could not have foreseen that studying jellyfish would 
found a large part of the biomedical revolution, or that 
military packet switching technologies intended to make 
military communication systems more resilient in the 
event of a nuclear attack would lead to the internet, social 
networking and the avalanche of apps spawned in Silicon 
Valley. 
Private actors face a diversity of risks — financial risks, 
career risks, legal risks, and many beyond — when they 
choose to innovate. The balance of risks and incentives 
determines what choices innovators (entrepreneurs, 
investors, inventors, bureaucrats, etc.) will make. 
Being exposed to risk is part of doing business. But some 
risks are appropriate guides to decision-making, while others 
may be unhelpfully imposed. Deciding not to proceed with 
an innovation investment because there is a high risk of 
insufficient demand is a sensible decision — the kind of 
decision that firms make routinely in order to maximize 
their value. Deciding not to proceed with a very promising 
innovation because of the risks imposed by regulatory 
unpredictability (e.g. policy risk), lack of appropriability (e.g. 
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CASE STUDY
FUKUSHIMA
Anthony Carrigan 
(University of Leeds)
Disaster experts agree that there is no such thing as a ‘natural’ disaster. Environmental hazards become disasters as a result of the 
risks and vulnerabilities that people are exposed to on 
a daily basis. Indeed, disasters are not single events — 
they are compound processes that must be understood 
historically, and from multiple viewpoints, to effectively 
reduce risks in the future. 
With the intensification of complex risks, including 
climate change, our vulnerabilities have also become 
more complex, arising at the intersection of 
technological change, environmental depletion, and 
economic inequality. These factors have been partly 
responsible for the increasing number of disasters 
experienced worldwide1, and it is always the poorest 
who suffer most. 
The 2011 Fukushima disaster — the largest nuclear 
catastrophe experienced in Japan since the atomic 
bombings of the Second World War — highlights what 
is at stake. The 9.0 magnitude Tohoku earthquake and 
tsunami, which claimed in the region of 20,000 lives, 
triggered the disaster. But it was the failure to meet 
basic safety requirements2 at the coastal Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plant that led to a radioactive crisis 
whose effects continue to spread3. 
The Fukushima disaster was a compound catastrophe 
caused by systemic negligence over safety precautions 
in a highly-developed country that is prone to 
environmental hazards. There was a lack of minimum 
protection against potential accidents, with flaws 
identified in how private corporations ran nuclear 
power plants across the country, and how these 
facilities were regulated4.
As a consequence, some of the biggest challenges for 
government and advisers responding to the Fukushima 
crisis relate to long-term responsibilities and ethics5, 
not least in light of historical debates over nuclear 
power and technological risks in Japan and worldwide. 
Policymakers must define acceptable levels of risk in the 
nuclear power industry. But what is an adequate level of 
protection and support, and how can governments act 
to reduce the vulnerabilities that can lead to disasters? 
There is a danger in focusing on minimum safety 
standards, as risk is unevenly distributed across 
populations and frequently outsourced from richer to 
poorer areas, both within nations and internationally. 
While uneven risk distribution is often hidden in 
everyday life, disasters render it visible and are 
therefore political proving grounds that highlight the 
degree of care and protection governments afford 
citizens in relation to risk exposure and post-disaster 
support. The Prime Minister of Japan, Naoto Kan, 
resigned just a few months after the Fukushima disaster, 
partly due to critiques over state accountability6.  And 
similar political discontent has been expressed in the 
wake of disasters ranging from the Bhopal gas tragedy 
of 1984 to Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New 
Orleans in 2005.
It may be decades before we know the full effects 
of the Fukushima disaster, but we can look to similar 
incidents to understand how distrust and anger are 
generated through perceived state and corporate 
irresponsibility. Examples like Bhopal show how 
‘disaster’ may come to refer less to the original 
explosion in a chemical factory, and more to failures in 
the recovery and accountability process. In some cases, 
the disaster becomes synonymous with inadequate 
legal aid and remediation; in others, it signifies a 
lack of healthcare or attention to chronic trauma, 
grief, and depression. It can also refer to exploitative 
reconstruction and development initiatives, and 
community dispossession. 
As many narratives and testimonies from Bhopal, 
Fukushima and New Orleans have shown, it is 
crucial to identify how compound vulnerabilities 
and structural risks build up over time, especially in 
poorer communities, and to support locally driven 
strategies for reducing these weaknesses. This not 
only ameliorates risk, but can establish sustained 
relationships of care that support long-term recovery 
after a disaster. Such processes are never linear, and 
are variegated across communities, so it is important 
to understand different cultural perspectives on 
disaster (including religious beliefs) in order to establish 
inclusive prevention and recovery measures. 
The Fukushima disaster is a stark manifestation of 
risks combining human decision-making, technological 
design, and natural hazards. The causes of vulnerability 
that lead to compound disasters are more political 
and economic than environmental: understanding and 
accepting responsibility for this is essential to reducing 
risk.
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unclear patent law), or barriers to entry (e.g. incumbent 
power), is a lost opportunity. It is through such risk-inducing 
channels that “government failure” can hamper innovative 
activity. The role of government is, rather, to influence the 
balance of risks, so that actors’ decisions relate, as much as 
possible, to the long-term value of innovation investments. 
Innovation can also create or mitigate other risks:
• some types of innovation introduce new risks (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals like thalidomide); 
• some types can amplify existing risks (e.g. mortgage-
backed securities combined with derivatives in the housing
market); and
• some types of innovation (e.g. renewable energy) can 
reduce or mitigate existing risks (e.g. climate change and 
energy insecurity).
The role of governments in relation to risk and 
innovation is multifaceted. First, legal frameworks, 
government institutions and policies shape the risks and 
incentives faced by non-government agents with respect 
to innovation. Second, governments and their agencies 
themselves can innovate, taking on uncertainty and risk 
when private agents are unable or unwilling to do so. 
Third, governments can regulate to manage the risks that 
innovations bring. Yet, just as there is market failure, there 
is government failure: without care, governments can stifle 
innovation and amplify risks. These and other aspects 
concerning the role of government in the innovation are 
explored further in Part B(iv).
B. A SOCIAL SCIENCE WINDOW INTO INNOVATION 
On the basis of the key ideas, definitions and issues set out 
above, this part of the chapter looks at innovation through 
the window of the social sciences.  We consider insights 
and examples that can be grouped into four categories: 
(i) the structure of economies and markets; (ii) firms and 
other institutions; (iii) individuals and behaviour; and (iv) 
governments. 
These categories clearly overlap, and they should not be 
seen as rigid. In particular, the role of government is relevan
across all categories, since laws and government policies 
— from intellectual property rights to competition laws, 
and from corporate regulation to infrastructure investment 
— affect innovative activity by non-government agents. 
Accordingly, government activity will be touched on in each 
section, though it will be the primary focus of section (iv).
(i) The structure of economies and markets
Innovation influences the structure of modern 
economies and the sources of their growth. Economy-
wide growth is especially influenced by so-called General 
Purpose Technologies (GPTs), such as computing, the 
automobile and electricity, which pervade many economic 
sectors and have many different applications and spillover 
effects, including spawning other types of innovation32.
Innovation is shaped predominantly by characteristics 
special to each industry, and by past episodes of 
innovation. The level of technological opportunity (e.g. 
arising from engineering advances or a wealth of recent 
discoveries in basic research) is a major determinant of 
how heavily firms will invest in innovation33. The structure of 
demand is another important factor: homogenous demand 
is likely to favour a small number of incumbent firms, while 
heterogenous demand opens up a larger number of niches. 
For example, in industries where technological opportunity 
is high and patterns of demand are diverse — as in today’s 
ICT industry — the market is likely to be characterized by a 
large number of small, innovation-intensive firms34. 
The market structure of an industry has differential 
effects on innovation, depending on the industry 
and the technology opportunities available. In some 
cases competition increases innovation, while in others, as 
Schumpeter predicted, competition can reduce innovation35. 
Network linkages among firms36 and openness to 
trade are important drivers of innovation. Interactions 
across organizational (firm-firm) and geographic (national, 
regional) boundaries promote innovation37. For example, 
when markets open to international trade and firms start 
exporting, they gain access to a larger market, which brings 
higher returns to innovation and increased diffusion of 
knowledge as firms interact with more overseas customers/
suppliers and learn from experience in other markets38.
Financial markets have an important role to play in 
managing and sharing the risks of innovation, but tend 
to favour short-term investments. Assessing the value 
of an innovation, or of a small firm without a track record, 
is complex and involves substantial uncertainties. Investors 
tend to prefer making a smaller number of larger, and safer, 
investments in mature firms instead.  Well-designed financial 
tools and institutions can unlock innovation by providing 
incentives for long-term investment, or by allocating capital 
and enabling the uncertainty and risk associated with 
innovation to be spread across multiple agents39. 
State development banks, including sectorally or 
thematically focused institutions such as green investment 
banks, can overcome some market failures and risks that 
private firms, including venture capitalist financiers, are 
unable or unwilling to bear40. Development banks can take 
a longer-term view, can develop a body of specialized skills 
that may be lacking in the private sector, and can employ a 
wide range of instruments (for example, instruments used 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
include equity investments, loans, guarantees, and technical 
assistance). The presence of such a bank, moreover, 
reduces the policy risk perceived by private investors, since 
government policy is less likely to be volatile in relation to 
sectors in which the bank is involved.
(ii) Firms and other institutions
Most innovation occurs within organizations – e.g. 
firms, universities, government research institutes/
agencies. Studying these organizations can therefore 
provide insights into the innovation process.
Firm size affects the quantity and type of innovation 
that occurs.  With regard to research, the quantity of 
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research done by firms tends to be proportional to firm 
size41. However, the type of innovation carried out does 
differ with firm size: larger firms tend to produce more 
incremental advances, while smaller firms are somewhat 
more likely to bring breakthroughs to market42. Since both 
types of firms have advantages in different conditions and 
face different kinds of constraints and market failures with 
different characteristics, policy should not focus on just one 
type or size of firm43. 
Patents are important instruments for incentivizing 
firms to innovate, but they also restrict the diffusion 
of knowledge. On the one hand, patent rights play a 
crucial role in incentivizing firms to innovate by providing 
a temporary monopoly and allowing licensing to address 
the ‘knowledge spillover’ market failure44. On the other 
hand, patents hinder innovation by raising transaction 
costs to the diffusion of knowledge and the transfer of 
technologies, deterring some other innovations that could 
build on these spillovers, and distorting the product market 
through monopoly pricing.  An efficient patent system will 
strike a balance between the competing demands of private 
property rights and openness45. 
Exactly where this balance lies, and its nature, vary 
across industries: in the U.S., for example, patent rights 
block innovation in the fields of computers, electronics 
and medical instruments, but not in drugs, chemicals or 
mechanical technologies46. This is predominantly because 
in the former industries ownership of patents is highly 
fragmented, raising the costs and coordination challenges 
of innovating. This especially impacts small firms seeking 
patents from larger firms, because the costs of seeking 
licenses are disproportionately higher for small firms47. 
Good patent policy thus requires a sensitivity to specific 
industry conditions — as well as good data and consultation. 
The same sensitivity to context is also warranted when 
determining what advances can be patented, since this 
affects basic research carried out by universities.  While 
patents can promote basic research, it can be adversely 
affected where patents block access to new scientific 
techniques with potentially large spillover effects48. 
The linkages between different organizations within 
“innovation ecosystems” — particularly between 
universities/institutes and private firms — are a very 
important determinant of innovation.  Whilst it is 
difficult to get these links right, there are lessons from 
experience. Basic and applied research, which typically takes 
place in universities and other research institutions, involves 
high levels of uncertainty with the potential to produce high 
social value over the longer term. Technology development 
and commercialization, which typically occurs in private 
firms, involves more manageable risks with the potential to 
produce high private value over the shorter term. Given 
their different institutional structures and imperatives, linking 
these parts of the innovation chain is challenging. 
Two generic approaches for improving these linkages 
are (a) public-private collaborations and (b) intermediate 
institutions for knowledge diffusion / technology transfer. 
But many attempts to foster such linkages have been 
unsuccessful.  While hubs of innovation have clearly 
developed around the UK’s major universities, attempts 
to recreate these success stories in other universities 
through co-location have generally led to disappointing 
results49. Technology transfer offices (or TTOs) established 
in universities across the developed world have been “found 
to be more at odds with both scientists and entrepreneurs, 
than the latter are between themselves”, suggesting that 
they are not a trusted intermediary50. The UK Government’s
“Catapult” centres provide a different — and perhaps more 
promising — model for linking diverse actors within the 
innovation ecosystem, based on public-private collaboration 
(see Box 1 for an example of one such centre). 
Incentive structures faced by researchers within 
organizations affect innovative activity. Institutional 
cultures that set out to experiment and learn, that 
give employees autonomy and that evaluate their 
performance over longer term cycles tend to be more 
innovative. The innovative activity that occurs within 
organizations is influenced by the institutional culture and 
incentive structures that researchers face, such as how 
much autonomy researchers are given, the structure of 
their employment, how performance is evaluated (shorter 
or longer term performance, process based or outcome 
based, and how these are measured, e.g. in terms of quantity 
of patents, types of publications etc.) and how they are 
rewarded51. Compare, for example, the Howard Hughes 
Medical Institute (HHMI), which tolerates failure and 
provides significant freedom to experiment and change 
course, with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
which imposes short review cycles and narrowly defined 
goals. Research suggests that the HHMI model results in 
significantly more “high-impact” papers per scientist52. 
There is a trend within the UK, the US and 
elsewhere to make universities and research institutes 
more results-oriented, commercially-focused and 
“entrepreneurial”; this risks emphasising shorter-term 
benefits at the expense of much larger, longer-term 
benefits to society. In the UK and US, universities are 
increasingly being expected to emulate private firms by 
patenting, and even commercialising, the discoveries of their 
researchers53. This particular approach to the public-private 
linkage problem (discussed above) could lead to higher 
volumes of innovative activity (e.g. patents) and innovation-
led growth in the short-to-medium term. However, the 
value of this new model is unclear: spin-off companies do 
not appear to be driving economic growth, and patenting 
appears to be a minor pathway for knowledge transfer 
to industry, compared to traditional academic papers, 
conferences and relationships54. 
 
Well-designed financial 
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More problematically, system-wide rollouts of ideas like 
the entrepreneurial university may pose substantial risks. 
Innovation scholars warn that the architecture of the 
institutions that organize academic research is old and 
poorly understood. Undertaking experiments in institutional 
design at large scales may result in prolonged slowdowns in 
innovation and growth55. For example, the new incentives for
commercialization risk crowding out the basic research that 
expands the boundaries of future innovation and economic 
growth, with unknown long-term effects56. Such pioneering 
basic research as the investigations into the Higgs Boson, 
jellyfish Green Fluorescent Protein, and mammalian gene 
targeting (the latter two generated new tools that now 
underpin modern biomedical research), each of which 
recently resulted in a Nobel Prize, might not have been 
funded in today’s short-termist, risk-intolerant innovation 
system57, where “results” are often measured in a narrow 
way such as counting the number of patents or papers. 
CASE STUDY 
THE HIGH VALUE MANUFACTURING CATAPULT
�
Dick Elsy (Chief Executive, High Value Manufacturing Catapult) 
The High Value Manufacturing Catapult (HVMC), the first “catapult” centre to be opened, just three years ago, helps commercialise innovative 
manufacturing ideas. It combines seven centres of 
industrial innovation across Britain, bringing together 
the following capabilities: 
• Provides companies with access to 
world-class facilities and skills to help scale 
up and prove high-value manufacturing 
processes; 
• Develops a network of leading 
suppliers who contribute to key UK 
industry supply chains; 
• Brings industry, government and 
research together around a shared goal 
to make the UK an attractive place to 
invest in manufacturing. 
The Catapult’s financial model works on the basis of 
shared risk, with funding coming from three sources: 
1. Government core funding; 
2. Industry funding; 
3. Competitively won collaborative Research and 
Development (e.g. Horizon 2020 projects). 
Government funding helps to give industry confidence 
to take the kind of technological risks from which it 
would normally shy away. Industry can access publicly-
funded manufacturing equipment and skills and has 
greater freedom to experiment, develop these radical 
concepts and learn from experience. 
The uptake of the HVMC has exceeded expectations 
and all of the commercial targets agreed at the outset 
have been surpassed. Industry funding has reached 45% 
with collaborative R&D at 30% and government core 
funding representing 25% of the total.The 
Catapult is now examining ways to secure this 
funding sustainably. 
In the past 12 months the HVMC has 
attracted: 
• 1515 private sector clients; 
• 1012 projects; 
• 1500+ SME engagements; 
• £224m total income; 
• £60m of innovation income accessed by 
SMEs; 
• £180m order book with >50% competitively won 
collaborative R&D; 
• 1250+ staff. 
As social scientists, we are interested in why institutions 
such as this are successful at fostering innovation, 
as this can help with future institutional design.The 
reasons behind the HVMC’s apparent success are likely 
to include the following: it enables risks to be shared 
between different organizations; it reduces some of 
those risks; and it provides a place where specialised 
and complementary skills can come together and grow. 
(iii) Individuals and behaviour 
Psychological factors shape the decisions people make about 
innovation, across all institutions — both public and private 
— and across all levels, from teachers, to scientists and 
engineers, to their managers, and to policymakers. 
Individuals tend to be loss averse58, and this may 
contribute to reduced innovation. When business is 
going smoothly, firms tend to neglect the uncertainties of 
innovation and favour the sure-thing of business-as-usual. 
The need to innovate becomes more salient once outcomes 
have begun deteriorating, by which point it can be difficult 
to innovate rapidly enough. Blackberry’s failure to maintain 
market share is one widely cited example of innovation 
neglect59. 
Governments may also neglect innovation until crises 
arise, leading to wildly fluctuating — and therefore 
highly inefficient — patterns of investment. This was 
seen, for example, with the rise in public investment in 
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energy R&D by oil importing nations following oil price 
shocks in the 1970s.  As oil prices fell through the late 1980s, 
interest in energy innovation subsided. By 2000, public 
spending on energy R&D had declined to 5-10% of its 1980s 
peak as a share of GDP60. Because innovation investments 
can take decades to deliver, and require continuity over 
time so knowledge and expertise can accumulate, a steady 
commitment to innovation is likely to produce substantially 
better outcomes per dollar. 
Monetary rewards — a type of external incentive 
— may displace other motivations and norms in the 
innovation chain. Internal motivations, like the desire 
for knowledge and discovery, play a large role in some 
parts of the innovation chain. These intrinsic or internal 
motivations can be “crowded out” by the imposition of 
external incentives61. External incentives may be particularly 
poorly suited to creative endeavours like scientific research. 
In particular, they can displace the “soft” institutions that 
drive basic research — the bedrock of trust and institutional 
norms, such as academic freedom, openness and knowledge-
sharing — with a more opportunistic culture62. This may 
explain why institutional incentive structures affect basic 
research outcomes, as discussed in the previous section. 
Better understanding of psychology and behaviour 
can itself lead to valuable institutional innovations. 
Individual choices — including critically important choices 
around savings, insurance, healthcare and education — 
can be powerfully shaped by seemingly non-rational 
psychological factors, with often immense welfare 
implications63. Behavioural economists (like those in the UK’s 
Behavioural Insights Team) use psychological research to 
design simple and low-cost interventions to spur sometimes 
dramatic changes in behaviour, which can provide rich and 
important examples of innovation:
• making organ donor programs opt-out instead of opt-in 
(which should have no effect in the standard economic 
view)64; 
• changing the wording on tax payment forms to prime 
social norms65; or 
• regulating the possible structures of credit card and 
banking fees in order to prevent predatory practices66. 
One of the most important insights concerns the value 
of experimental policy design, where randomized control 
trials are used to identify the most effective approaches67. 
Given the importance of incentives, social norms, and 
other complex behavioural factors for innovation decisions, 
innovation policymaking should become behaviourally 
literate. 
(iv) Governments
Governments have a critical and multifaceted role 
to play in innovation, especially at the medium and 
macro scale. Among other things, there is a strong case 
for governments to: shape the formation of human capital 
through education and training68; carry out and finance 
basic research in universities and research centres; support 
institutions to link universities and research institutes with 
industry; uphold an efficient, effective and appropriately 
constrained intellectual property regime69; and provide 
targeted support for innovative activity, both its supply (e.g. 
grants and loans for demonstration and deployment of new 
technologies) and demand (public procurement, fiscal policy, 
regulations/standards, fostering new social norms/values)70.
However, governments are ill suited to intervening 
in the micro-details of innovation processes, and 
should avoid being excessively prescriptive. For 
example, specifying outcomes that researchers are to 
achieve is usually inappropriate given the impossibility of 
predicting them. Similarly, constraining researchers within 
rigid timeframes, or within incentive systems that demand 
“breakthrough” outcomes or commercialization, is likely 
to impair researcher creativity. Once the innovation 
infrastructure has been provided, and, broad national 
priorities set, innovators should be allowed substantial 
leeway to pursue the questions they believe to be important 
in the ways they see fit71.
Governments have an especially important role 
to play in carrying out and financing basic research 
and development. Due to the public goods aspects of 
basic research, and governments’ high capacity to tolerate 
uncertainty and delayed returns on investment, governments 
are uniquely suited to carrying out (e.g. through government 
research institutes) and financing (e.g. in universities) basic 
research. In the UK, the foremost funders of basic research 
are the seven Research Councils, which draw around £4.5 
billion, or approximately 0.2% of annual GDP, in annual 
government funding. The rate of social return to R&D is 
extremely challenging to calculate, but importantly, research 
typically finds extremely high rates across a variety of 
industries—e.g. from 35-100% is typical72. This suggests there 
is considerable scope to increase basic research spending 
and reap large rewards. 
Government funding of innovation can usefully 
extend beyond “letting a thousand flowers bloom”, and 
governments have actively shaped the development of 
many of today’s most important technologies. In many 
areas it is sensible for governments to focus on facilitating 
innovation by others. This includes looking to foster 
outcomes rather than details of methods or technologies 
and avoiding “picking winners” in the form of specific firms 
and sectors as much as possible, and taking care to avoid 
government failure. Yet sometimes it is impossible to avoid 
making judgements about innovation support priorities 
(e.g. in areas of national priority where the private sector 
Psychological factors 
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is unwilling or unable to undertake the capital expenditures 
and bear the uncertainties and risks). For example, research 
at large-scale physics experiments, such as the Large Hadron 
Collider at CERN73 or developing nuclear fusion, cannot be 
achieved without some involvement and focus on particular 
technologies or methodologies. There are, moreover, 
numerous cases in which state institutions have proactively 
engaged and inspired scientists and engineers to envision 
and invent some of the most important breakthrough 
technologies of the last half-century74. For example, the 
US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
played a vital role in organising and funding the development 
of computers, electronics and the internet in the 1960s 
and 1970s75. The US Government is currently playing a 
similar role — financing and coordinating a group of leading 
innovators — in the development of nanotechnology76. 
State institutions and policies can provide the patient,
long-term finance needed for the demonstration and 
early commercialization stages of innovation. New 
technologies typically face funding gaps as they proceed 
from development to demonstration and commercialization, 
including early-stage deployment, when production costs 
are high, private returns are difficult to appropriate and 
commercial finance is difficult to obtain. State institutions 
and policies can help to overcome this gap by providing 
long-term, ‘patient’ capital. One area where this is especially 
important is in clean energy technology, largely because 
demonstration and commercialization is so capital-intensive. 
As we mentioned previously, state development banks 
can operate in sectors or themes that still have private 
sector barriers. For example, the China Development Bank, 
German KfW and Brazilian Development Bank (BDNES) 
are leading state financiers of clean technology firms77, and 
the UK Green Investment Bank was recently established 
to play such a role in the UK78. The Catapult Centre 
example discussed earlier (see Box 1) provides a different 
model for government financing in the demonstration/
commercialization stage.
Government policies and regulations influence 
the direction and volume of demand for innovative 
products and services. Governments can grow (and 
hinder) market demand for innovations by using regulation, 
taxes and other policies. Regulation constrains the 
choices that producers and consumers can make. Market 
instruments, such as taxation, tradable permits or market-
based subsidies, change the price of certain activities/
products and therefore change the quantity demanded. 
Both types of policy instruments provide strong incentives 
for firms to innovate. For example, regulated standards 
for phasing out lead in petrol spurred the development 
of unleaded petrol79. Meanwhile, market incentives for the 
supply of clean energy in the form of purchase guarantees 
and premium payments (e.g. feed-in-tariff schemes) have 
proved effective at increasing demand for renewable energy 
infrastructure in countries such as Germany and Denmark 
(especially solar PV and wind), fuelling innovation and rapid 
cost reductions through incremental innovation (learning-
by-doing), economies of scale and industry competition80. 
 
Finally, governments can also shape many markets through 
their own procurement policies and practices (e.g. for 
computer hardware and software, and sustainable buildings 
and appliances), since they are themselves large consumers.
Governments can also innovate in the provision 
of public services and the design of government 
institutions and policies. Governments are important 
providers of public services that can be improved through 
innovation.  An example is the development of a highly 
cost-effective Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in Bogota, 
Colombia and needed government action on the use of 
road space to do this81. Following Bogota’s success, BRT 
systems were introduced in a number of other Latin 
American countries and have since spread to more than 
160 cities around the world, with the aid of the C40 Cities 
Climate Leadership Group – itself a good example of (city) 
government-led institutional innovation82. 
Government (in)action can introduce policy risk that 
hampers desirable innovative activity. Badly designed 
or implemented government policy can discourage private 
innovation by raising the policy risk associated with 
investment. For example, making frequent changes to funding 
mechanisms for clean technologies undermines investment 
in this important field of innovation (especially when the 
changes have a retrospective effect, as with the changes 
to Spain’s feed-in-tariff scheme)83. Public institutions can 
play an important role in mitigating policy risk in particular 
fields. For example, the UK’s National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) provides national standards 
and guidance in healthcare, bringing transparent criteria and 
analysis, stability and consistency to national health policy.
On the other hand, antiquated regulations, and 
unreasonable regulatory inertia, can hold back the diffusion 
of innovative products and business models.  An example of 
the latter concerns regulations associated with vehicles in 
many parts of the world, which have been slow to adapt to 
new business models associated with the sharing economy 
(e.g. taxi and parking regulations inappropriate for car-
sharing services) and to battery-powered vehicles (e.g. 
zoning regulations hampering the growth of battery charging 
and switching infrastructure, or making it difficult to connect 
electric vehicles to the energy network in the first place; 
and energy pricing structures ill-suited to encouraging the 
benefits of electric battery storage of electric vehicles)84.
Governments can influence the utilization of 
innovations, and thereby respond to the risks posed 
by innovations themselves. Not all innovations produce 
social value85. To take a recent example, the financial 
derivatives associated with sub-prime mortgages in the US 
housing market were certainly an innovation. But these 
took concentrated risks and made them systemic, triggering 
the Global Financial Crisis. Many other innovations 
pose significant risks to security, human health and the 
environment. Government therefore has a role to play in 
regulating the utilisation of innovation.
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Innovation touches on all economies, all sectors and all 
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institutions. It should be interpreted broadly as new ways of 
providing and creating services and products, as well as new 
services and products themselves. It is likely to continue 
to be the single most important source of economic 
growth for the UK, and a central focus of any discussions 
of our comparative advantage. Innovation in services — 
which account for nearly four-fifths of the UK economy 
and are experiencing high growth in productivity — will 
be particularly important to the UK’s future economic 
prosperity. These facts should be reflected in government 
thinking — and ambition — for policies intended to foster 
innovation. 
Innovation policy is difficult to get right. Human 
rationality is bounded and innovation, along with the factors 
determining it, can be complex: Knightian uncertainty is 
ubiquitous, time horizons may be long, and the evidence 
about what works can be difficult to interpret86. Learning 
from past experience in order to improve the innovation 
system is difficult, and efforts to influence the system carry 
their own risks.  We should, therefore, be sceptical about 
simplistic approaches, and take a broad view of process, 
products and sectors.   We should not insist on one theory 
of innovation, or disproportionately favour one kind of 
innovation (breakthrough vs. incremental), one phase of the 
CASE STUDY
L’AQUILA 
Chris Whitty (Chief Scientific Adviser, Department 
for International Development) and Marcus Besley 
(Government Office for Science)
In the early hours of 6 April 2009, an earthquake devastated the medieval city of L’Aquila in central Italy. L’Aquila’s residents were used to living in an 
earthquake zone, and to taking precautions such as 
sleeping in the car during periods of seismic activity. Yet 
this time 309 people were killed.
Six days earlier, a meeting of earthquake experts had 
been held in L’Aquila. In the margins, the deputy head of 
Italy’s civil protection department was filmed saying that 
the situation was favourable, and agreeing that everyone 
should “go and have a glass of wine”. He and six scientists 
were later prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter, on 
the claim that 29 of the deaths were a direct result of 
them underestimating and inappropriately communicating 
the risks of a major earthquake.  All seven were convicted 
and sentenced to long prison terms, although the six 
scientists have recently had their convictions overturned.
Those verdicts raised potentially serious questions 
for scientific advice in other countries. In the UK, 
government relies on having the best science to hand, 
including in emergency situations. This happens through 
multiple mechanisms: many scientists are employed as 
civil servants or serve on advisory committees, but 
external scientists also lend their expertise less formally, 
as good citizens. 
As a consequence of the trial, the Government Chief 
Scientific Adviser asked a group of departmental Chief 
Scientific Advisers to look into the implications of the 
L’Aquila case for the UK. This resulted in specially-
commissioned advice from government lawyers, an 
independent barrister, and an expert in Scottish law. The 
advice is due to be published towards the end of 2014 on 
the GOV.UK website. It summarises the current position 
in UK law, and covers all scientists providing advice to the 
government, whether or not they are actually employed 
by government.  
The lawyers considered the various legal routes, both 
civil and criminal, by which an allegation of negligence 
in scientific advice could be pursued.  Assuming that the 
contested advice was given professionally, honestly, and 
in good faith, they concluded that there are multiple legal 
tests and high bars for any such action to succeed against 
an individual scientist in the UK, and that the courts are 
alive to the need not to stifle or discourage valuable 
research. 
For example, the infamous weather forecast before the 
Great Storm of 1987, in which the public were told not 
to worry about reports of a hurricane, did not lead to a 
L’Aquila-style case. It would be hard to argue that such a 
situation should do so.
This should provide reassurance against the scenario 
of scientists around the country being hit with a flood 
of legal claims, either civil or criminal. Nonetheless, the 
lawyers noted that in a case of grossly negligent scientific 
advice, prosecution for manslaughter (culpable homicide 
in Scotland) is theoretically possible. It is important that 
scientists communicate risk well, saying enough to be 
helpful while avoiding blanket statements that may come 
back to haunt them. 
There has yet to be a test case analogous to L’Aquila 
in the UK. But there is a need both to encourage 
appropriate professional standards, and to protect 
scientific advisers who make a sensible best estimate 
that may later turn out to be wrong. The government 
community of Chief Scientific Advisers is continuing to 
develop and share good practice in this area.
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innovation process, or one sector or set of activities.  And 
we should be wary of imposing perspectives or policies that 
may skew innovation priorities in undesirable ways. 
Yet, there are data to be studied, rich lessons to be 
learned, and more benefits to realize. Nevertheless, policy 
has to be made and the evidence we have tried to assemble 
is, we would argue, helpful and valuable. This chapter has 
sought to capture some of the most important evidence 
from economics and other social sciences. Understanding 
what has made innovation work or fail can play a valuable 
role in influencing what can make it work in the future.
Drawing together the conclusions of this chapter, we 
identify four pillars or foundations of a first-class ‘innovation 
infrastructure’: 
1. The first pillar is a high-quality, merit-based system
of education and training. Its importance is difficult to 
overstate. The UK possesses some advantages in top-
tier institutions, but there is increasing competitiveness 
in universities worldwide, and these advantages require 
constant investment to be maintained. Further, the UK 
faces a serious risk of falling behind rising stars like South 
Korea in crucial population-wide competencies. Too many 
children experience low-quality schooling, which presents 
large economic costs for the long-term. On the national 
budget, education should be viewed not as an expenditure 
but as one of the highest-return investments available. 
2. The second pillar is substantial investment in basic 
research. Governments are able to manage levels of 
risk and time horizons on investment, which the private 
sector may find more difficult. This gives governments a 
special and indispensable role in supporting basic research. 
The UK government should take great care to ensure 
that its comparative advantage in basic research is not 
overwhelmed or weakened by understandable enthusiasm 
for commercialization in universities. By increasing its 
support for basic research, the UK government can 
expand the horizon of future growth. 
3. The third pillar is the system of government-
managed incentives that promote innovation via 
markets and entrepreneurship. First is an efficient 
and effective, and appropriately constrained, system of 
intellectual property rights. The system is due for an 
evaluation, with sensitivity to industry-specific needs. 
Secondary institutions include: systems and incentives 
for technology transfer that promote the diffusion of 
knowledge; policies to assist small firms to access licensing 
patents; regimes of taxes, subsidies and regulations that do 
not arbitrarily discriminate in fostering new firms and new 
ideas; and state development banks to provide patient, 
long-term capital to innovators. The details matter, and we 
have tried to indicate how they should be examined.
4. The fourth pillar is the setting of, and investing 
in, national innovation priorities. One clear priority 
is resource management: increasing the productivity of 
energy, land and other natural resources, and minimising 
greenhouse gas emissions. The design of cities, as drivers 
of resource consumption as well as creativity and 
 
economic growth, is especially important. These are areas 
where markets and prices alone are unlikely to capture 
the interdependence and public nature of many of the key 
services and outcomes. They are also areas where benefits 
are likely to be fairly long-term. Other priorities should be 
determined through assessment of strategic advantages, 
engagement with leading innovators, and the generation of 
aspirational technology roadmaps.
Finally, we identify four guidelines for the process of 
innovation policymaking: 
1. Take a long-term, systems view of innovation. 
This means avoiding narrow, compartmentalist views of 
policymaking that focus on just one sector and/or a short 
time horizon.  An effective policy mix will take account of 
each part of the innovation system; will take advantage of, 
and be wary of, feedback between system components; 
and will appreciate that actions today have critical long-
term implications. This type of approach will help lessen 
the scope for government failure that can arise from 
bureaucrats and politicians fiddling with processes they fail 
to understand. On the other hand, the potential market 
failures are so important, and the subject so vital for 
growth, competition and living standards, that government 
disengagement is not a sensible approach.
2. Consult widely. Innovators’ needs vary widely 
across industries and institutions, and across parts of 
the innovation chain. Innovators may also recognize 
the potential for unwanted impacts, or detect them 
in practice, before policymakers are able. Ensure that 
important voices which may not be sufficiently prominent, 
such as those of small firms, teachers and of research 
scientists, are given weight.
3. Adopt a learning approach to policy design and 
evaluation. This means trialling different approaches, and 
improving the collection of data on inputs, processes and 
outcomes as well as feedback from key actors.  A range 
of innovation policy problems could benefit from this 
approach, including the design of grant application rules 
for basic research, of the school system, and of institutions 
for fostering university-industry linkages.  Accompanying 
this should be a sustained investment in research on 
innovation itself. Such research is not easy given that the 
subject is about learning, covers many disciplines, and the 
outcomes may be uncertain and long term: but it is very 
important.
4. Ensure that innovation policies are transparent, 
consistent and stable over time and investment. 
Innovation will be more likely to proceed where actors 
are more confident rather than more confused, and 
where evaluations of sovereign and policy risk favour 
commitment rather than withdrawal.  Where future 
flexibility may be required, as is often the case for 
experimental policy, ensure that processes are specified 
in advance. Certainty is not on offer, but unnecessary 
uncertainty can be reduced.  A fundamental lesson is that 
government-induced policy risk can be a major deterrent 
to both innovation and investment.
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CHAPTER 2: FUTURE GLOBAL 
TRENDS IN INNOVATION 
Innovation and the associated flow of ideas, products, services and people 
are likely to continue to provide significant opportunities for progress — but 
these same trends are also likely to be associated with increasing systemic risk, 
complexity and uncertainty.
Ian Goldin (Director of the Oxford 
Martin School, and Professor of 
Globalisation and Development at the 
University of Oxford)
26
1. TRENDS IN INNOVATION AND GLOBALIZATION
Globalization and innovation are transforming the way we 
live. The pace of change and increasingly interconnected 
nature of our societies makes predictions even more 
hazardous than in the past. Future developments are unlikely 
to reflect a continuation of past trends. The only certainty 
about where the world is headed is that it will be full of 
surprises. Innovation in products, services and processes will 
yield extraordinary benefits for humanity, not least in the 
areas of health and medicine. Negative shocks are also likely, 
with the future characterized by increased systemic risk, 
and a higher likelihood of potentially destabilizing and even 
catastrophic events.
The integration of the global economy has been 
associated with increased access to ideas which allow for 
the transformation of both economic and social systems, 
as well as access to the products, goods and services which 
enable improvements in livelihoods. Recent decades have 
been associated with the most rapid decline in poverty in 
history and remarkable improvements in health outcomes 
for billions of people. 
 Not everyone is benefitting equally from these 
concurrent trends of innovation and globalization: 
globalization is uneven, and as many as 1.5 billion people 
have not accessed the improvements that globalized 
innovation affords1.  Within almost all societies, inequality 
in access and outcomes is growing, as those able to 
benefit from change accelerate ahead of those locked into 
increasingly outmoded systems.  A more interconnected, 
mobile and educated world yields many positive benefits. 
However, it also places a greater premium on remaining up 
to date and reinvesting in health, education, infrastructure 
and other determinants of economic and social outcomes. 
The more rapid the innovation, the greater is the 
requirement for investment and agility in order to stay 
abreast. For particular individuals or communities, such as 
the elderly, who do not have the necessary capabilities to 
remain current, the pace of change may provide a threat to 
at least their relative place in society.
In the first section of this chapter, we consider a number 
of the drivers of technological innovation and identify a 
sample of the major trends currently transforming the global 
landscape, including globalization, rising levels of education, 
and economic and demographic change.
As our world becomes increasingly interconnected and 
complex, new dangers also emerge: we become increasingly 
vulnerable to systemic risks. To reap the benefits of our 
interconnected and innovative world, we must address and 
mitigate these risks. This will be the subject of the second 
part of this chapter.
1.1  Technological change
Elderly people today have seen revolutionary technological 
change during their lifetime.  Yesterday’s science fiction is 
today’s reality. In 1980, we barely understood genes, now 
we can manipulate them. In 1990, a mobile phone was the 
size of a brick, now the nanotechnology industry is creating 
electronics that float on air and that you could not see 
without a microscope. Twenty years ago, there were fewer 
than 3 million people with internet access; now there are 
nearly 2.5 billion. Genetic modification can give rabbits an 
eerie green luminescence. Robots make cars. Guns can be 
manufactured with a 3-D printer.
Technology is a double-edged sword. It unleashes new 
potential and has been central to human progress. It can 
level the playing field, helping the emerging economies of the 
world to catch up more swiftly, and continues to lift more 
and more people out of poverty. However, technological 
change also can wreak havoc, as exemplified in the 
unchecked growth of derivatives, which Warren Buffet called 
‘weapons of mass destruction’ in the financial sector. 
Forecasting beyond the near future, however, is a foolish 
effort. Google was founded as recently as 1998, Facebook 
in 2004 and Twitter in 2006.  What new technologies will 
define our lives in 2030 or 2050?  We cannot be sure. But 
we can be reasonably confident that the future will be 
influenced by a number of current technological revolutions: 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, mobile networking, a faster 
and more accessible internet, 3-D printing, the spread of 
sensors, and machine learning. These will affect our daily 
lives, the operations of companies, and the prospects of 
global markets.
Gordon Moore’s 1965 forecast that computing power 
would double about every two years has proven true, and 
will likely continue to do so for the next several decades2. 
Although there are many questions regarding certain 
dimensions of the future of processing speed, not least 
with respect to heat generation and energy efficiency, 
the continued exponential growth in processing power is 
likely to continue to transform all our lives, and also has 
fundamental implications for our economies and society. 
A 2013 report by the McKinsey Global Institute estimated 
that technological improvements will increase productivity 
by as much as 25% and will generate a predicted $3.7 to 
$10.8 trillion for the world economy by 2025 (ref. 3) .  A 
number of recent technological advances already have had 
a global impact. The number of mobile phones worldwide 
exceeds the total population4. Indeed, more people have 
access to mobile phones than to working toilets, illustrating 
the depth and breadth of saturation in the mobile phone 
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market5. The African continent has twice as many mobile 
phones as the United States6. In some areas, such as mobile 
financial services, a number of African countries are global 
leaders, illustrating the potential of new technologies to 
disrupt older systems and leapfrog ahead of older fixed line 
phone systems or traditional banking services in rapidly 
growing emerging markets7.  As digital access increases, it 
is estimated that four billion people will be online by 2020, 
using up to 50 trillion gigabytes of data8. 
Meanwhile, improvements in artificial intelligence 
increasingly allow robotic processes to augment or replace 
tasks previously undertaken by people.  Apple, for example, 
is planning to install over a million robots in its China 
manufacturing plants to produce the iPhone9.  Artificial 
intelligence is permeating a growing range of jobs, and 
has significant implications for skilled as well as unskilled 
workers. In medicine, for example, the New York Memorial 
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center has used IBM’s Watson 
supercomputer to survey hundreds of thousands of medical 
reports and millions of patient records to improve its 
oncology care10.
Analysis suggests that automation may lead to as many 
as 47% of jobs being lost in the United States and a 
similar proportion in the United Kingdom as a result of 
computers replacing human capabilities11.  While this raises 
major concerns regarding employment, these and other 
technological changes are likely to be associated with 
increased productivity and new types of employment, as 
with previous technological revolutions.
If knowledge is power, digital sensors are poised to 
become the data providers of the twenty-first century. In 
electrical power systems, sensors that provide real time 
data to processing centers and automated control systems 
can reduce electricity usage and waste, improve supply 
efficiency, and isolate electrical failures, thereby minimizing 
the impact of blackouts. Smart grid technology was deployed 
recently in London, Houston, and Singapore to streamline 
traffic. Control routing centers effectively decreased average 
commuting times by 10-20%, enhancing productivity for 
workers. This technology is also being deployed to farming, 
with real time crop moisture readings ensuring that drip 
irrigation is able to maximize efficiency, a critical component 
in feeding a substantially growing population.
In addition to infrastructure improvements from smart 
grids and sensors, automated driving is becoming a reality. 
An automated Google car has already driven 300,000 
miles on American roads with no accidents. Driverless 
cars have multiple benefits. They free up the would-be 
driver to other tasks. This is a substantial improvement, 
given that the average American car commuter spends 750 
hours per year driving, while the average European car 
owner spends about 300 hours per year behind the wheel. 
Additionally, automation with sensors will allow cars to 
drive far closer together, reducing wind drag (allowing lower 
fuel consumption per mile traveled) while also diminishing 
congestion without the need for additional infrastructure. 
Finally, given that 1 million people die in traffic accidents per 
year — with 70-90% of those caused by avoidable human 
error — automation could also improve safety on the roads 
substantially.   
3-D printers are machines that print out physical objects 
rather than words on a page.  Using design blueprints, they 
print out a substance — currently most often a plastic 
—with layers upon layers that eventually form a tangible 
object. The scale of these items is no longer small.  A Dutch 
firm is currently in the process of creating an entire house 
from specialized 3-D printers. 3-D printing is also being used 
to produce a car, the Urbee 2.   
3-D technology is transforming a variety of processes in 
product design, development, and manufacturing. It rapidly is 
becoming easier for both established companies and start-
ups to produce prototypes for new items, reducing design 
costs and allowing better testing and design tweaking before 
products come to market. Moreover, products can easily 
become customizable to the specifications of individual 
consumers at low-cost. UPS, for example, is introducing 3-D 
printers to several of its stores in the United States, allowing 
consumers the option of creating their own objects easily. 
Technology is also emerging that gives scientists the 
ability to 3-D print living tissue, with printers emitting cells 
rather than ink. The possibilities of this nascent technology 
are wide-ranging; already, custom-made cartilage has been 
printed that might be used to repair damaged knees, and 
there is the possibility that eventually doctors will be able to 
3-D print customized organs. 
This technology, while impressive, also presents perilous 
new frontiers.  With production passed onto consumers 
easily, there is substantial opportunity for counterfeit 
products, lack of quality control, and safety issues. For 
example, a 3-D printed gun has already been produced and 
successfully fired. Piracy is also a major concern.
Nanotechnology refers to products and properties that 
exist and emerge at scales of less than 100 nanometers. For 
comparison, the average human hair is 100,000 nanometers 
wide. In nanotechnology, the basic building blocks are 
individual molecules and atoms.  The potential economic 
impact of this is far reaching.
Nanotechnology could be used to create disposable or 
digestible wireless devices, for example, with applications 
including the fabrication of digestible transmitters attached 
to tablets to monitor the use of prescription medicines. 
In health care, nanotechnology is being applied in a variety 
of ways. Researchers have developed ways to use gold 
nanoparticles as cancer “sniffers” that are not only able to 
detect cancer before visible symptoms or tumors exist, but 
also can pinpoint exactly which kind of cancer is present in 
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the body. Nanoparticles generated by IBM are able to kill 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, attaching to the bacteria and 
poking tiny holes in it — potentially a critical breakthrough 
in the fight against global disease.   
Recently discovered properties of absorption at the 
nano-scale also offer substantial applied value. The low-cost 
nanocarbon graphene can be used as a filter to remove 
salt from saltwater, sifting out the salt ions while letting 
the water molecules pass through.  This method could be 
used to desalinate seawater, and improve the prospects for 
recycling, a key to overcoming global water shortages in an 
era where already 780 million people do not have access to 
clean, safe drinking water.   
In addition to these technologies, there are new frontiers 
in nanotechnology that have not yet been realized 
but are both plausible and revolutionary. For example, 
Eric Drexler of the Oxford Martin School argues that 
molecular-level manufacturing could dramatically transform 
global production. The economic possibilities associated 
with nanotechnology are hard to calculate because the 
technology is advancing so rapidly. Nanotechnology may 
well have a revolutionary impact, ranging from cancer 
treatments to everyday use. However, as in so many other 
revolutionary areas of progress, the potential negative and 
harmful applications are inadequately understood, and these, 
together with the consequent regulatory implications, need 
urgent attention.
The human genome was successfully mapped and declared 
complete in 2003. The implications have been impressive. 
Scientists can now use genetic screening to determine 
whether an individual patient is prone to a wide range of 
genetic diseases. Such screening is becoming increasingly 
affordable  
Genetic material can also be used to treat patients. 
Gene therapy has already effectively cured patients with 
hemophilia, a debilitating blood disorder. The ability to 
manipulate the genetic code will open new frontiers in 
research and ethics. It will soon be technologically possible 
for parents to choose desirable traits using genetic screening 
in combination with in vitro fertilization. This is a particularly 
stark reminder that as we enter the Age of Mastery, we 
must tread carefully. Even when the economic incentives and 
technological breakthroughs allow advancement, they may 
be ill advised. In addition, as we highlight in our discussion 
on systemic risks, the potential abuse of these technologies 
to create new biological pathogens reminds us that all 
technologies are potentially dual use. 
As economic growth continues around the world, our 
energy needs are also expanding. New technologies are 
under development to make previously uneconomical 
resources fit for extraction, reduce the carbon emissions 
of current extraction methods, and enable renewable 
sources of energy. The combination of horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing makes it possible to reach oil and 
gas deposits that were known to exist in the United States 
and other places but that were not economically accessible 
by conventional drilling methods. Citi estimate that the 
cumulative impact of new production, reduced consumption 
and associated activity may increase real GDP in the United 
States by 2% to 3.3%, or $370-$624 billion (in 2005 $) 
respectively12. The growth in this energy source has spillover 
effects on the petrochemical industry, improving the viability 
of Gas to Liquid plants (GTL) currently under consideration. 
With large payoffs at stake there are further new types of 
reserves, including coalbed methane, tight sandstones, and 
methane clathrates that could potentially usher in another 
energy revolution.
Industrial processes will need to make technological 
changes in order to meet domestic and regional targets on 
carbon emissions reductions. The European Union aims to 
reduce carbon emissions by 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels. 
Each industry is called upon to develop techniques that will 
aid in achieving this target. The steel production industry is 
one of the industries that is likely to pilot and experiment 
with new carbon capture technology (CCS). The technical 
and economic feasibility of achieving these efficiency gains 
rests on incentives for further research and funding for 
these types of technologies.  Already it is clear that price 
incentives alone from the EU carbon-trading scheme will 
not be enough to prompt such investment.
Renewable energy presents a way for society to move 
from being driven by processes that strip the earth of its 
natural resources — which potentially creates political 
conflicts and pollutes the atmosphere — to a self-sufficient 
endless supply of energy. Such promise holds great 
economic benefits if it can be unlocked, but the cost of 
energy generation from these methods is still much higher 
than oil, coal and gas.  As a result, the development of the 
sector is highly dependent on subsidies and high carbon 
taxes on polluting sources of energy. Despite mixed global 
policies over renewables, the investment costs for solar 
photovoltaics and onshore wind have fallen rapidly. Beneath 
these gains lies an uncomfortable truth: the carbon intensity 
of the global energy supply has barely changed in 20 years, 
despite successful efforts in deploying renewable energy. 
Investment in this sector is likely to increase in order to 
facilitate the transition to a more sustainable future.
The rate of global change is accelerating, largely due 
to the breakneck pace of technological innovation. The 
economy will be transformed in many ways, from expanded 
existing technology, innovative new methods such as 3-D 
printing, and the no-longer-science-fiction frontiers of 
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nanotechnology and biotechnology. Developing economies 
— and their billions of people — will enter the digital age, 
lowering barriers to growth and unlocking an enormous 
amount of creative potential. Developed economies 
will continue to drive innovation and begin competing 
with developing economies to harness the fruits of that 
innovation. Companies and countries that are successfully 
able to invest in and harness emerging technologies will be 
better suited to thrive in this new era. 
Policy makers and societies need to prepare for the 
inventions that will emerge and disrupt the global economy. 
Not every invention will change the way society functions 
nor even work at all.Technological progress at times rises 
out of the ashes of dead-end research programs, useless 
inventions and failed commercial ventures. Many of our 
greatest inventions have come through partnerships 
between states and corporations.The American railroad 
network and the underlying infrastructure of the Internet 
were initially funded by federal initiatives. Investors and 
entrepreneurs joined these initiatives and have made 
them into what they are today, huge communication 
and transportation networks. In order to provide these 
for future generations, policymakers need to decide 
how to partner with business to invest in new forms of 
infrastructure and education. In particular, lawmakers and 
regulators are faced with a particularly difficult challenge of 
new moral dilemmas relating to the human condition and 
the protection of citizen’s rights in new domains, where 
technological progress is leaping ahead of our knowledge of 
its potential applications and consequences. 
1.2 A more global world is a more innovative world 
The contemporary period of economic integration was 
inaugurated with the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
From 1950 to 2007, global trade grew at an average pace 
of 6.2% per year13, and GATT’s successor organization, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), now has 159 country 
members.The 2012 accession of Russia brought all of the 
major global economies into the WTO fold. India, not usually 
thought of as a particularly strong proponent of open 
borders, reduced its peak tariffs on industrial products from 
over 200% in 1990 to less than 10% in 2009 (ref.14), and 
China has seen a similarly radical reduction in its restrictions 
on trade.The flows of products, services and people across 
borders have been further facilitated by regional agreements 
and groupings such as NAFTA,APEC and European Union’s 
Single Market Programme. 
Meanwhile, international agreements such as the 1989 
Montreal Protocol and the 2003 Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control have yielded significant results in 
mitigating ozone emissions and improving public health. 
International coalitions and partnerships have brought 
stakeholders together to find creative new solutions to 
major global problems15.The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, collates inter­
disciplinary research on climate change (see case study). 
The IPCC’s major ‘assessment’ reports are collaborative 
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projects and include researchers from across the scientific 
community as well as policymakers. In the sphere of public 
health, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations 
(GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis and 
Malaria bring together representatives from government 
ministries, donor organizations, civil society, the private 
sector, and the academic community. According to their 
own estimates, GAVI and the Global Fund have worked to 
prevent 5.5 million and 6.5 million deaths respectively since 
their inception16. 
Along with goods and ideas, people are becoming 
increasingly mobile both within and across countries, 
creating networks of collaboration and ‘brain circulation’. 
International migration increased 42% in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century17, and by 2010 well over 200 million 
people resided outside of their country of origin18. People 
are moving within countries as well, notably from rural to 
urban areas. 2008 marked the first year that the number 
of urban dwellers surpassed the number of people living in 
rural areas worldwide19. 
A mobile population leads to increases in productivity, 
wealth and innovation. Because of their heightened 
mobility, migrants help to stabilize economies through 
their willingness to move in response to labour market 
fluctuations20. Moreover, flows of people facilitate innovation 
by connecting people with opportunities. Evidence from 
OECD countries suggests a strong connection between 
migration and GDP growth and total employment in 
recipient countries21. In the United States, United Kingdom 
and the European Union, up to a third of economic growth 
has been attributed to migration by some22. In addition 
to filling jobs in low-wage sectors, migrants are a key 
component of innovation in research and technology 
sphere. In the United States, migrants are only 12% of 
the population, but they file more than 40% of patent 
applications annually every year23. Evidence from the US also 
suggests that a higher concentration of migrant employees in 
a particular sector correlate with increased patent filings by 
natives24. It is not surprising, then, that high concentrations 
of migrants can be found in the most dynamic US industries. 
1.3 Education and growth 
The future prospects for continued innovation also look 
positive in the context of the improvements in quality and 
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access to education that are occurring worldwide. 
The number of children not attending school has dropped 
from 108 million to approximately 60 million over the past 
two decades25. Globally, 91% of primary-school-age students 
and 62.5% of secondary-school-age students were enrolled 
in school in 2010 (ref.26). Global tertiary enrolment has 
also risen, from 19% in 2000 to 29% in 2010 (178 million 
students worldwide). Though the percentage of students 
enrolled in tertiary education continues to vary significantly 
between countries and regions27, it is predicted that global 
enrolment in higher education will increase by almost 
50% to 262 million students by 2025, driven primarily by 
increases in educational attainment in China and India28. 
Students are not only attaining higher levels of education, 
but they are also moving to access this education. The 
number of university students studying abroad doubled 
during the first decade of this century and stood at almost 
4.3 million in 2013 (ref.29).  With new innovations like 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) altering the 
educational landscape, growing numbers of people around 
the world will have access to the best academic institutions.
 With these increases across all levels of educational 
attainment, growing numbers of young people will develop 
the foundational, technical and transferable skills that can 
make the global population more flexible, adaptable and 
innovative.
CASE STUDY
COMMUNICATING THE RISK OF CLIMATE CHANGE
James Lyons (University of Exeter)
Environmental scientists have long acknowledged that global climate change is a “highly complex and global elusive hazard”, characterized by 
“system lags and lack of immediacy”1, which makes it 
particularly difficult to convey to lay people. Investigating 
public perceptions of climate change, Thomas Lowe and 
colleagues found that this challenge is compounded 
by the fact that “people feel overwhelmed by shocking 
images and, although it heightens their concern, it also 
reduces their self-efficacy to take action and lessen 
these events through personal action”2.
Gill Ereaut and Nat Segnit have coined the term 
‘climate porn’ to describe the counterproductive 
impact of unintentionally thrilling images of sensational 
environmental disaster3. If, as Susanne C. Moser and Lisa 
Dilling propose1, “the goal of effective 
risk communication is precisely to 
support proper adaptive behavior”, 
then it seems particularly important 
to use strategies cognizant of the 
role played by images and visual 
metaphors in the understanding of 
climate change risk.
An instructive instance of a high-
profile communication campaign 
around climate change is the 
award-winning documentary An 
Inconvenient Truth, presented 
by former US Vice President 
Al Gore. Its approach to risk communication is highly 
visual, employing numerous graphics, graphs, video 
clips and charts as part of the slideshow that forms 
the backbone of the film. But just as important to its 
approach is the way that it utilizes what psychologists 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have termed the 
“availability heuristic” in employing imaginatively vivid 
and personalized examples of everyday risk arising 
from Gore’s family life, from automobile accidents to 
smoking-related lung cancer4. In the face of an issue 
that can seem remote and abstract, this emphasis on 
visually compelling everyday 
risk seeks to recalibrate 
the audience’s own risk 
perception, embodying 
what Paul Slovic, in his 
work on the affective 
dimensions of risk 
perception, terms the 
“feeling of risk” — making 
the issue personally and palpably graspable5. 
By creating powerful visual metaphors that 
help to bring the issue within the ambit of the 
everyday, the film is able to sidestep paralyzing 
alarmism and abstruse complexity, concentrating 
ultimately on modeling what it means to be 
an informed citizen capable of exercising 
individual agency in relation to an array of 
contemporary risks6. 
1.4 Addressing demographics through innovation
Our demographic future is remarkably uncertain. The UN 
population forecasts for 2050 range from a high of around 
11 billion people to a low of less than 9 billion. Nevertheless,
one thing is clear: the global population is becoming 
dramatically older.  Changing demographics alter the global 
economy and will have a powerful influence over markets 
and investment opportunities. 
The combination of rising demands on state and private 
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pensions, a surge in health care costs, and a smaller 
labour force to pay for these needs creates what may 
be called “a perfect storm” of demographic change.  The 
impact of the storm will be uneven. It will hit some places 
hard while missing others completely, before returning 
with a vengeance in decades to come. Everywhere, the 
demographic storm can be weathered, even harnessed 
by businesses and governments alike with the right 
preparations and policy adjustments. Governments and 
investors ignore demographic trends at their own peril.  
While demography is not destiny, demographic transitions 
offer tremendous opportunities for shrewd planners in 
business and government.
While globalization links us all together, the advanced 
economies of the world are becoming the silver economies 
as birth rates plummet, Baby Boomers mature, and people 
live longer. There were 200 million people over the age of 
60 in 1950. Today, that number has grown to nearly 800 
million. By 2050, it is projected to stand at 2 billion.  Age 
pyramids are becoming age funnels, and they are siphoning 
off economic power from the dominant economies of the 
late twentieth century.  
In emerging markets, the storyline is inverted.  Many 
countries are just cracking open the ‘demographic window’, 
a period when a solid base of labour will support a much 
smaller population of dependents. This window is projected 
to remain open until 2020 in China, 2025 in Brazil, 2030 
in Turkey, 2035 in Indonesia, 2040 in Malaysia, and 2045 in 
India30.  When the window is open, the country is primed for 
growth — though it will take more than good demographics 
to ignite this engine of growth.  
Like all of these trends, new opportunities exist side-by-
side with new challenges. If ageing, advanced economies do 
not adapt to face demographic realities, they will stagnate. 
Pension structures must be reformed, health care costs need 
to be reigned in, retirement ages need to be extended, and 
workplaces will need to find innovate ways to keep their 
employees working productively for longer. Finally, advanced 
economies that are open to migration to plug labour gaps 
will be better equipped to thrive in the twenty-first century 
than those that are closed off and exclude new workers.  As 
a result of the lagged effects of demographic change, we can 
be reasonably certain about the contours of demographic 
shifts; what we do not know is how well the new silver 
economies will adapt or how well the young emerging 
markets will harness their demographic potential.
With a dearth of people, the economic impact of the 
demographic problems facing developed nations can be 
partially mitigated through innovation and the creation of 
new labour-saving technologies to promote productivity 
growth. BMW, for example, has developed robotic 
technology adapted to older workers to compensate for 
their diminished strength relative to younger workers31.  
1.5 Economic Prospects
It is projected that the world will see steady economic 
growth of 3–4% until 2050 on the global scale. However, 
this growth will not be evenly distributed and will be 
concentrated in the developing economies. China and India 
are the obvious examples, and are set to become the first 
and third largest economies in the world over the next 
three decades. Some predict that by 2020, the Emerging 7 
(China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) 
will have acquired a greater share of the world’s GDP than 
the current G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United 
Kingdom and the United States)32.  As these economies 
grow, they will transition from export to consumer markets. 
Expectations of growth in the advanced economies, 
particularly in Europe, should be modest at best.
There are a few safe bets and a few wild cards in the 
economic game of the twenty-first century. The safe 
bet is that low- and middle-income countries will drive 
global growth, while unfavorable demographics and 
macroeconomic weaknesses drag down the prospects of 
the major developed economies. Everything else is less 
certain. Even though developing countries are primed for 
a major economic expansion, countries that create the 
necessary institutional infrastructure for growth will be 
far more successful than those that do not implement 
overdue reforms. Likewise, while Europe, the United States, 
and particularly Japan will find themselves facing daunting 
demographic hurdles, the advanced economies could use 
innovation and more liberal migration policy to dampen 
the impending economic slowdown.  Among the major 
wildcards are uncertainties regarding which emerging 
markets will put in place the right policies to take advantage 
of favorable demographics and create a market ripe for 
investment, and which advanced economies will be savvy 
enough to overcome the inevitable barriers to robust 
growth. Either way, the overall picture is certain: growth will 
happen much more in the developing world, and firms and 
investors operating in developed economies would be wise 
Many countries are 
just cracking open 
the ‘demographic 
window’.
Global enrolment 
in higher education 
will increase by 
almost 50%.
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to seek opportunities for more substantial returns in newly 
emerging markets, the powerhouses of the twenty-first 
century economy.
2. Systemic risk
A more globalized and networked world has many benefits, 
particularly for the prospect of information sharing and 
innovation. However, complexity is also positively correlated 
with uncertainty and risk, and increased complexity can 
heighten vulnerability within global systems. Increasingly 
complex global networks diminish individuals’ and 
governments’ abilities to accurately predict the intended and 
unintended outcomes of their decisions33.
Geographic concentration has resulted in efficiency 
gains, but has also made the global system less resilient to 
single shock events. Urbanization and increasing population 
density in metropolitan regions facilitates the transmission 
of diseases, while concentration of capital and production in 
a few geographic regions creates the possibility of massive 
market disruptions. 
Systemic risk can be understood as the potential for 
holistic systemic break down, as opposed to a more partial 
breakdown of individual system components. This complete 
collapse occurs when an adverse systemic shock cannot be 
CASE STUDY
RISK AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
A NEW APPROACH TO GOVERNING GM CROPS
Philip Macnaghten (Durham University/University of Campinas) and Susana Carro-Ripalda (Durham University)
The key objectives of the GCSA’s report  are to raise awareness of risk and innovation concepts, to share issues of common concern 
and interest, and to promote learning across borders. 
A parallel set of objectives informed a recent Durham 
University project, GMFuturos1, which was funded by 
the John Templeton Foundation. The project set out 
to use novel risk and innovation concepts to 
examine the adequacy of current models of risk 
and regulation of genetically modified (GM) 
crops, and to propose alternatives. 
Given that existing governance mechanisms 
of GM organisms (GMOs) have suffered 
polarization and controversy in Europe, 
and increasingly also in North, Central 
and South America, there is an 
evident need to encompass broader 
factors and concerns within science-
informed processes.  An influential 
2009 Royal Society working group 
concluded that global food security 
requires the sustainable intensification 
of global agriculture, with new crop-
production methods, including GM and 
other innovations2.  Although the rise of 
GM crops has been dramatic, their uptake 
has not been the smooth nor universal 
transition predicted by its advocates. Even 
those countries where approvals have been 
impressively rapid have seen significant controversy. 
All too often the regulation of GM crops has been 
challenged as inadequate, even biased — and in some 
settings, such as India and Mexico, the planting of 
certain crops has been judicially suspended. Our strategic 
question was to examine why GM crops have not been 
universally accepted as a public good. If we do not address 
this, we will fail to understand the conditions under which 
GM crops may contribute to global food security in an 
inclusive manner that meets human needs.
Current approaches to the regulation and governance 
of GM crops have been dominated by risk-based 
assessment methodologies. The assumption has 
been that the key criterion mediating the release 
of GMOs into the environment should be an 
independent case-by-case risk assessment of their 
impacts on human health and the environment. 
One consequence is that the public debate 
surrounding GM crops has been boiled down to 
one of safety: are they safe to eat, and are 
they safe to the environment? 
In relation to these questions, we remain 
agnostic. Our argument is that we need, in 
addition, to ask different questions — for if 
we are to govern GM crops in a socially and 
scientifically robust fashion, we need to engage 
with the issue within the terms of the debate as 
it is considered by an inclusive array of actors. 
The fieldwork for GMFuturos was undertaken 
in three of the global ‘rising powers’, namely 
Mexico, Brazil and India, and involved ethnographic, 
interview and focus group research with farmers, 
scientists and publics3, 4. In Mexico, we found that 
maize is highly culturally resonant, and that protests 
against GM maize have come to signify the defence of 
Mexican culture and identity in the face of an unwanted 
form of imposed neoliberal globalization. In Brazil, we 
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contained.The depth of our interconnectedness means that 
a number of today’s global systems have opened themselves 
up to new systemic risks34. 
The 2008–09 financial crisis provided an illustrative 
example of how systemic risk can create a global crisis when
a system encounters a shock. A complex set of factors, 
including excessive leveraging and the securitization of 
financial products, directly led to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. However, it was the transnational networks 
created by interbank markets, which caused the collapse 
of Lehman to reverberate across the world.The high 
concentration of market capital in several nodes — the 
found that even though the coverage of GM crops had 
risen rapidly since 2005 (mostly GM soya and maize), 
the issue was far from settled, with little evidence of 
public acceptability or inclusive governance. In India, 
we found that GM cotton had become a provocative 
symbol of foreign control and imposition, where 
regulatory bodies have been routinely criticized for 
using inadequate procedures for the approval of GM 
crops. Across all three case studies, we found that the 
technical regulatory bodies charged with approving 
the release of GMOs have not provided ‘authoritative 
governance’5; that the predominant research cultures in 
national biotechnology laboratories have little capacity 
to respond to wider societal responsibilities; and that 
lay people across the board have tended to adopt 
negative views when introduced to the technology and 
its application. 
Overall, we found that key factors responsible for 
the controversy over GM crops are social, cultural 
and institutional in nature, and transcend questions of 
technical risk.Yet in relation to these ‘non-risk’ factors, 
current policy arrangements have little capacity to 
respond, with few rules or norms to offer guidance. 
Such considerations thus tend to become hidden from 
public accountability and influence. Responding to 
this ‘institutional void’6, we proposed a novel way to 
govern GM crops that was informed by recent debates 
on responsible innovation7: that if we are to innovate 
responsibly and robustly, we need new institutional 
capacities to better anticipate the wider driving forces 
as well as impacts of emerging technologies; to open 
up an inclusive debate with stakeholders and wider 
publics; to develop more reflexive scientific cultures; 
and to develop new governance architectures that are 
responsive to these processes. 
The responsible innovation framework has been 
pioneered in UK research8 and is being implemented 
by UK research councils9. It offers the potential to 
reconfigure the debate on the governance of GM foods 
and crops in the UK, in Europe and internationally, 
and hopefully to help move the debate away from its 
current polemic and impasse. 
‘too big to fail’ banks — amplified this cascading effect.Thus, 
when the subprime market collapsed, transnational chains of 
counterparty risk spread the instability of this single market 
to the broader financial system, resulting in over $4 trillion 
in losses around the globe35. 
But while the financial crisis is an oft-cited example of 
the risk of complexity and interconnectivity, the financial 
sector is only one of the global systems that are vulnerable 
to systemic risk. Physical and virtual infrastructure 
provides another example of the dangers inherent in 
an increasingly connected world.The organization of 
infrastructure around several highly connected nodes has 
created points of potential systemic instability. Moreover, 
the indispensability of infrastructure for communication 
and market exchange make this risk particularly significant. 
Just as the financial sector found itself centered around a 
few banks, global infrastructure is organized around a few 
network hubs (such as Chicago’s O’Hare International 
Airport, London’s Heathrow airports, and the Suez Canal), 
which have accumulated a high concentration of global 
traffic. Disruptions at any one of these major hubs can cause 
severe disruptions. 
When Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted in 2010, 
for example, it caused several of the largest global airports 
to shut down, thereby leading to the greatest disruption in 
global traffic since the Second World War36. Resulting in an 
estimated $5 billion in losses, the volcano eruption showed 
how a single shock can cause widespread impact by affecting 
important system nodes37. 
Virtual infrastructure is also vulnerable to disruption. 
Intentional attacks of cyberaggression and cybercrime 
carried out through software worms and viruses can 
significantly impact business and government activity. 
When hackers used cyberattacks to disrupt online traffic 
in Estonia in 2007, they managed to shut down dozens of 
websites, including those of the Estonian president and high-
level government ministries. Estonia’s strong dependency 
on e-commerce amplified the damage caused by the 
compromised cyber networks38.
 Shocks to energy infrastructure can have similarly 
debilitating consequences. When a tree fell in Ohio in 
August 2003, disrupting the operation of a Con Edison 
electricity plant there, the resulting power outage affected 
50 million people for over a day39. Oil and gas supply lines 
are equally vulnerable to disruption. In Europe, energy 
pipelines originating in Norway, Russia and countries in the 
The volcanic eruption
showed how a single
shock can cause
widespread impact. 
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Middle East and Africa mean that the European continent is 
largely reliant on activities that occur outside of its borders 
for much of its energy supply.  
 In the global production of consumer goods, cost-cutting 
practices have created supply chain risks that undermine 
resilience and have the potential to disrupt global systems 
of production. The trend towards just-in-time delivery 
minimises inventory holdings and allows companies to 
more accurately adjust supply to reflect consumer demand. 
At the same time, subcontracting production to far-flung 
regions where production costs are lowest creates market 
concentrations in certain producers and areas. This market 
concentration is evident in electrical goods. In 2010, for 
example, two Korean semiconductor manufacturers, 
Samsung and Hynix, comprised close to 50% of the global 
market40.
For individual firms, these practices lower costs and 
increase profitability.  When aggregated across an entire 
system, however, they create instability and increase risk. 
With a substantial portion of global production relying on 
a few production centres and with the just-in-time supply 
chains sensitive to any variations in production, a single 
disruption to the supply chain can bring global markets to a 
halt.  When flooding in Thailand, a global manufacturing hub, 
caused factories to close in 2011, the shut downs resulted 
in a 28% drop in the global production of hard disk drives, 
and interrupted the production of goods as disparate as 
computers and electronics (Toshiba, Western Digital), cars 
(Honda, Nissan, Toyota), and soft drinks (Coca-Cola, Nestle, 
Oishi)41.
Aside from business and market exchange, global 
connectivity can pose a dangerous threat to health and 
wellbeing. Population growth and mobility have increased 
the global risk of pandemic. The concentration of people 
in urban metropolises raises the risk of disease spread 
within local regions, and the interconnectedness of these 
metropolises to global networks through airport traffic and 
trade broadens this risk transnationally. 
The twenty-first century has already seen three potentially 
global pandemic or pandemic-like events: SARS, H1N1 
(swine flu), and H5N1 (bird flu). The SARS virus illustrated 
how a localized disease can spread rapidly across the globe. 
SARS first appeared in November 2002 in the Guangdong 
province in China. The virus remained within the confines 
of the region until a single carrier — Liu Jianlun, a doctor 
from the region who had treated SARS patients — traveled 
to Hong Kong in 2003 (ref.42). From there, SARS spread 
around the world, and by June 2003, SARS cases had been 
identified on every continent, with over 8,400 cases in 30 
countries43.
From an environmental perspective, globalization and 
growing complexity increase risks from the environment, as 
has been discussed above, as well as increasing risks for the 
environment. Environmental degradation is caused by a rising 
output of emissions due to economic growth and increased 
energy usage44. Trade and travel also spread invasive 
species to new environments causing potential harm45. The 
production of monocultures, incentivized by efficiency and 
global competition, negatively affects biodiversity and leads 
to ecological homogenization. 
Perhaps equally as complex as environmental biodiversity 
are the social and political ecologies of a globalized world. 
Increasing connectivity facilitates information sharing and 
political mobilization. In a world of growing social inequality, 
this mobilization can have destabilizing effects for political 
leaders and governments.  After the global financial crisis, 
only 3 of the 27 democratically elected European leaders 
in office before the crisis were still in power46. The Arab 
Spring, protests in China and Russia, and the Occupy Wall 
Street movement are further indication of the agency that 
citizens have in mobilizing for political change. The Arab 
Spring protests illustrated that this agency can be infectious, 
spreading from one country to another.  
While systemic risk is an inherent consequence 
of globalization, steps can be taken to mitigate risk. 
Diversification and de-concentration in terms of capital and 
geography can protect companies from major disruptions. 
Flexible and diverse organizational structures that can 
respond to major systemic shocks should be implemented 
by investing in risk management planning. Developing 
risk-mitigating strategies requires resource allocation, 
transparent communication and the engagement of 
shareholders and society at large. 
Innovation and integration of global knowledge and the 
associated flows in ideas, products, services and people 
are likely to continue to provide significant opportunities 
for progress. However, these same trends are likely to 
be associated with increasing systemic risk, complexity 
and uncertainty. Some recent evidence suggests that 
the response of societies may be to seek to withdraw 
from global integration. This would be a mistake, as more 
coordination is required to ensure that our societies 
are better able to harvest the opportunities arising from 
innovation and integration, while at the same time mitigating 
and building resilience against the resultant systemic risks.  
Flooding in Thailand 
interrupted the production 
of electronics, cars and 
soft drinks.
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CHAPTER 3: A RECENT 
CHRONOLOGY OF PUBLIC RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT 
Government risk management strategies have developed considerably over the 
past two decades, but policymakers must now look beyond five-year terms to 
ensure that society is prepared to meet the challenges ahead.
Simon Pollard and Sophie Rocks 
(Cranfield University)
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Significance to Decision
Means of calibration Making progress Decision context
Nothing new or unusualCodes and standards
Well understood risks
Established practice
No major stakeholder implications
Verification
Peer review Life cycle implications
Risk trade-offs / transfers
Some uncertainty or deviation 
from standard best practiceBenchmarking
Significant economic implications
Internal Stakeholder Very novel or challenging
Consultation Strong stakeholder views
Significant risk trade-offs / transfers
Large uncertainties
External Stakeholder Perceived lowering of safety 
Consultation standards.
FIGURE 1
A typology of approaches to decision analysis, by reference to context and the means of calibrating 
the appropriateness of the decision3 (UKOOA, 1999).
Codes and 
standards
Good A
practice
Engineering
judgement
B
Risk analysis
CCompany 
values
Societal
values
At their core, decisions are about balancing risk and reward; loss and gain1. Consequently, risk-informed decisions — those that embody considerable 
uncertainty (see Figure 1; the case study on synthetic 
biology that follows this chapter; and the case study on 
natural disasters in Section 4) — must involve several steps. 
Managers seek to frame decisions with interested parties; 
understand the magnitude and character of the risk or 
opportunity through analysis; decide whether risks need 
management, and what the options for this might cost 
relative to the risk; and then implement decisions effectively,
reducing the risk to an acceptable residual level while 
recognizing that zero risk is not achievable2.
Whilst frameworks and procedures for risk management 
offer road maps for decision-making, it is ultimately people, 
organizations and systems that must manage risk, and so 
the term ‘risk governance’ has become used to reflect a 
multidisciplinary field straddling the physical, social and 
natural sciences (see Chapter 11). Importantly, not all 
risk decisions require complex risk analysis. Many risks 
are managed through the adoption of standards and 
good engineering judgement (category A in Figure 1). 
Defensible decisions should generate the confidence of 
interested parties in the strategies devised to manage risk 
or opportunity, and in their implementation. For industrial 
operations typical of category B in Figure 1, where there 
are known uncertainties, stakeholders seek confidence in 
the safety of activities, and so perceptions of trust in its 
guarantors are never far away.
Critically, debates on risk also raise questions about 
individual and societal values:  What is it we wish to protect? 
Why should this subject of protection have priority over 
other deserving subjects?  Whose voice is critical to 
decisions on risk management? These can become the 
subject of intense debate, often about the motivations 
for a specific action or development — the planning of a 
new incinerator, for example, or access to a new cancer 
drug. Increasingly, stakeholders appear unconvinced by the 
risk management intentions of governments without an 
accompanying discussion of the underlying motivations for 
decisions (category C in Figure 1). Stakeholders need to 
know:  Who will bear the cost?  What benefits will accrue 
to those who bear the risk?  Where is the evidence for the 
long-term effectiveness of risk management actions? And 
who is responsible for monitoring the residual risk — the 
risk that remains once measures are in place? Further, 
there is a growing recognition that risk decisions frequently 
expose ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and so the distributions of 
gains and losses, by reference to who bears the risk, hold 
intense interest for most stakeholders (see Chapter 5). One 
might place the debates on genetically-modified organisms, 
nanomaterials or hydraulic fracturing in this category. 
Some risk debates might also straddle these categories, as 
illustrated by the case study on bisphenol A (BPA), which 
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has necessitated a combination of evidence-informed risk 
analysis and wide stakeholder consultation4. 
The UK government’s role in managing public risk has 
been the subject of considerable scrutiny over recent 
decades5, 6, 7, 8, 9. In this chapter, we summarize some of the 
discussions since the early 1990s to illustrate progress 
in this area, and as the basis for the forward trajectory 
discussed elsewhere in this volume.The general shift over 
the years has been from recognizing public risk as a product 
of market failure (and thus a subject for central control) 
to a more devolved approach to measured risk-taking and 
value creation, with accountabilities distributed between 
various actors armed with high-quality evidence and 
structured accountabilities for shared risk and opportunity 
management. Public sector reform and modernization, 
the emphasis on risk-based regulation, and the current 
approach to risk and cost sharing in government all reflect 
this shift.The social processes of recognizing and accepting 
accountabilities for risk management and of delegating and 
monitoring these are critical to ensuring that risk reduction 
is secured. 
Managing public risk 
We recognize risk as a multidimensional concept with 
social, financial, human and natural resource implications, 
and with the potential for positive and negative outcomes. 
Society cannot function without taking measured risks.That 
is how innovations, discoveries, industrial endeavour and 
societal developments have been secured. Our industrial and 
civic societies are challenged when innovation is pursued, 
however, because social and economic activity inevitably 
comes with some risk attached. We have historically looked 
to our government to manage public risk in situations 
where the market fails10. For public risks, those that impact 
on goods that are readily available to members of the 
community, government departments have developed and 
retained expertise to evaluate and manage risk, whether 
directly or indirectly, ensuring the maintenance of the public 
good11.That said, there is a wide variety of views on the 
effectiveness of government capacity in risk management 
and in its maturity in handling public risk, particularly in a 
climate of cost constraint. 
The United Kingdom’s stance to risk and its management 
has evolved considerably, and has been highly influenced 
by the socio-political landscape.The nature of a risk or 
opportunity, its familiarity, location and distribution, all 
influence how risk is perceived (see Chapter 9 for a richer 
discussion of context, behaviour and agency). Politicians will 
hear public demands for action, and the political landscape 
— with all its tensions and influences — frequently 
determines management action.These decisions are usually, 
but not exclusively, informed by the evidence base. Political 
stances also influence how risks are portrayed; and whether 
the government adopts a directive or precautionary 
approach, or one that is more risk-seeking in order to 
capitalize upon the potential benefits12. 
The assessment of public risk alone is insufficient as 
a basis for managing it. Public risks must be assessed, 
The United Kingdom’s
stance to risk and its
management has evolved
considerably. 
managed, communicated and governed: the political, social 
and organizational aspects of sound risk management are 
as critical as the technocratic analysis of risk. Individual 
and organizational accountabilities and arrangements 
for managing risk prove critical and in practice, the 
responsibility for managing most public risk is shared 
between government, other organizations and the public. 
An overriding theme of national scale risk events has 
been the failures in risk management that occur when 
shared responsibilities for managing risk are unclear, where 
accountabilities are blurred or where the complexities of 
systems are insufficiently understood. Fragile, interconnected 
and excessively lean systems are vulnerable, especially where 
there is a loss of oversight or where behavioural incentives 
within systems, or among their custodians, are at odds with 
maintaining systemic resilience to shock. Successive failures 
in systemic risk management and oversight by institutions, 
as illustrated by the global financial crisis (see case study), 
can cause pervasive, substantive and long-lasting damage that 
erodes public confidence. 
A useful starting point for the recent chronology is 
the Royal Society’s influential 1992 report Risk: analysis, 
perception and management13, chaired by Sir Frederick 
Warner FRS, an international authority in the field, which 
was published as an update to a 1983 report on risk 
assessment practice.The temporal context of the Royal 
Society’s 1992 report was a catalogue of industrial disasters, 
including the Piper Alpha oil rig fire in the North Sea, the 
capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise, and the King’s 
Cross underground station fire — all national tragedies that 
had raised considerable disquiet about the management 
of risk by a variety of actors.The Royal Society sought 
to address developments in risk assessment practice, to 
bridge the gap between quantified and perceived risk, and 
to comment on the merits of risk-benefit trade-offs.The 
latter parts of the report reflected an increased emphasis 
on risk communication (updated in Chapter 8 by Nick 
Pidgeon, a contributor to the 1992 report) and signalled the 
emergence of an analytic-deliberative approach to decision 
making that had been in discussion since the 1970s (refs. 14, 
15). 
Up until this point, one might argue that risk management 
had been deployed as a defensive approach to reassure 
publics that consideration had been given to a risk and 
that action could be taken — displaying a tendency to 
manage the perception of uncertainty and limit blame. 
Hopefully, this tenor of approach is now a thing of the 
past. A fundamental requirement for all risk analyses, once 
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CASE STUDY
CONSISTENCY AND TRANSPARENCY IN EVIDENCE-BASED 
REGULATION: RISK AND PRECAUTION IN THE REGULATION 
OF BISPHENOL A
Patrick Miller (Food Standards Agency)
Regulators often need to review and adapt regulations as the evidence on risks develops. But if they are to maintain credibility and 
trust, they must handle this process in a consistent 
and transparent way, and always explain the rationale 
for their risk-management decisions. They should 
clearly distinguish between hazard and risk; between 
the uncertainties addressed directly within a risk 
assessment, and wider uncertainties that may pertain 
to the risk management decision; and consider the 
unintended consequences of any new measures. The 
case of bisphenol A (BPA) illustrates some of the 
challenges of this approach.
BPA is a chemical used to make plastics, including 
those used as protective coatings and linings for food 
and drinks cans, and also in some refillable 
drinks bottles and food storage containers. 
Minute amounts of BPA can transfer 
from these materials into food and 
drinks. For plastic food-contact 
materials, EU legislation sets limits for 
the amount of BPA that can migrate 
into food. These ensure consumer 
exposure remains within guidelines 
established by independent expert risk 
assessments.
There is some evidence that BPA interacts 
with hormone systems and may act as an endocrine 
disruptor.  Consequently its safety has been reviewed 
several times to assess whether these potential effects 
are relevant for human exposure to BPA. The European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) began its most recent 
comprehensive review of BPA in 2012, and consulted 
on two parts of its draft opinion in 2013 and 2014; 
its final opinion is due later in 2014. The draft EFSA 
opinion proposes a revised exposure guideline for 
BPA and concludes that exposures to BPA are below 
this level for consumers in all age groups. EFSA’s 
initial finding is thus that the health concern for all 
population groups is low1.
Regulatory responses to the revised EFSA risk 
assessment
The UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) is clear that 
any change in BPA controls should be based on a 
rigorous assessment of the balance of evidence, 
and an understanding of how any changes will 
achieve an improvement in consumer protection in 
a proportionate way, while guarding against adverse 
unintended consequences. The UK Committee on 
Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products 
and the Environment (COT) has concluded that the 
draft EFSA opinion does not indicate a risk to UK 
consumers from dietary exposure to BPA2. The FSA 
will also assess the final EFSA opinion and review the 
need for any further action, working with the European 
Commission and EU member states3.
Some EU member states have already introduced or 
announced plans for more restrictive controls on BPA, 
which are described as ‘precautionary’.  This raises a 
number of issues:
1. Acting in advance of, or contrary to, 
an EFSA opinion risks undermining 
the process of risk-based decision 
making in the European Union.
2. According a communication 
from the European Commission, the 
‘precautionary principle’ should not be 
used to cope with uncertainties that 
are dealt with during a risk assessment, 
but only when there are wider, more 
fundamental evidence gaps4.
3. Use of precaution should not be one-sided. 
Regulators need to consider the balance of risks and 
benefits, and the associated uncertainties, that are 
caused by a ‘precautionary’ action, and compare that 
with the effects of maintaining the status quo. This 
includes a consideration of unintended consequences 
— for example, problems with the safety and 
effectiveness of replacements for BPA.
4. Decision-makers may of course take other factors 
into account, and do not have to rely solely on the 
risk assessment — but when they do so, they should 
set out their rationale and the supporting evidence 
transparently.
The FSA is working with the network of national food 
agencies in Europe to try to develop principles and 
tools to improve consistency and transparency in this 
process5.
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promoted by the Better Regulation Task Force, is that they 
are open, transparent, and that they involve deliberative 
problem formulation from the outset. The expectation since 
the 1990s (ref. 16) is that risk-informed decision-making 
is a process involving multiple perspectives on the scope 
of the risk under investigation. Of course, risk analysis 
without subsequent mitigation or action on risk provides 
no guarantee of safety, and as Lisa Jardine discusses in this 
report (see Chapter 12), ultimately a decision must be made.
Moves for consistency and transparency in risk 
management
Around the time of the Royal Society report, the handling and 
regulation of public risk was promoted as a key component 
of public sector reform for modernising government in the 
United Kingdom. The white paper Modernizing Government17 
placed a firm emphasis on quality public services, including 
effective regulation, a proportionality of approach to public 
risk management, and the delivery of good practice in the 
assessment, management and communication of risks.
Government activity in risk policy and regulation spans its 
departments and agencies, covering, among others, aspects 
of defence, education, health service provision, health and 
safety in the workplace, food standards, and environmental 
protection.  Within these structures, policy and regulatory 
decisions are made with close reference to statutory or 
supervisory duties and/or powers within the primary 
legislation, accompanying regulations, or in policy and guidance 
from central government. Evidence plays a critical part in 
decision-making, and has been the subject of successive 
guidance from the government’s Chief Scientific Advisors18, 
which is regularly reviewed across government19, 20.
Recognizing the need for improved risk management 
practice, the United Kingdom Interdepartmental Liaison 
Group on Risk Assessment (UK-ILGRA, 1996-2002) was 
established to promote good practice in risk assessment, 
management and communication across government 
departments and agencies, and reported periodically 
to ministers on progress. This was the first attempt to 
coordinate risk management capability across government, 
and in its second report21 the group reflected on the 
adoption of the analytic-deliberative approach to risk 
management, further emphasizing good risk communication 
and recommending that departments and their agencies 
publish their policy or regulatory frameworks describing 
how risk is managed within their areas of control. These set 
out each department and agency’s regulatory philosophy, 
the first of which — Reducing risks, protecting people — was 
issued by the Health and Safety Executive.
This period also saw the rise of the Government Chief 
Scientific Advisor (GCSA) and the network of CSA posts 
within core departments.  With onset of the BSE crisis 
(1986-1992), and the loss of public confidence in scientific 
decision-making that ensued22, the Office of Science and 
Technology issued guidance to government departments 
on the use of science and evidence in policy making. 
Successive editions of this guidance emphasized the need 
to communicate uncertainty and handle different types 
and lines of evidence. These principles underscored the 
importance of early identification and anticipation of risk 
issues, the use of all available scientific information, the early 
publication of data, the need for clarity over the existence 
of uncertainties, and for early thought to be given to the 
presentation of information to the public. The requirement 
for government departments, and by extension their 
executive agencies and associated bodies, to develop and 
maintain a mature capability to address risks was stressed23. 
The growing need for coordinated best practice and a 
joined-up approach to public risk management — especially 
where accountabilities were shared across units, exemplified 
for the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment 
Agency by the 1999 Control of Major Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) legislation — led to a pivotal move in which risk 
governance became a key focus of the Cabinet Office.
Following UK-ILGRA’s influential work24, and the GCSA’s 
guidelines on evidence and handling decisions in the face 
of uncertainty, departments began to pursue a platform of 
risk activity, initially coordinated across government by the 
Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit (2002) and then HM Treasury 
(2003). This saw the introduction of headline principles for 
managing public risk and the issue of the so-called Orange 
book25, which contained guidance to government on public 
risk-management principles and capabilities.
Departments responded by establishing dedicated risk 
coordinator posts, their work typically comprising the 
development of structured approaches to managing the risks 
of policy delivery26 and the publication of domain-specific 
risk frameworks (e.g. for environmental risk management 
across Government27). Training and support for civil servants 
on risk was made widely available through the Office of 
Government Commerce (OGC) and the then Civil Service 
College, with oversight and review of departmental risk 
frameworks and their implementation provided by the 
National Audit Office (see Figure 2 for these and other 
developments).
The ‘better regulation’ agenda of the early 2000s then 
addressed issues such as developing a proportional response 
to risk, ensuring the effectiveness of response, and the 
design and targeting of regulatory intervention on aspects 
of a hazard that contribute most to risk. Here, effort was 
focused on the wise use of risk analysis to inform where 
regulatory interventions to manage public risk were best 
targeted and resourced.  Adopting thinking developed 
Governments must 
look beyond five-year 
terms to ensure genuine 
preparedness and 
resilience.
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within Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution28, 29, built on 
by the Environment Agency30, the European Commission31 
and its Network for the Implementation and Enforcement 
of Environmental Law (IMPEL)32 and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)33, 
approaches to risk-based regulation secured growing 
traction among the regulated community, including the 
Confederation of British Industry34.The work of the Better 
Regulation Task Force (1997-2005) and its successors, the 
Better Regulation Commission (BRC) and the Risk and 
Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC)35, resulted in a suite of 
reviews on regulators’ implementation of these principles 
(known as the Hampton Reviews36). They focused on the 
targeted inspection of regulatees, and on compliance and 
enforcement strategies, by reference to risk37. These reviews,
and the changes that emerged from them, sought to offer 
financial incentives and a lighter regulatory touch for high 
performing regulatees38 that offered demonstrable evidence 
of their ability to manage their own risks, while ensuring 
greater attention on poor performers that were managing 
higher-hazard operations. Generally welcomed by industry, 
these initiatives have stimulated the deployment of a more 
intelligence-led approach to the management of public risk 
that has set the foundation for current (2009–) initiatives 
on smarter regulation39 as part of the regulatory reform 
agenda40.
 
A timeline of risk management developments in the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, its predecessor bodies, and more broadly across government.
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FIGURE 2
Risk management in local government
It is useful to reflect briefly on the role of local government 
and its handling of risk across the wide range of public 
services it manages. The Localism Act (2010) enacted 
a shift in power to local authorities, including devolved 
responsibilities for risk management through, for example, 
neighbourhood planning. Local government is at the front 
line of public risk management, handling a multitude of 
issues around local service provision, long-term planning and 
community cohesion41. Yet within a ‘paradox of thrift’ there 
is an increased challenge to the consistent management of 
risk in local government in a climate of resource constraint. 
Given the variation between local government structures 
(county councils, district councils and unitary authorities); 
in the size and scale of local authorities (large versus 
small, urban versus rural); and their differing priorities 
about the need for inward investment, or to protect 
existing structures (rural versus metropolitan versus major 
conurbation); a single solution or approach is not suitable 
for all, and a range of options needs to be investigated 
and considered. Good risk governance is fast becoming a 
creative discipline for many local authorities.
Table 1 (see page 42) illustrates a wide range of 
responsibilities and diversity in the operating structures 
of local government, potentially leading to a separation 
between policymaking (core strategy) and regulation 
(technical services). Under these conditions, silo mentalities 
are a constant threat to joined-up risk management becasue 
staff work closely within their own divisional structures and 
may have difficulty working with others outside. In addition 
to the variation between local government organizations, 
risks frequently extend beyond administrative boundaries, 
raising the issue of shared risks, accountabilities and 
Broader risk landscape
Defra initiatives
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Tom Sorell (University of Warwick) 
The failure of the Wall Street bank LehmanBrothers in September 2008 marked themoment of greatest uncertainty and panic in
a global financial crisis that is only now coming to an
end. It was just one event in a much longer and less
visible period of distress in US financial services before
2008, and it ushered in a long period of stress in global
financial markets as a whole that has lasted until late
2014 in the UK, and will last longer elsewhere.There
may be other financial crises in the offing in Europe
in the near future, connected to sovereign debt and
the solvency of banks that have made loans to highly
indebted governments. But these will be different from
the one we have already experienced. 
The ingredients of the distress in the US included
the following:
1. The development of novel financial products in the
mortgage market. 
2. Sales of those products to people with meagre assets
and low financial literacy. 
3. Huge foreign and domestic demand for collateralized
(and therefore safe-looking) US dollar investments. 
4. The invention of investment vehicles to cater for that
demand. 
5. The development of new savings products in a
relatively new and uninsured retail and commercial
banking market — so-called money market funds. 
6.The development of a private market in esoteric
financial products — derivatives — without the liabilities
of the institutions in the markets being clear to market
participants, and without the products being understood
by the senior management of banks. 
7. The deregulation of US banking in 1999, which
permitted ill-considered mergers and acquisitions and
uncertain valuations of banking shares. 
8. Proprietary trading — where investment bank
subsidiaries of universal banks invested retail depositor
assets, or similar monies, in very risky products. 
9. Poor modelling of prospective house price
movements, which were crucial to the calculation of the
value of collateral for securitized real-estate products. 
10. Poor commercial credit-rating of banks holding very
large quantities of securitized assets. 
11.The US government’s indications to banks and
other financial institutions — just before the time of the
Lehman collapse — that it would subsidize losses. 
12. An internal culture in banks that rewarded short-
term profits from trading shares and derivatives rather
than from long-term commercial investment. 
13. An over-reliance on money-market borrowing, as
opposed to deposits for investment and operating costs. 
14. International regulatory agreements (especially the
Basel II agreement) that allowed bigger banks to be their
own judges of the adequacy of their capital to cover
liabilities. 
UK subsidiaries of US banks, including Citibank,
were exposed via their parent companies to the
risky behaviours in this list, and UK-owned banks
were sometimes significant investors and traders of
securitized products. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in
particular was highly exposed through its US subsidiary,
Greenwich Capital Markets, which RBS acquired with
its takeover of NatWest in 2000.The resulting losses
contributed to the near-failure of RBS and its rescue by
the UK government in October 2008.The government
had already acquired mortgage provider Northern Rock
in February 2008, following a decline that was marked
by long queues of depositors trying to withdraw their
savings. Northern Rock was affected by declines in the
values of some of its mortgages through points 2 and
13 in the list above. Another big bank, HBOS, sought to
be taken over when write-downs in its commercial loan
book made the business unsustainable. It, too, incurred
risk from point 13. Lloyds, the bank that acquired
HBOS, in turn required government rescue when losses
inherited from HBOS materialized. 
There are three main lessons to be learnt from 
the financial crisis: 
1. The speculative operations of big universal banks are 
systemically damaging, where those systems stretch 
across borders, and take in whole economies, not just 
the banking sector of a single economy. 
2. Risks from esoteric financial products are extremely 
difficult for either banks or government to manage 
effectively. 
3. There are continuous, big incentives to introduce new, 
esoteric financial products. 
A partial antidote to some of these risks is for 
governments to incentivize the traditional banking 
function of intermediation: turning insured deposits with 
capped interest rates into profitable commercial loans 
and mortgages that prospective borrowers prove they 
can repay. This kind of banking is easy for all parties to 
understand, relatively easy to regulate, and beneficial to 
depositors, lenders and borrowers. 
A more general lesson is that big banks are not the 
only systemically-important institutions: energy and 
telecommunications companies also pose systemic, 
cross-border risks. In this respect, being a customer 
of Gazprom may not be so different from being a 
shareholder in Lehman Bros. 
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liabilities.
The coalition government has introduced changes to 
reshape risk management practices across local government. 
The emphasis on breaking up public monopolies and 
transferring power away from central government allows 
local government to innovate and develop new solutions 
to past issues, drawing on the professional judgement 
of local government officers.  A key challenge involves 
providing officers with relevant information so they 
have an appropriate evidence base to take informed risk 
management decisions and to partake in measured risk 
taking, whereby well-evidenced risks are assessed on their 
probability and consequences. Under these conditions, local 
authorities may reform their risk management approaches 
by passing on the responsibility for some risks through 
contracts, insurance or delegation (to other bodies or 
individuals); and by engaging with new actors so they 
understand the challenges these risks present, as well as 
how to take precautionary and preventative action in order 
to protect them from harm. This seems to offer support 
to individuals who can assume greater responsibility and 
proactively manage their interests, rather than relying on 
state intervention. But it also recognizes that certain risks 
require onward scrutiny and oversight, because they are too 
important to devolve.
National registers, risks and futures
A natural outcome of pan-government risk analysis has 
been a capacity to compare and contrast many different 
types of risk that have national strategic significance. 
What distinguishes one risk or opportunity from another 
is its character43, 44: not only its magnitude, dimensions 
and significance, but also the means by which it might be 
realised, how likely it is to come to fruition, the individual 
mechanisms by which this might occur, the knock-on 
consequences that may emerge, and how it is understood 
and managed by those that engage with it45. Emerging 
naturally from a more joined-up, pan-government approach 
to risk management, the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 
was established in 2001 as the Cabinet Office department 
responsible for emergency planning in the United Kingdom. 
The role of the secretariat is to ensure the United 
Kingdom’s resilience against disruptive challenge. By working 
with others, it aims to anticipate, assess and prevent risks; to 
prepare and respond in the event of major threats; and then 
recover from risks that are realized.
Since 2010, the emphasis of government’s risk 
management has been on national resilience — a focus on 
the systemic features essential to ensuring society is robust 
to shock and able to recover quickly when adverse events 
occur. The National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 
and the National Security Strategy set out government 
thinking and embody a strategic perspective46, 47. In compiling 
these registers, frameworks for analysing and presenting 
strategic risks adopted within business settings48 have been 
deployed across government.  Notwithstanding the debates 
on method49,50, 51, one cannot argue with the impact these 
national risk analyses are having in shaping policy discussions 
on the effectiveness of public risk management52; the societal 
appetite for the current levels of residual risk; and on how 
national risks might evolve under a variety of possible 
futures.
Looking to the far horizon53 is now widely recognised as a 
reserved responsibility of government with respect to public 
risk management. Recent reviews of capability have called 
for a centrally-coordinated approach to horizon-scanning 
and foresight activity that, in some ways, mirrors the policy 
initiatives on risk of the late 1990s discussed above. This 
can only lead to a maturing capability and lend support to a 
long held view that governments must look beyond five-
year terms to ensure genuine preparedness and resilience in 
society’s ability to meet the intergenerational and existential 
challenges ahead54 (see Chapters 2 and 10).
Simplified account of local authority 
responsibilities within England42
TABLE 1
MD = metropolitan district; SC = shire county; SD = shire district;
UA = unitary authority; LB = London borough; 
GLA = Greater London Authority
Source: Local Government Financial Statistics, England, CLG
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HIGH LEVEL CASE STUDY: 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Lionel Clarke (UK Synthetic Biology 
Leadership Council), Richard Kitney 
(Imperial College London) and 
Roland Jackson (Sciencewise)
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Advances in the life sciences continue to deliver significant benefits to society across a broad spectrumof application areas, ranging from health products 
to sustainable materials. Rapidly advancing technologies and 
deepening understanding are now generating the potential to 
deliver increasingly effective and beneficial solutions, such as 
targeted diagnostics (including infection and disease monitors), 
personalised therapies, and speciality chemicals from a range of
sustainable feedstocks. Synthesis — a mainstay of the chemical 
industry for nearly two centuries and currently enabling the 
production of tens of thousands of useful chemicals ranging 
from aspirin to Lycra — plays an increasingly important role 
in supporting these advances. For example, whereas insulin 
extracted from the pancreas of pigs was originally found to be 
an effective therapy for diabetes nearly a century ago, since the 
early 1980s the large-scale synthesis of genetically modified 
forms of insulin and its analogues now enables the delivery of 
more effective and affordable treatments. 
Synthetic biology represents a leading edge in our 
understanding of the relationship between molecular structure 
and function at the genomic level. This capacity stems from 
rapid developments since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century in high-throughput, low-cost data-analysis techniques 
such as DNA sequencing, combined with remarkable advances 
in computational power and data handling, and the field 
continues to assimilate new tools and techniques. This builds 
on more than forty years of complementary and contributory 
advances in the life sciences, with origins stemming back to 
the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953. Introducing 
engineering design principles into the design–build–test cycle 
can also enhance the predictability and robustness of these 
innovations, and accelerate the development of more bespoke 
and cost-effective solutions. 
Yet the commercialization of effective solutions depends not 
only on technological feasibility, but also on their affordability 
and their social acceptability. To ensure that intended benefits 
are delivered, it is important to recognize the existence and 
significance of a wide range of stakeholder interests, societal as 
well as technological, and to generate an environment in which 
relevant issues can be identified and addressed transparently 
and unambiguously. The UK government’s Synthetic Biology 
Leadership Council provides a multi-stakeholder forum in 
which such issues may be addressed.
 
 
What exactly is synthetic biology?
A clearly expressed and widely adopted technological 
definition of synthetic biology was outlined in the Royal 
Academy of Engineering report on synthetic biology1, and 
in the UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap2: “Synthetic Biology is 
the design and engineering of biologically-based parts, novel 
devices and systems as well as the redesign of existing, natural 
biological systems”. This highlights the key differentiator 
between synthetic biology and other fields: the application 
of systematic design through the implementation of the 
engineering principles of standardization, characterization 
and modularization.  Adopting these principles allows for the 
application of systems theory, control theory, signal processing 
and a range of metrology techniques and standards. These 
themes are reiterated in the European Commission’s recent 
definition of synthetic biology3.
However, it cannot be overlooked that other definitions 
exist and the term is sometimes applied more loosely, forming 
a potential source of ambiguity. This partly reflects the evolving 
nature of synthetic biology, the different interests and needs 
of stakeholders, and the various purposes to which the term 
is applied. Non-specialists may sometimes apply the term 
‘synthetic biology’ as a shorthand descriptor covering a broad 
range of leading edge bio-technological developments. But a 
technical specialist, funding agency or regulator may require 
a much sharper definition to be clear what is or is not being 
considered in a particular context. Such diversity of language 
is common to many technical fields and not peculiar to 
synthetic biology. It is not therefore a significant issue, as long 
as the purpose and context of any definition or description is 
understood. Here, we adopt the definition expressed above as 
representing the core characteristic of synthetic biology, and 
supplement this definition with a clarification of its scope as 
follows.  
A key goal of synthetic biology is to translate innovative 
concepts developed at a laboratory scale into potentially useful 
and commercializable options. This is not simply a matter 
of seeking uses for an emerging new technology. Market 
pull — the need to develop effective solutions to ongoing 
challenges — will often provide the inspiration and goal. These 
activities enable the identification of a product or service 
concept that will then have to be assessed against available 
marketplace alternatives before committing to full-scale 
commercial investment. Regulatory conformance is just one 
of a wide range of checks and balances that will determine 
whether a particular option ever reaches market. To scale 
up into a robust and viable market product or service, many 
other considerations ranging from process engineering and 
economics to customer value assessment may need to be 
taken into account. For example, pharmaceuticals will need 
to pass clinical trials, speciality chemicals will need to meet 
product performance specifications, and so on. In this context, 
synthetic biology may often serve as an innovative front-
end to established market-facing sectors such as industrial 
biotechnology, agri-tech and healthcare, each sector being 
subject to its own specific, stringent regulatory frameworks 
and marketplace dynamics.   
Synthetic biology is essentially an enabling discipline. Meeting 
the underlying objective of introducing engineering design 
principles — by generating robust and reliable biological 
parts, devices and systems — directly focuses attention onto 
sources of uncertainty. Identifying and reducing those sources 
of uncertainty is key to increasing predictability. In its current 
early stage of development, this objective restricts synthetic 
biology to the incorporation of a limited number of parts at 
a time, but as we gain greater understanding of the complex 
interactions and internal control mechanisms that occur 
within biological systems, so the potential of the approach 
will expand. Historically, the redesign of biological systems has 
been a predominantly empirical ‘trial-and-error’ activity, but 
the ongoing establishment of relevant standards and metrology 
will facilitate the introduction of engineering-related design and 
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performance standards. 
The successful functioning of designed biological systems is
already confirming the growing extent of our understanding.
The concept of a design–build–test cycle reflects the evidence-
based nature of the synthetic biology process. Improving
design capability reduces the number of iterations of the
cycle required to achieve a specific performance target, and
may therefore improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness
of identifying potential solutions. Even when public or private
sector incentives are specifically applied to address a given
challenge, the benefits may not be realized unless sufficient
cost-effectiveness is achieved to underpin sustainable
commercial production. Improving the design and synthesis
processes not only facilitates the automation of novel system
development — it may also permit practitioners to focus
less attention on the mechanics of construction, and place
more attention on the robustness of the resulting system’s
performance. 
Regulatory challenges 
Synthetic biology has the capacity to deliver solutions where
conventional methods are ineffective, too expensive or simply
do not exist. In the near- to mid-term, such solutions are
expected to fall within the range of established channels to
market, each subject to its particular operational constraints
and prevailing regulatory standards.These standards are
regularly reviewed, and the considered expert view is that
such applications remain adequately addressed by current
regulations. 
Nevertheless, because synthetic biology represents a leading
edge of current understanding, it is reasonable to anticipate
that further innovations will emerge over time that could
present regulatory challenges.To ensure that society benefits
from synthetic biology in a timely and affordable manner, 
key stakeholders must continue to identify and address any
potentially new risks that could be associated with such future
innovations. 
Every conceivable application will have its own particular
benefit/risk profile.To manage risk, it is important to maintain
a broad perspective across the whole opportunity space. 
This requires balancing the assessed risks of an innovation
against the loss of opportunity associated with failing to move
forwards. Attempting to reduce potential risk by blocking
a particular activity may inadvertently block access to even
greater future benefits in related areas. In these respects, the
principles of risk management relating to synthetic biology are
no different from those that apply to other cutting-edge areas
of innovation.
Taking a long-term view of the future provides a structured
opportunity to anticipate risks and associated issues, and also
gives more time to reflect upon and address them.The UK
Synthetic Biology Roadmap2 has paid considerable attention
to mapping out a multi-decade vision of the future, raising
awareness of the underlying directions, values and envisaged
timelines. In addition to the ongoing process of review by
regulatory bodies, numerous other checks and balances have
been put in place.The Synthetic Biology Public Dialogue4, for 
example, provided an opportunity to engage a wide range
of stakeholders outside the scientific community, identifying
concerns and viewpoints that have helped to shape current
responses. As potential applications emerge, wider societal
conversations may be required. Such conversations should
not only be about potential risks but also about desirable
trajectories and priorities, set against alternative solutions to
given challenges.These conversations need to take place well
before specific regulatory consultations.
From bench to marketplace 
From the perspective of industrialists and investors, the
presence of effective (but not excessively bureaucratic)
mechanisms for managing risk in the marketplace — ranging
from clear regulatory frameworks to best practice guidelines
and standards — can be highly welcome, because they
provide a reliable basis for overall risk assessment and
strategic investment decisions. Industrial interest covers a
broad spectrum of organizational structures, ranging from
specialist start-ups to broad-based multi-nationals. For the
larger established companies, successful product lines and
services, and satisfied customers, provide the benchmark.
Commercial choices will be based not only on confidence in
technical delivery, strategic fit and reputational impact, but
also on current and anticipated marketplace needs and values.
Synthetic biology is increasingly forming the core of specialist
start-ups, which may help deliver toolkit advances or address
very specific challenges. At present, the United States has well
over 100 such companies, with the United Kingdom hosting
almost 50. Such a broad-based community of practitioners
helps to ensure that a wide spectrum of practical experience is
becoming available to inform ongoing discussions. 
The potential of synthetic biology also attracts many
students, and the field is benefitting from their enthusiastic
engagement, innovative capacity and critical judgment. A prime
example of this is the International Genetically Engineered
Machine (iGEM) competition5. Over the past decade, many
hundreds of student iGEM teams from the world’s top
universities have taken part in this annual competition,
discovering how synthetic biology can generate a wide range
of potentially beneficial applications. In many cases, iGEM
projects have led to more detailed professional research
projects, and even to the formation of start-up companies.
Examples of such projects include a cost-effective arsenic
sensor to verify the safety of drinking water, and a system
that can address a challenging health issue such as gluten
intolerance. 
Synthetic biology is inherently multi-disciplinary, stimulating
constructive challenges and the sharing of best practice.This
reinforces a culture of ‘responsible research and innovation’2, 
which helps practitioners to consider the potential implications
and impacts of their work beyond its immediate focus.
Proactive approaches such as these must be encouraged,
because effective risk management is key to instilling
confidence both in potential investors, and in society as a
whole. After all, it is society that stands to benefit not only
from the products and services delivered by synthetic biology,
but also from the jobs and economic growth arising from
successful commercial operations. 
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SECTION 2: UNCERTAINTY, 
COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE
Neonicotinoids were introduced 
in the 1990s and now make up 
about 30% by value of the global 
market in insecticides.
It takes a lot of 
effort for people and 
organizations to adapt 
to and capitalize on 
new technologies. These 
‘sunk investments’ can 
reinforce commitments 
to a particular innovation 
pathway – even if it widely 
seen as unsatisfactory. 
Exhibit A: the QWERTY 
keyboard.
UK shale gas 
development will require 
estimated supply chain 
spending of £3.3 billion 
per annum and generate 
64,500 jobs.
Relative measures of 
risk can be misleading: 
being told that regularly 
eating a bacon sandwich 
increases your lifetime 
risk of pancreatic cancer 
by 20% may be somewhat 
unconvincing if the baseline 
is extremely low and the 
bacon sandwich is rather 
pleasant.
On a nuclear submarine, about 100 times more 
effort is applied to nuclear safety than to guard 
against other accidents. 
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Sciencewise has guided 
17 experimental dialogue 
projects on issues ranging from 
nanotechnology and stem cell 
research, to the uses of DNA in 
forensics and geoengineering to 
combat climate change.
The chemical and 
pharmaceutical 
industries are the 
United Kingdom’s biggest 
manufacturing export 
earner. Together, they have 
a turnover of £60 billion 
and support 500,000 jobs. 
Many major global 
industries are built around 
once-marginal technologies, 
like wind turbines, ecological 
farming, or super energy-
efficient buildings. Grassroots 
social movements were all 
involved in their pioneering 
origins.
If there is still considerable 
scientific uncertainty after 
quantifying risks, then it is 
reasonable to be cautious as 
a temporary holding position: 
amber, rather than red. Between 2002 and 2007, the UK invested over 
£150 million in research into the development and 
impact of nanotechnologies. 
Innovation is not a one 
track race to the future. 
Each direction for innovation 
is a social choice involving 
issues of uncertainty, legitimacy 
and accountability as well as 
competitiveness.
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CHAPTER 4: MAKING CHOICES IN THE 
FACE OF UNCERTAINTY: STRENGTHENING 
INNOVATION DEMOCRACY
Innovation is not so much about a race to optimize a single pathway, but a 
collaborative process for exploring diverse alternatives — as such, we need 
to nurture a more realistic, rational and vibrant innovation democracy.
Andy Stirling (Science Policy 
Research Unit, University of 
Sussex)
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Innovation is not just about technological inventions. It encompasses all the many ways of furthering human wellbeing. This includes improved production and use of 
goods or services in firms and other organizations1. But it 
also includes new practices and relations in communities, 
households and the workplace2.  Advanced science and 
technological research can help to drive and enable 
innovation3, yet many other new forms of knowledge and 
action are also important4. Innovation can be created and 
guided by social mobilization5 as much as commercial 
entrepreneurialism6, for example. So grassroots movements7, 
civil society8, creative arts9, and wider culture10 feature 
alongside small business, service industries11 and the public 
sector12 in being as important for innovation as universities, 
research labs and high-tech companies. 
Of course, there are no guarantees that any particular 
innovation in any of these areas will necessarily be positive. 
To take extreme examples that most may agree on, new 
forms of torture, financial fraud or weapons of mass 
destruction are all areas for innovation that might be judged 
to be generally negative. For other kinds of innovation, the 
picture is varyingly ambiguous. But it is rare that any given 
innovation is entirely, unconditionally and self-evidently 
positive13.  And these judgements are always relative. So the 
unqualified claim in the UK government’s slogan adorning 
venues used during the preparation of this report — 
“Innovation is Great… Britain”14 — is not automatically 
true. Like other prevailing talk of ‘pro-innovation’ policy — 
around the European Union’s ‘Innovation Union’ strategy, 
for instance — this misses the crucial point that the most 
important queries are about ‘which innovation?’.  Whether 
or not any given innovation is preferable on balance to the 
alternatives — let alone ‘good’, still less ‘great’— is not just 
a technical issue. It is also a fundamentally political question. 
This means that even quite detailed aspects of innovation 
policy are legitimate matters for democracy. 
In these widest of senses, however, well-conceived 
innovations can undoubtedly offer important aids not only 
to economic productivity15, but also to enhancing many 
kinds of human flourishing or the public good16. This need 
not be a bone of contention, even under the most critical 
views17. The more ambitious the aspirations to progressive 
social change, the greater the need for broad, diverse (and 
carefully scrutinized) kinds of innovation18, 19.  An example 
lies in the imperatives for transformations towards a 
more sustainable20, equitable, healthy and peaceful world.  
Whatever forms these possible futures are held to take, they 
require radical kinds of innovation in the widest of senses21. 
Some innovation opportunities can be addressed by well-
governed fair and efficient markets22. So one important role 
for innovation policy lies in helping to foster commercial 
innovation in the public interest23. But not all benefits, risks 
or impacts are restricted to those private actors who 
are typically most directly involved in steering business 
innovation24. The established understandings, motivations and 
incentives that drive the most powerful market actors often 
fail to prioritize wider relevant social values and interests25. 
In areas like health, agriculture, energy, environment, water, 
mobility, security, waste and housing, many of the least 
privileged (and most vulnerable) people around the world 
are disproportionately excluded from conventional global 
patterns of innovation26. Nor, as we shall see below, are 
many important forms of uncertainty and ambiguity always 
fully or appropriately addressed by relatively narrow market-
based signals or official statistics27. 
Depending on the context, then, market processes alone 
do not necessarily drive the best orientations for the kinds 
of innovation that are most needed from broader social 
viewpoints. This is true both across different domains of 
policy as well as within any given sector. For instance, the 
single largest area for public expenditure on research 
and innovation — in the UK28 and worldwide29  — is 
military. Innovation towards less violent means for conflict 
resolution are relatively neglected30, 31. The most strongly-
pursued energy options are those that offer greatest 
returns on established infrastructures and supply chains32, 
33. For its part, biomedical research tends to focus more 
on health disorders of the rich than the poor, and on 
therapeutics rather than prevention34. This is especially so in 
speculative (but potentially lucrative) new areas like ‘human 
enhancement’ and ‘life extension’35–36, with the Royal Society 
raising particular questions about patterns of prioritization 
in neuroscience37. Consequently, there are important roles 
for public policy in helping to prioritize across sectors, as 
well as in encouraging and supporting appropriate scales and 
directions for innovation in particular areas. Public policy is 
also crucial in helping to address the many uncertainties and 
ambiguities — by promoting greater analysis, deliberation 
and political accountability38. 
In nurturing these qualities, public policy can also 
fulfil other significant roles.  Alongside higher education, 
business and civil society, government policy can do much 
to promote the knowledge, capabilities and environments 
that best facilitate socially-effective innovation39. The more 
demanding the challenges for innovation (such as poverty, 
ill health or environmental damage), the greater becomes 
the importance of effective policy40, 41. These challenges 
of innovation policy go well beyond simplistic notions of 
governments trying to ‘pick winners’42, 43. In any case, this 
dilemma does not exclusively afflict the public sector, but 
also applies to powerful market actors44. Indeed, essentially 
the same uncertainties and intractabilities are equally 
experienced by government, business and civil society45. 
Instead, the central challenge in innovation policy is about 
helping to culture the most fruitful conditions across society 
There are no guarantees 
that any particular 
innovation will necessarily 
be positive.
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as a whole, for seeding and selecting across many alternative 
possibilities and together nurturing the most potentially 
beneficial21. This is about collectively deliberating, negotiating 
and constructing what ‘winning’ even means, not just how 
best to achieve it. These are the questions on which this 
chapter will focus.
Policy and the Politics of Choice 
The most important (but neglected46) issue here is that 
innovation of all kinds in any given area is not a one-track 
race to the future47. Instead, it is about social choices across 
a variety of continually branching alternative pathways 
for change48. In this sense, innovation is more like an 
evolutionary process than a race49, 50. It is as much about 
exploring a space of different possibilities, as optimising any 
one51–53.  As already mentioned, it is rarely self-evident — 
and often hotly contested — what should count as the most
desirable directions for discovery. This is true, for example, 
of particular domains like sustainable agriculture, zero-
carbon energy services or clinical and preventive responses 
to improving public health. In all these areas, there unfold 
many radically contrasting pathways for innovation. Two of 
the most pervasively important qualities in choosing which 
pathways to prioritize are therefore: (i) attending fairly to 
a diversity of possible directions and strategies54; and (ii) 
including a plurality of perspectives in appraising any one55. 
The ways in which such social conversations are most 
effectively achieved is discussed further in Chapter 5.
Consequently, it is not only important that innovation 
be efficient and competitive in any particular direction. It is 
also crucial for economic and wider social wellbeing that 
the prioritized directions for innovation are as robustly 
deliberated, accountable and legitimate as possible56.  An 
economy that fails to do this exposes itself to the risk that it 
will become committed to inferior innovation pathways that 
other more responsively-steered economies may avoid. In 
other words, innovation may ‘go forward’ quickly, but in the 
wrong directions. 
History presents plenty of examples of innovation 
trajectories that later proved to be problematic — for 
instance involving asbestos, benzene, thalidomide, dioxins, 
lead in petrol, tobacco, many pesticides (see case study), 
mercury, chlorine and endocrine-disrupting compounds, as 
well as CFCs, high-sulphur fuels and fossil fuels in general58, 
59. In all these and many other cases, delayed recognition 
of adverse effects incurred not only serious environmental 
or health impacts, but massive expense and reductions 
in competitiveness for firms and economies persisting in 
the wrong path.  As discussed in Chapter 1, innovations 
reinforcing fossil fuel energy strategies43 — such as hydraulic 
fracturing59 — arguably offer a contemporary prospective 
example.  And similar dilemmas are presented by the 
exciting new possibilities of nanotechnology (see case study 
later in this chapter)60 — both internally within this field and 
externally with respect to alternative ways to address the 
same priority social needs61.
The key conundrum is that each alternative innovation 
pathway in any given area (such as food, energy, health or 
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military) will typically display contrasting pros and cons 
under contending perspectives.  Animated differences 
emerge, for instance, around infrastructures for urban 
automobiles or cycling62, nuclear power or renewable 
energy44 and violent or peaceful approaches to national 
security31, 63. Each involves different innovation trajectories. 
Competing pathways will also routinely differ in their social 
distributions of benefits and harms, winners and losers.  And 
— in any view — many deep unknowns further obscure 
the whole picture. Crucially, a decision not to innovate will 
also present its own mix of pros, cons and uncertainties. 
Innovating in any particular direction will typically diminish 
innovation in others, not least through foregone resources 
and opportunity costs.  Whether deliberate or inadvertent, 
each direction for innovation is a social choice involving 
issues of uncertainty, legitimacy and accountability as well as 
competitiveness. 
It is important to acknowledge these complexities of 
choice, because innovation debates in particular areas 
often become quite simplistic and polarized. For instance, 
innovation in fields like food, health, energy or human 
security is frequently discussed as if it were a one-track 
race47, rather than an exploratory process, and simply about 
whether to ‘go forward’ or not. But the crucial questions 
in such areas are typically not just about “yes or no?”, 
“how fast?” or “who’s ahead?”.  What often matters more 
are queries over “which way?”, “what alternatives?”, “who 
says?” and “why?”64. The scope for uncertainties under these 
wider questions compound the scope for controversy, 
so conflicts can become especially intensive and disabling 
(and potentially economically disastrous) if these broader 
questions are ignored.
Across all fields, the key challenge is that there exists 
no single definitive scientifically-sound or evidence-based 
way to calculate the most rational balance of resources 
to expend on alternative innovation pathways within or 
across different domains65.  A robust knowledge base and 
rigorous analysis are both necessary. But these are typically 
insufficient. The merit rankings constructed in this way for 
different innovation choices invariably overlap — and may 
often be inverted — under contrasting equally reasonable 
assumptions and value judgements66, 67. Decisions concerning 
which kinds (or areas or aims) of innovation to prioritize 
are therefore inherently partly subjective and political, rather
than purely technical or economic. This is why research and 
innovation remain intrinsically matters for democracy. The 
more this point is denied or neglected, the more imperative 
it becomes. 
This makes it all the more important that high-quality 
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CASE STUDY
NEONICOTINOID INSECTICIDES AND INSECT POLLINATORS
Charles Godfray and Angela McLean (University of Oxford)
Neonicotinoids were introduced in the 1990s and now make up about 30% by value of the global market in insecticides. They can be 
used in different ways, but most commonly they are 
applied as seed treatments, with the insecticide being 
taken up systemically by the growing plant. Because 
the compound is present in all plant tissues, it is 
potentially very effective in reducing the damage done 
to crops by insect pests. However, the presence of the 
insecticide in pollen and nectar raises the possibility 
that neonicotinoids may harm populations of beneficia
insects such as bees and other pollinators. This is 
a particular concern, because there is evidence 
that pollinator populations have declined in 
Europe over recent decades. 
A series of studies1 which found 
that bees suffered harmful, sub-
lethal effects after foraging on 
treated flowering plants prompted 
the European Commission to 
ban the use of neonicotinoid seed 
treatments for flowering crops 
for an initial period of two years starting in 
December 2013. But there is controversy over 
whether this ban is justified by the 
strength of the underlying evidence 
base.
The debate over 
neonicotinoids 
highlights a number 
of issues concerned with 
making decisions in the face of 
uncertainty, particularly concerning 
environmental questions.
1. Policymakers need to know whether this 
type of insecticide reduces pollinator densities 
in real agricultural landscapes. But the answer to 
this question requires large and expensive field 
experiments, at spatial scales that reflect agricultural 
practice and bee foraging distances. Carrying out 
such experiments is not currently required for 
insecticide registration, and as a consequence 
few have been conducted.
2. In the absence of these large-scale field 
trials, data on the toxicity of different 
compounds chiefly comes from laboratory 
experiments and so-called semi-field 
studies, which typically involve administering known 
doses of the insecticide to pollinators in the field. 
Experiments with neonicotinoids clearly show they 
can harm individual pollinators, but the most severe 
sub-lethal effects occur when insects are exposed 
to concentrations higher than they are likely to 
receive as a result of routine agricultural practice. 
Less severe effects can be observed at more realistic 
concentrations, but whether these are bad enough to 
affect pollinator population densities is much less clear.
3. Because the evidence base is limited, 
different policy conclusions can be drawn 
depending on the importance given to 
avoiding any potential negative effects of 
low-dose exposure to different 
compounds or combination of 
compounds.
4. It is unclear what farmers 
will do without recourse to 
neonicotinoids, and how this 
might affect pollinators.  Will they use less 
insecticide overall, or switch to potentially 
more harmful chemicals? Might they grow 
fewer crops that benefit pollinators?  How 
should these behavioural and economic factors 
be included in policy formulation?
5. Recently, a new area of debate has opened up. 
A number of non-governmental organizations have 
argued that the evidence base for neonicotinoid 
effectiveness is small and dominated by industry-
funded studies, and that farmers are subject to 
intense marketing to buy insecticides. Industry 
responds that there is no other source of funding 
for this type of study, their experiments are of high 
quality, and that farmers are sophisticated customers 
for different agrichemical products.  Would all sides 
gain from greater openness in the way industry 
studies are set up and reported?
6. Finally, neonicotinoids are only one of 
several potential explanations for the loss of 
pollinators, chief among them being habitat 
loss. Could there be a danger that the policy 
focus on one threat might lead to reduced 
attention being paid to more important 
factors?
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information concerning public policy in and around 
innovation, is available for wider scrutiny and debate. But 
the recent House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology report on the setting of priorities for 
publicly-funded research identified several important areas 
for improvement68. The Committee confirmed that there 
remains significant scope for enhancing the quality of 
official statistics concerning public support for contrasting 
innovation pathways. It made recommendations that this 
information be clarified in several particular ways. Yet these 
recommendations remain to be implemented. Consequently, 
further deliberate efforts are required in order to enable 
more transparent and accountable democratic politics 
concerning the directions and rationales underlying UK 
innovation policy.
Steering Innovation Pathways
One reason why it is important to address the politics 
of choice in innovation is that chosen pathways can 
quickly become effectively irreversible.  A diversity of well 
understood social, political and economic processes exert 
various kinds of positive feedback as innovation pathways 
unfold. These can act to reinforce the trajectories favoured 
by the most powerful interests, and exclude others that may 
be more widely beneficial.  
Typically, it takes a lot of effort for people and 
organizations to learn about any new way of doing things, 
capitalize on the opportunities and adapt to the changed 
requirements.  As these efforts become ‘sunk investments’ in
a particular innovation, they can help reinforce commitments
to the associated pathway. This can occur, even if the 
innovation in question is widely seen to be unsatisfactory69.  
Although complicated70, a classic example of this remains 
the QWERTY keyboard71,72, 73. This was originally designed 
for nineteenth-century mechanical typewriters, specifically 
to slow down typing in order to reduce jamming of the 
type bars for letters frequently used together. But this very 
property of modulating typing speed helps to aggravate 
office injuries73. Better keyboard configurations do exist74. 
Yet the deeply socially embedded familiarity of QWERTY 
makes it difficult for alternatives to become established. 
So the problem persists through successive innovations in 
 
 
automatic typewriters, computers and touchscreen tablets, 
continuing several technological generations after the initial 
rationale lapsed. Even where the incumbent innovation is 
essentially a product of historical chance, then — with no 
powerful backing — it can prove very difficult to reverse the 
associated path dependency. 
This dynamic of path dependency makes it especially 
important to do whatever is achievable at the earliest 
stages of innovation, to give confidence that unfolding 
directions are as appropriate as possible75. The dilemma is, 
of course, that this is precisely the time when the positive 
and negative implications are most uncertain77, 78. So there 
can be enormous pressures on all sides to exaggerate the 
confidence with which evidence can be interpreted, and to 
understate the scope for competing interpretations78. One 
reasonable response to this is to be much more open and 
questioning about uncertainties65. This will be returned to 
below and in Chapter 6. But another rational measure is 
to extend scrutiny beyond anticipated consequences and 
also look at the driving purposes of innovation79.  Whilst 
the variously claimed positive, negative and indirect effects 
may remain uncertain, the motivating values, interests and 
incentives that lie behind particular innovation pathways are 
typically much clearer80. In this way, critical appraisal of the 
driving forces behind alternative innovation pathways (not 
just the claimed aims) can be undertaken with confidence at 
an early stage, despite the uncertainties81. 
This kind of careful broad-based societal consideration 
is, however, rarely evident in mainstream innovation. More 
often, it is a narrower range of expectations about the 
future that most strongly drive directions for change. The 
values upheld by particular communities of researchers 
themselves may be influential, as well the interests of leading 
firms, powerful financiers or particular users82. If a specific 
pathway is strongly held to be more likely than others by 
these kinds of influential actors, then this can become self-
fulfilling83. Examples include competing media formats or 
software operating systems, where early market penetration 
can be driven more strongly by expectations about future 
adoption, than by assessments of performance50. Some 
degree of performance shortfall is often the price for 
There remains significant 
scope for enhancing 
the quality of  official 
statistics concerning 
public support for 
contrasting innovation 
pathways.
Another rational measure 
is to extend scrutiny 
beyond anticipated 
consequences and 
also look at the driving 
purposes of innovation.
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CASE STUDY
NANOMATERIALS
Kamal Hossain (National Physical Laboratory)
‘Nanotechnologies’ describes a broad group of technologies that focus on the engineering and manipulation of materials at the 
nanoscale (1nm–100nm).  At these scales, many 
materials exhibit novel properties 
that are not seen in their bulk forms. 
For example, quantum dots made of 
nanoscale semiconductor materials 
exhibit excellent and novel properties 
for display and lighting applications, 
and gold nanoparticles exhibit optical 
properties that make them excellent 
tools for medical imaging.
In 2004, the Royal Society (RS) and 
the Royal Academy of Engineering 
(RAE) published the world leading 
report Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: 
opportunities and uncertainties1. 
This report acknowledged both 
the significant opportunities in 
nanotechnologies for UK industry, 
as well as the challenges that their 
development posed.  As with the 
development of many emerging 
technologies, these challenges focused 
on uncertainties around risks to health 
and the environment. 
Researchers had already begun 
to investigate the toxicology and 
environmental impact of a range of 
nano-objects prior to the publication 
of the 2004 report, which stimulated 
further investment. Between 2002 
and 2007, the UK alone invested 
over £150 million in research into 
the development and impact of 
nanotechnologies. 
Despite this investment, issues still 
remain. Conflicting results and differing 
scientific opinion mean regulators still 
cannot always make adequate risk 
assessments and policymakers may 
lack the evidence to develop effective 
policy. For example, the European 
Commission’s Scientific Committee 
on Consumer Safety published its 
latest opinion on the use of nanoscale 
titanium dioxide in consumer 
products in 2013 (ref. 2), which stated that there were 
still uncertainties over the risk assessments used for 
nanomaterials, despite knowledge gaps being highlighted in 
the first opinion on the use of nanoscale titanium dioxide 
published 13 years ago.
One reason for this continued 
uncertainty is largely due to an 
issue raised in the 2004 report: a 
“need to develop, standardize 
and validate methods 
of measurement of 
nanoparticles and 
nanotubes”. This 
100nm development is essential 
for the accurate 
quantification of any 
potential risk. In layman’s 
terms, you cannot 
measure the toxicological 
or environmental impact of a 
material if you don’t know what 
it is or how to measure it correctly.
With UK government support, 
work is underway to address this 
issue. The National Physical Laboratory (NPL) is 
the UK’s centre of excellence in measurement 
research and represents the United Kingdom 
globally in measurement standards development. 
NPL undertakes research that aims to develop 
robust, repeatable measurement technologies and 
methods that can be applied reliably to understand, 
predict and manage potential risks of engineered 
nanoscale materials. By removing uncertainty 
around the impact of nanotechnologies on health 
and the environment, this work benefits regulators, 
policymakers and industry by increasing confidence 
in policy decisions. NPL’s world-renowned expertise 
and work in nanoscale measurement is being applied 
to the development of international standards that 
UK industry can follow, helping the United Kingdom 
to maintain a leading position in the field. 
Foremost in these activities is the NPL’s 
work with the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) technical committee (TC) 
229 Nanotechnologies. The BSI (British Standards 
Institution), in close co-operation with NPL and UK 
industry, put forward the case for TC 229, which 
was formed in 2006 and is chaired by the United 
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Kingdom. It has 34 participating and 13 observing
countries, along with liaison bodies including the
European Union.TC 229’s remit spans four work
packages, providing internationally agreed language; 
characterisation protocols; material specifications; and
health, safety and environmental standards. ISO TC
229 has published 39 documents, and over two dozen
are in progress. 
TC 229 is now eight years old, and the
standardization framework is beginning to have an
impact as published guidance and standards are taken
up by regulators, academia and industry. For example, 
in 2011 the European Commission recommended
a definition of a nanomaterial3 that cited the work
of TC 229. Other international standards have
been published in the areas of metrology, toxicity
measurement of engineered nanoparticles and carbon
nanotube characterization methods. Guidance on the
contentious issue of voluntary labelling of consumer
products has just been published4. 
Ten years on, the recommendations of the RS and RAE
report are having a meaningful impact, such as: 
• National centres for nanotoxicology being set
up, with advice from NPL on instrumentation and
measurement procedure. 
• A library of reference nanomaterials to support
researchers, which is available from LGC Standards in
Teddington.These were one of the key outputs from
a global project, led by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, in which NPL played
a central role undertaking physical and chemical
characterisation of some of the most important
nanomaterials in use. 
Much work remains to be done, but the next few
years will see a range of new standards, reference
materials and improved instrumentation and
methodology, all leading to: 
• More reliable toxicology and eco-toxicology testing, 
which will reduce uncertainty around risk. 
• Better regulation and policymaking. 
• More reliable industrial processes and quality
control, and the removal of barriers to international
trade in nanomaterials, leading to increased economic
benefits. 
collective compatibility84. Consequently, expectations can 
add to path dependencies mentioned above, compounding 
the ‘locking in’ of a particular innovation, and the crowding 
out of alternatives85.This is an issue that arises, for instance, 
from the conditions described in the nanotechnology case 
study36. 
Processes of learning, volume production and economies 
of scale can add to these positive feedbacks. For instance, 
‘lock in’ can be significantly further reinforced by measures 
to standardize infrastructures86, establish organizational 
momentum87, appropriate intellectual property88,89, build 
monopolies90, realize rent on value chains91, condition user 
preferences through marketing92, ‘capture’ regulators93 and 
‘entrap’ competing political interests94.The overall result of 
such so-called network externalities are a range of powerfu l 
increasing returns that can entrench a particular favoured 
trajectory and exclude other paths95. Despite being ignored
in the apparently simple policy language of ‘going forward’, 
these more complex dynamics in science and innovation do
not go unnoticed by interests wishing variously to reinforce
(or disrupt) particular pathways96, 97. If innovation policy is t o 
be fair and effective, it is therefore important that it attends
to these processes in explicit, direct and accountable ways. 
These challenges are formidable enough. But, as 
indicated above, problems of ‘lock in’ are intensified by the 
deliberate exercise of powerful interests at the earliest 
stages of an innovation process, in order intentionally to 
promote particular favoured pathways or disadvantage 
others98, 99. For instance, automobile manufacturers and 
allied industries sought historically to promote the car by 
suppressing competing urban public transport systems100. 
Lead compounds were also promoted as anti-knocking 
agents in transport fuels, at the expense of less profitable 
alcohol-based products, even though these were very early 
known to be less harmful57. Further examples of this more 
deliberate type of lock-in include the strategies of the 
tobacco industry over the past century to maintain high 
levels of consumption101. Before it was finally abandoned 
in most countries, the nuclear fuel reprocessing industry 
worked for many decades to condition continuing 
government support94. Likewise, ostensibly disinterested 
debates over alternative radioactive waste management 
Problems of ‘lock in’
are intensified by the
deliberate exercise of
powerful interests at
the earliest stages of an
innovation process. 
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strategies also inherently depend on – and help condition – 
future prospects for new nuclear power102,103. More recently, 
pharmaceutical industry strategies have been challenged 
for neglecting innovation of socially vital antimicrobials due 
to their low profitability104.  Where innovation systems 
are driven by these kinds of dynamics, there are especially 
important roles for democratically responsive government 
policy and collaborative international pressure. 
It is crucial not to misunderstand the implications of 
‘lock in’. In order to be successfully achieved, even the most 
positive innovation pathway will require some closing down 
in associated standards, regulations and practices105. So 
some degree of ‘lock in’ is not in itself necessarily always a 
bad thing. But it remains a significant policy dilemma, since 
it means that not all potentially good innovations that are 
technically practicable, economically feasible or socially 
viable will actually prove to be historically realisable. The 
most important point, then, is that these issues need to 
be discussed and addressed openly — and democratically 
— rather than brushed under the carpet or drowned in 
simplistic and polarising ‘pro’ claims, or ‘anti’ accusations, 
over innovation in general.
Opening Up Innovation Portfolios
Many of the retrospective examples above are judged with 
the benefit of hindsight. Looking forward in any given area, 
it becomes even more difficult to conclude definitively 
which of a variety of innovation pathways offers the 
most favourable balance of pros and cons. One especially 
important prospective example lies in the field of innovation 
for more sustainable global food systems106. How will a 
growing world population be fed at a time when natural 
environments are increasingly stressed107? Here there exists 
an especially rich diversity of possible innovation pathways, 
each with contrasting implications108, and many kinds of 
diversity are possible109. But public debates display a shared 
tendency on all sides to close down discussions, as if they 
were about simply being ‘for’ or ‘against’ the single family of 
innovations around genetic modification (GM), for example, 
which are favoured by the most powerful interests in this 
sector. 
With resulting policy debates polarized by this especially 
deep form of power play110, 111, it is often portrayed as if GM 
were — self-evidently and in-principle — either individually 
indispensable or uniquely unacceptable.  Whatever 
reasonable political perspectives are taken on the pros and 
cons of the many disparate innovation pathways in this 
field, neither of these positions is actually tenable. In fact, 
the much-discussed (apparently specific) innovation of ‘GM 
plant breeding’ is much more complex and ambiguous than 
often suggested by either critics or advocates alike. Technical
variations like transgenics, cisgenics, apomixis, gene editing, 
genomic assist and marker selection112 each offer partly 
overlapping and partly contrasting benefits and risks — 
and present important differences in their potential social, 
political, economic and ecological implications113. 
For example, among the more striking recent claims 
made for UK government-supported research towards 
 
enhanced sustainability in global staple crops, are the 
remarkable flood-tolerant qualities reported for ‘scuba 
rice’114. But these have been achieved through marker 
assisted backcrossing, rather than any form of transgenics115. 
So the most important factor typically differentiating GM 
technologies is not that they offer a unique means to secure 
crop improvement. The crucial distinction lies more often 
in the potential for innovating firms to recoup investments 
by obtaining rents on intellectual property or global supply 
and value chains116. For instance, transgenic crops are 
often deliberately engineered for tolerance to particular 
proprietary broad spectrum herbicides, thus expanding their 
sales117. Or the inclusion of particular transgenes can make 
the resulting organisms patentable, and thus more reliable 
sources of royalties118. It is the resulting commercial forces 
and counterforces that help make the ensuing discussions so 
regrettably polarized119. 
This point becomes even more important as attention 
extends beyond science-intensive innovations. Outside 
the techniques of molecular genetics, there are many 
other promising innovations for improving global food 
sustainability108. These include participatory breeding120, 
agricultural extension services121 and open source seed 
sharing methods122, which harness the innovative capacities 
of farmers themselves and help tailor crop development 
to important local conditions123. Likewise, there exist many 
innovations in wider agricultural practices that also offer 
significant benefits to the productivity of small farmers124, 
including intercropping125, integrated pest management126 
and other methods of ecological farming127 and sustainable 
agriculture128. 
Likewise organizational innovations in the food chain 
also offer potentially major benefits, including reforms to 
distribution systems, storage provision and better food 
waste management129.  Arguably the greatest implications for 
global food provision, however, are presented by innovations 
that are still wider in scope130, including reforms to land 
tenure and agricultural property rights120, income support 
for marginal famers131, social equity between different 
rural groups132, or moving diets towards lower meat 
consumption108. These kinds of innovation may often offer 
significantly greater benefits to poor farmers or consumers 
than science-intensive technological solutions. But their 
less attractive commercial benefits mean they remain, like 
Outside  the techniques of 
molecular genetics, there 
are many other promising 
innovations for improving 
global food sustainability.
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Cinderella, too often uninvited to the innovation party.  
 What is shown by this food sector example, is that — 
even in a specific area — innovation is not about simply 
‘forging ahead’, ‘lagging behind’ or ‘catching up’133. It is not 
a single-track race driven by a particular privileged field 
of science. Instead, it is about diversity, exploration and 
choice. This is why it is misleading to uphold particular 
pathways as offering exclusively ‘sound scientific’ or uniquely 
‘pro-innovation’ options (or for all contingently-emerging 
innovation to be asserted necessarily to be “great”).  And 
this is why exaggerated ‘no alternatives’ language (on any 
side) can polarize controversy and so also impede effective 
innovation policy. By seeking to invoke the general authority 
of science and technology in partisan ways, this kind of 
language does not only threaten effective innovation. It also 
risks compromising science and undermining democracy 
itself134. More mature and rational debate recognizes 
that choosing between the pros and cons of alternative 
innovation pathways like those exemplified here are less 
technical than they are political. 
A more reasonable and productive way to handle 
these crucial issues in innovation policy is to be more 
transparent, deliberate and accountable about when it is 
right to ‘open up’ and when to ‘close down’ in any particular 
field135. This means that no particular innovation should 
be unduly favoured by policy making, simply because of 
its appeal to particular powerful vested interests within 
a given innovation system. Nor should it be treated on 
these grounds as self-evidently uniquely unacceptable. 
Either position requires context and perspective-specific 
argument. In other words, what is needed is mature political 
debate, as much as ostensibly definitive analysis136.  What 
can be recognized as well, though, are the benefits of some 
requisite degree of diversity137.  And this is a general quality 
that can be achieved in many different ways — even to the 
extent of potentially excluding any particular innovation. 
This can be illustrated by the further example of the 
challenge of mitigating climate change by building zero-
carbon energy infrastructures. Here, decades of intensive 
research by government and industry bodies has shown 
that there exist (despite the formidable constraints) a 
range of alternative innovation pathways that are viable 
under contrasting equally-informed understandings138. For 
some, the solutions centre around nuclear power139. Others 
highlight large scale use of carbon capture and storage140. 
In the wings, momentum is growing behind expedient and 
idealized aspirations somehow deliberately to control the 
global climate through geoengineering141–145 – a technology 
threatening particularly acute and irreversible forms of ‘lock 
in’146, 147. Yet all the time, a rich array of renewable energy 
technologies is available for addressing climate change in 
a diversity of radically different distributed or centralized 
ways148–151. 
The key point is that there is no definitive technical 
or economic reason why any of the energy strategies 
above cannot (for better or worse) provide a basis for 
a variety of zero-carbon UK or global energy futures. 
Crucially, this includes the clear feasibility (equally for the 
UK and Europe147–153 and the world as a whole118, 119, 136, 154) 
of strategies built entirely around energy efficiency and 
renewable energy. Yet one of the main obstacles to this 
lies in high profile self-fulfilling assertions to the contrary, 
including by authoritative policy figures155, 156. In energy, 
as in the food sector discussed above, the obstacles to 
less favoured strategies are typically more commercial, 
institutional and cultural than they are technical.  Amongst 
the most potent of these political obstructions are claims 
from partisan interests — such as incumbent nuclear 
or fossil fuel industries — that there is no alternative 
to their favoured innovations and policies155. Even given 
the formidable constraints bearing on sustainable energy 
and agriculture157, there remains much hidden scope for 
radical choice.  And this is a matter for critical democratic 
deliberation as much as technical analysis21.
There are many ways to resist such unhelpful syndromes 
and to develop more reasonable debates about innovation. 
Some are about the style of discourse — for example, 
developing a greater tolerance on all sides for embracing 
adverse public reactions to particular innovation pathways. 
When they transcend privileged ‘not in my backyard’ 
parochialisms, general public preferences offer an important 
guide to the general orienting of innovation.  And just as 
scepticism is one of the crucial constituting qualities in 
science itself158, 159, so space for public scepticism and healthy 
critical debate can help improve the quality of innovation 
more generally160, 161.  With mainstream institutions often 
especially strongly disciplined by incumbent powerful 
interests, the role of delivering on this important quality of 
scepticism often falls disproportionately to civil society162. 
And this important role of wider society extends 
beyond debate and controversy. It is remarkable how 
many major global industries are building around once-
marginal technologies like wind turbines, ecological farming, 
super energy-efficient buildings, or green chemistry7.  All 
of these owe key elements in their pioneering origins to 
early development by grassroots social movements163. For 
instance, without the small country of Denmark remaining 
partly below the radar of international nuclear interests, able 
to nurture alternative energy strategies in the 1970s that 
were driven strongly by anti-nuclear social movements, it is 
arguable that the present global wind industry might never 
have become competitive164. This is just one of the examples 
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of innovations that were systematically marginalized — 
sometimes actively suppressed — by incumbent interests in 
science, government and industry165. 
It is of course important not to become too romantic 
about the dynamics of social movements and their favoured 
innovations162. These too warrant exactly the same kinds of 
healthy scepticism appropriate to other actors in innovation 
debates. But history does reveal the origins of many of the 
ostensibly driving environmental and social justice concerns, 
which currently play such prominent roles in justifications 
of current innovation policy.  Without decades of 
struggle by social movements dedicated to humanitarianism, 
environmentalism and social justice, it is doubtful that high- 
level global agenda-setting developments like the Stockholm 
Environment Conference or the Brundtland Commission or 
the Millenium Development Goals would ever have become 
as formative as they have166–170.  And this pattern is arguably 
reinforced by the history of continuing crucial roles played 
by civil society in other emancipatory transformations 
around colonialism, racism, women’s and gay rights171–177. 
Just as the famous dark matter in cosmology stabilizes the 
visible structures of galaxies, so these apparently intangible 
distributed social forces help condition the gradients 
that ultimately help forge and steer new directions for 
innovation172. The greater the critical interest in the most 
progressive orientations for innovation — rather than those 
that preserve the status quo — the more this is generally 
true.
Risk, Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Ignorance
These policymaking challenges are compounded because the 
pros and cons of different innovation pathways are — under 
all views — subject to seriously incomplete and problematic 
knowledge.  As discussed further in Chapter 6, the normal 
way to address these dilemmas is by means of regulatory 
risk assessment173, 174.  Although often not implemented in 
full, this prevailing approach invokes the apparent authority 
of probabilistic analysis175, 176 to assert a notionally single 
‘sound scientific‘ or ‘evidence-based’ picture177, 178. This task 
can be approached in many variously complex ways179, 180. But
at root, it involves alternative possible positive and negative 
outcomes being weighted by their respective likelihoods to 
aggregate a single overall ‘expected value’ for the balance of 
future benefits and harms181, 182. 
In conventional innovation policy and regulation, it is 
simply assumed that whatever products or technologies are 
most energetically advanced for risk assessment are in some 
way self-evidently beneficial183, 184. Questions then typically 
focus on whether any associated risks will be tolerable185, 
186. It is rare for the claimed benefits themselves to be 
rigorously scrutinized57, 187, let alone compared in a balanced 
way with other potential benefits of alternative innovation 
pathways58, 188. Therefore existing forms of risk regulation 
do little to address the wider issues in innovation politics 
discussed above. Innovation pathways backed by the most 
powerful interests typically prevail. 
Further challenges arise in the reliance of risk-based 
regulation on the methods provided by probability theory189, 
 
190. Probabilistic tools can be useful in tackling familiar, high-
frequency, relatively unchanging challenges, as found in the 
risk regulation of many urban transport or public health 
systems191, 192, for example.  Where empirical evidence arising 
from past experience is held to be a reliable guide to the 
future, these tools can be very powerful — as in established 
responses to familiar safety risks193. But where an innovation 
pathway (or its context) is novel, complex or rapidly 
changing, uncertainties cannot confidently be reduced to 
single definite probabilities194. Such inabilities to justify a 
single picture of probabilities can arise, for instance, in the 
regulation of nanotechnologies195 (see the case study in this 
chapter), endocrine disrupting chemicals196, or novel living 
organisms197. Under these conditions, it can be irrational 
to assert a single definitive ‘evidence-based’ picture198. In 
these fields (as more widely), policy making must often 
contend with contrasting — but equally reasonable — 
interpretations of uncertainty65, 78. These cannot reliably or 
rationally be reduced to simple numerical probabilities.
These are not the only limits to risk assessment. Beyond 
uncertainty in the sense discussed above199–200, there exists 
a further array of challenges201, 202. These involve not the 
relative likelihoods of different outcomes, but the meanings 
of the possibilities themselves. For instance, divergent views 
may exist over how to categorize or partition different 
kinds of benefit or harm. Or there may be questions over 
exactly how to frame the various dimensions under which 
these are defined203.  What are the appropriate imaginations, 
understandings, values, or interests according to which they 
should be interpreted or prioritized204? There may also be 
differences over which innovation pathways to include or 
exclude from scrutiny, or how to allocate attention76. 
These are challenges of ambiguity — contradictory 
certainties205 — rather than strict uncertainty206, 218.  And risk 
assessment is no more able to resolve these disagreements 
over meanings as over likelihoods207. Indeed, Nobel Prizes 
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have been awarded in rational choice theory, for axiomatic 
proofs demonstrating there can be no definitive way to 
guarantee the calculation of a particular optimum balance 
between contending ways to interpret, measure or prioritize
possible outcomes208, 209.Yet such challenges remain not only 
the norm in many innovation debates, but constitute the 
key issues in contention in controversies like those over 
alternative agricultural, energy or health strategies210. Under 
ambiguity, claims to derive single definitive ‘sound scientific’ 
or ‘evidence-based’ prescriptions are not only seriously 
misleading, they are an oxymoron211. 
The above difficulties may seem tricky enough. But even 
more intractable than uncertainty and ambiguity is the 
further challenge of ignorance77, 201, 212, 213. Here, possibilities 
are not just disagreed upon, but at least some are entirely 
unexpected202, 214.This was the case, for example, in the early 
regulatory history of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE)215, endocrine-disrupting chemicals216 and damage by 
CFCs to stratospheric ozone217. Like many other cases55, 
56, these involved mechanisms that were not just thought 
unlikely at the inception of the issue, but were at the time 
‘unknown unknowns’218. Whenever we don’t know what 
we don’t know219, the prospect of possible ‘black swans’ is 
raised220.These challenges are not about calculable risk, but 
inherently unquantifiable surprises222,234, 235.To seek to assign 
single definite values for risk in these circumstances is not 
just irrational but dangerous223. 
Surprise is not necessarily always a bad thing. It is intrinsic 
to the rationale for blue skies science — as well as research 
and innovation more generally — that positive benefits 
can also be entirely unexpected221. An example might be 
the laser — a novel laboratory phenomenon that was for 
a long time a tool without a use224. Likewise, although it 
raises many variously questionable applications, the internet 
has also undoubtedly given rise to a host of benefits that 
were initially entirely unexpected225. But it is also clear — 
for instance in areas like nanotechnology — that there is 
no guarantee that further research will necessarily reduce 
uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance226.  As Albert Einstein 
famously observed, it is often the case that the more 
we learn, the more we find we don’t know227.This is not 
necessarily bad — indeed, it is a key motivation in science228. 
It is instead political pressures that resist the humility of 
acknowledging ignorance229. Either way, it is clear that some 
of the greatest dilemmas in innovation governance extend 
well beyond risk, because they are about surprises. With 
conventional regulatory risk assessment entirely unable to 
deal with this deepest form of incertitude, the importance 
of robust critical deliberation and wider political argument 
about innovation is seriously reinforced. 
Precaution and Diversity 
One widely established and intensely debated response to 
these challenges in innovation policy is the precautionary 
principle230, 231. Although it comes in many forms232, a 
classic general expression of precaution is that scientific 
uncertainty is not a reason for inaction in preventing serious 
damage to human health or the environment233. By explicitly 
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hinging on uncertainty rather than risk, precaution helps 
to promote recognition that social choices in innovation 
are not reducible to ostensibly precise, value-free, technical
risk assessments234.These dilemmas are instead explicitly 
recognized to involve wider issues and alternatives requirin g 
overtly value-based — and thus political in this sense — 
deliberations over policy. 
This message is inconvenient to many powerful partisan 
perspectives wishing to dragoon the authority of science 
as a whole in favour of specific interests235. Often driven 
by such motives, opposition to precaution rests largely 
on assertions (or assumptions) that established ‘science­
based’ regulatory risk assessment offers both a sufficient 
general response to the challenges of social choices across 
alternative innovation pathways, and a particular way to 
justify favoured technologies236, 237. So, precaution remains 
a subject of much misunderstanding and mischief238, 239,241. 
This often involves ironically emotive rhetoric in supposed 
defence of reason240. It is on these grounds, for instance, 
that arguments are sometimes made that it is somehow 
irrational not to always use probabilities to qualify potentia l 
hazards. In this way, many critics of precaution mistakenly 
ignore uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance, insisting 
instead that these be treated as if they were risk182. The 
precautionary principle has played a crucial role in fosterin g 
more rational reflection about these highly political 
pressures on the use and abuse of science in technology 
regulation. 
Treating general dilemmas of uncertainty, ambiguity 
and ignorance as a simple state of risk perpetrates the 
misunderstandings discussed above: that probabilistic 
analysis is universally applicable, and that innovation is 
a single-track race. When these misapprehensions are 
corrected, precaution can be recognized simply as a guide 
to the more rational and realistic steering of social choice 
among possible innovation pathways242. So precaution is 
not (as often alleged) about being somehow generally 
‘anti-innovation’ or ‘anti-science’240, 243, 244. Instead, it simply 
urges greater rational consideration of different aspects of 
incertitude than can reasonably be reduced merely to risk 56, 
231, 236, 260, 261. 
Consequently, precaution does not automatically mean 
abandoning any particular innovation, still less innovation 
in general247. Contrary to many claims248, there is nothing 
inherent in the precautionary principle that automatically 
requires bans249, or makes it biased in its applicability to 
innovations of contrasting provenance250, 251. Precautionary 
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action inhibiting any one innovation pathway inevitably 
favours another245.  And precaution does not even mean 
abandoning risk assessment204, 267. It simply reminds us that 
risk-based approaches do not offer a complete response to 
the deeper challenges of choice252. 
Precaution is also a guard against the error of treating 
the absence of evidence of harm as evidence of absence 
of harm253. This is often a particular danger for innovations 
whose novelty means there has been little time for evidence 
to accumulate, or where incumbent interests discourage 
research or assessment of the requisite kinds254. Before 
invoking a lack of evidence of harm, it is necessary to 
think about how visible this evidence might actually be 
expected to be if it existed, or how vigorously it is sought255.  
Uncovering false negatives is often more important than 
identifying false positives57.  In this respect, precaution is a 
guard against misleading blinkers favouring the status quo256. 
In essence, precaution simply highlights that innovation 
policy and associated politics should pay more careful 
attention to the intrinsically problematic nature of 
knowledge, as well as its vulnerability to economic and 
political pressures. But it does not just highlight problems. 
The precautionary principle also opens the door to 
solutions — pointing to a range of rigorous and practical 
strategies for dealing with the realities of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and ignorance in innovation257. These ‘Cinderella 
methods’ can be neglected if there persists a sense that risk 
assessment alone is sufficient223. Practical examples include 
a range of different practices for opening up regulatory 
appraisal, research strategies and innovation policy258, as well 
as the prioritising of qualities like reversibility259, resilience260 
and flexibility261. 
Rather than resting hubristically on an ostensibly definitive 
picture of the pros and cons at some particular point in 
time, these precautionary strategies acknowledge stronger 
grounds for greater humility229. They prioritize measures 
to maximize learning201 and adaptability262 in careful step-
by-step implementation rather than optimistic wishful 
thinking263. This in turn means taking particular care when 
appraising or pursuing innovation pathways that might lead 
to irreversible effects249, or whose associated infrastructures 
might prove to be especially inflexible250.  All else being 
equal, when a range of innovation pathways look as if they 
present similar balances of pros and cons, precaution simply 
highlights that it is reasonable to prioritize that which is 
more reversible over the less flexible alternatives264. 
At root, a key value of precaution lies in helping to free 
policy debates from the Panglossian fallacy that the most 
powerfully favoured innovation pathways are somehow 
necessarily the best or only option265. It reminds us that 
particular values also need to be applied, especially around 
human health and environmental integrity266. This enables 
societies to discuss rationally and directly when it is right 
for governance deliberately to discourage or discontinue 
a particular entrenched trajectory267. The crucial point 
is that precaution makes this possible without incurring 
existential anxieties over innovation in general.  As a general 
principle, it offers a flexible means to avoid simply relying on 
hopes that powerful vested interests will be spontaneously 
relinquished.  And in this, precaution points to a further 
quality in research and innovation systems, namely diversity. 
Even though it is neither a panacea, nor a ‘free lunch’268, 
nor self-evident in its composition, diversity is a vital 
consideration in research and innovation policy54. Like 
other strategies, it brings its own challenges and remains 
intrinsically a matter for political judgement. But in any given 
area, recognition of the importance of diversity encourages 
caution about concentrating resources in support of the 
particular innovations that happen to be favoured by the 
most powerful interests269. Diversity urges instead greater 
attention to alternatives, leading to more deliberately and 
systematically-constituted portfolios comprised of some 
balanced variety of disparate innovation pathways54. 
In these terms, diversity offers a remarkably practical way 
to help address several otherwise intractable innovation 
problems. It offers a ‘resource pool’270 helping to nurture 
creativity55, mitigate lock-in95, hedge against surprise271, 
accommodate ambiguity272, resolve irreconcilable interests273 
and cultivate resilience274.  And by fostering more intensive 
encounters between varying kinds of knowledge and 
practice, deliberate diversification can also help enhance 
innovation processes themselves275, and make them 
more effective and socially responsive and robust276. It is 
remarkable to find so many otherwise intractable challenges 
addressed (albeit always provisionally and incompletely) 
by a single operational strategy.  And there exist plenty of 
useful tools to help focus more concretely at the level of 
innovation portfolios277, 278.
Consequently, deliberate diversification is one key 
pragmatic way to deliver greater precaution, while also 
helping to diffuse unhelpful polarisation in debates over 
innovation279. This is aided by more explicit and measured 
pursuit of portfolios of innovations in particular areas, rather 
than single, privileged, supposedly uniquely ‘scientifically-
sound’, ‘evidence based’ solutions. Moreover, a focus on 
diversity may also help to develop greater political tolerance 
for the otherwise difficult — but inevitable — kinds 
of failure that are so essential to effective learning280. If 
commitments lie at the level of diverse portfolios rather 
than single supposedly ‘no alternative’ solutions, then it 
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becomes easier to accept and justify the kinds of failures 
that contribute so much to learning. 
To help realize these concrete benefits, however, diversity 
must move away from being a fig leaf or argument-of-last­
resort for some otherwise ill-favoured but powerfully-
backed choice281. It is all too easy to support otherwise 
indefensible proposals on the basis that “we must do 
everything”282.This invites powerful interests to continue 
insisting on the adoption of their own favoured policy, 
simply on the grounds that every option must be pursued283. 
There are typically many kinds of diversity, each exclusive in 
some ways and inclusive in others269, 284. As with individual 
innovation pathways, the detailed constituting of diversity 
also involves inherently political judgements. By urging this 
greater attention to diversity (as in other ways), precaution 
can be as much a spur to innovation in general, as a brake 
on any specific kind. 
Three Key Conclusions 
Formulating an adequate response to the challenges 
discussed in this chapter requires being clear about the 
resulting practical implications for policy.There have been 
many recent reports outlining concrete recommendations 
for research and innovation strategies, and the wider policy 
procedures and political debates in which these are set. 
The European Science Foundation usefully reviewed key 
background issues on the relations between research and 
innovation systems across wider European societies285. 
The Expert Group on Science and Governance put this 
in the context of the European ‘Knowledge Society’246. 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics looked at the most 
effective institutional practices for governing newly-
emerging technologies36.The UK’s Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council helpfully identified a number 
of responsibilities to be encouraged across all actors in 
innovation systems286. A ‘new manifesto’ funded by the UK’s
Economic and Social Research Council explores some of 
the global implications287. Many other international initiatives
contribute much further detail288, 289,290. But the general 
practical implications are quite readily summarized in terms 
of three overarching principles: participation, responsibility 
and precaution256. 
First, there is public participation in innovation. Policymakin g 
should more explicitly and transparently acknowledge the 
inherently political (rather than purely scientific or technical ) 
nature of the interests and motivations driving contending 
pathways for innovation. As addressed in Chapter 5, 
this requires sincere and detailed forms of participatory 
deliberation and wider engagement with diverse public 
perspectives.This is not about fostering credibility, trust 
or acceptance291, but about helping to determine the 
priority directions for research and innovation292. Nor 
is participation about political correctness, or relativism 
about science (implying a position that ‘anything goes’293). 
Indeed, public engagement often offers the most effective 
way to illuminate how particular extant understandings 
are inappropriate in any given context. In essence, public 
engagement is simply about more rigorous exploration of 
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specific ways in which legitimate judgements about benefits, 
excellence, relevance, risk and impact all depend partly (but 
irreducibly) on values and assumptions as well as evidence. 
In other words, it is only through effective public 
participation that policy can address how valid 
understandings of the appropriate directions for research 
and innovation are inherently ‘plural and conditional’105. 
‘Plural’, because a number of contrasting interpretations 
are typically equally robust. ‘Conditional’, because the 
salience of each depends partly on perspectives and 
circumstances. A rich variety of carefully developed 
participatory and deliberative practices are available, with 
varying kinds of value in different contexts294–295.  And 
crucially, participation does not just mean talking about 
innovation, but also inclusion in the means for supporting 
the actual doing of innovation7, 296, 297. So in engagement — as 
in innovation itself — there are key roles for the creative 
arts, humanities and civil society. Some approaches are less 
formally structured than others, involving uninvited as well 
as invited engagement298. But together, these enable more 
careful scrutiny of how reasonably differing understandings, 
assumptions, uncertainties, questions, priorities and values 
can legitimately favour contrasting innovation pathways in 
any particular area299. In short, greater participation helps to 
open up deeper and wider appreciations of alternatives258. 
In this way, diverse forms of public engagement can 
supplement, enrich and inform (rather than substitute) the 
conventional procedures of representative democracy300. 
And freed from the pressures to pretend at ostensibly 
definitive,‘sound scientific’ prescriptions, decisions may 
become not only more democratically legitimate, but also 
more efficient and timely. 
The second major policy imperative sits alongside, and is 
reinforced by, the value of public participation.This involves 
all actors in research and innovation processes — especially 
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the most powerful — taking more direct and explicit 
responsibility for the consequences and uncertainties of their 
activities.  As addressed in Chapter 9, this involves serious 
effort to be reflective in anticipating, describing and analysing 
the impacts that might arise, as well as the attendant 
ambiguities and unknowns. This helps to avoid the ‘organized 
irresponsibility’ of otherwise passing the buck to insurers, 
regulators, victims, the state, or society at large to deal with 
inevitable unintended and indirect outcomes301.  Assisted by 
public engagement, responsibility involves being more open 
about the motivating aims and interests of relevant actors. 
Responsibility is not about aspiring — let alone claiming — 
to predict or control consequences. Nor is it about simple 
exhortations to trust302. Instead, responsibility is about 
trustworthiness303. It means going beyond conventionally 
narrow institutional and economic interests, to care — 
and be accountable — for wider social and environmental 
implications. 
Crucially, the aim of responsibility is not to assert a single 
definitive technical authority, as is too often emphasized in 
conventional risk regulation. Instead, responsibility informs 
engagement by helping illuminate a range of contending 
directions for decision making. There is nothing about this 
process that should make decision making more protracted 
or burdensome. Indeed, by helping to avert ill-advised 
trajectories at an early stage, engagement and responsibility 
can enable innovation to become more effective in 
addressing social values40. This does suggest particular 
responsibilities for the media, though. The discussion in 
this chapter has shown that it is quite simply irresponsible 
to pretend (as is too often the case) that science and 
technology are apolitical.  What is required instead is a less 
simplistic and romantic portrayal of technical expertise. 
The media hold especially important responsibilities for 
enabling more realistic, mature and open debates about 
the inherently contestable and power-laden nature of both 
scientific knowledge and technological innovation.
This leads to the third and final general policy implication: 
that greater and more deliberate efforts are needed to 
moderate the powerful forces of closure and ‘lock-in’ in 
science and technology. This chapter has described the 
particular value of precaution as a way to address this 
point. Rather than treating existing patterns of research 
and innovation as value-free, the precautionary principle 
strikes a stronger balance under uncertainty, in favour of 
human health, environmental integrity and social well-being 
in steering innovation priorities. Thus guided by precaution, 
engagement and responsibility can elucidate more clearly 
what might be meant by these values in any given context. 
Together, these complementary imperatives help to provide 
a counterweight to otherwise dominant incumbent interests.
In particular, precaution directly addresses the tendencies 
for uncertainties, ambiguities and ignorance to be closed 
down in the most convenient directions, as if they were just 
‘risk’. 
Once innovation is recognized as a branching rather 
than single-track process, it becomes clear that precaution 
is also not about impeding innovation, but steering it. 
 
Acknowledging the scope for systematic deliberation 
over values, priorities and alternatives in the context of 
uncertainty, precaution broadens out risk regulation to 
allow greater consideration for a wider plurality of issues, 
options, perspectives and scenarios. This can help enable 
entrepreneurs, smaller businesses, new entrants, civil society 
groups and marginalized interests (as well as government) to 
challenge and reshape established trajectories.  As we have 
seen, precaution also implies a greater focus on qualities 
of diversity, flexibility and responsiveness.  And a final key 
lesson of precaution is that research and innovation policy 
should seek to respect and embrace (rather than manage or 
curtail) public mobilization and critical dissent. In essence, 
precaution expresses the fundamental principle that — in 
innovation just as in science itself — reasoned scepticism 
fosters greater quality.
Further practical implications of these principles of 
participation, responsibility and precaution are returned to 
in the Government Chief Scientific Advisor’s Annual Report 
2014. But in concluding this chapter, we return to a point 
made at the beginning. In any given area, innovation is not 
so much about a race to optimize a single pathway, but a 
collaborative process for exploring diverse alternatives. 
Current noisy anxieties over single-track competitive 
innovation races tend to be driven by expedient pressures 
from incumbent interests. These can conceal or deny 
underlying motives, uncertainties and alternatives. Instead, 
the three principles of participation, responsibility and 
precaution can help innovation policy escape from currently 
narrow (often fear-driven) supposed technical inevitabilities. 
They illuminate how innovation is fundamentally about the 
politics of contending hopes21. Most importantly of all, it is 
perhaps only in these ways that we can move away from 
narrowly technocratic ideas of a knowledge economy246, 
to nurture instead a more realistic, rational and vibrant 
innovation democracy. 
A more fully referenced version of this paper is posted at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/prfh0/innovation_democracy.
pdf
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CHAPTER 5: HOLDING 
A WIDER CONVERSATION
It is necessary – and unavoidable – for innovation policy to include a broader 
range of views, as the experiences of the GM and radioactive waste disposal 
consultations demonstrate.
Tim O’Riordan 
(University of East Anglia)
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Science has forever been a reflection of changing cultures. In many respects, science advances as a series of unfolding conversations. These conversations 
take place within the host of scientific communities; 
between scientists and their funders, sponsors and power 
brokers; amongst the many social and ideological interests of
the various publics that compose democracy and citizenship; 
and between scientists, policy makers and the multitudinous 
publics.  Andy Stirling has introduced this special engagement
in Chapter 4. 
Conversation is an art-form which may have to be re-
learnt. Daniel Menaker suggests1 that conversation has 
many purposes: gossip, grooming, socialising, and learning. 
For the purposes of this chapter, conversation requires 
empathy and understanding between the communicating 
parties; a willingness to tolerate different views through 
respect and sensitivity; but crucially a commitment to learn 
and to realize how and when to agree and to disagree. 
Conversation is both inherent and learned. Social animals 
communicate for prosperity, for survival and for love, 
to appreciate danger, and to judge risk.  Widening the 
conversation is a democratic necessity, a reflection of basic 
human rights, and an expression of responsible citizenship 
(see case study). Yet in the present age, such a course cannot 
be taken for granted. So extending understanding and 
engagement may prove to be a vital cohesive force for an 
anxious polity.
In an age of expanding global reach and a shrinking local 
sphere, addressing innovation and risk has to grapple with 
the changing political and social attention span. (In Chapter 
10, Nick Becksted and Toby Ord consider both catastrophic 
and ‘beyond catastrophic’ (existential) risks in this larger 
context). Social attention span in turn is distracted by the 
social media, with their exuberance of free expression 
that is usually unencumbered by the restraints of peer 
acceptance. The emerging discourse is fragmented, but 
overall it is learning and responding. This creative interaction 
provides the setting for this chapter. Holding a wider 
conversation is unavoidable and vibrant. If done well, it 
will recreate science as an extension of social and political 
learning. The focus on innovation and risk, with its inherent 
contradictions and interdependencies from the outset, offers
robustness and timeliness to this enlarging conversation.
 
 
 
Political anxieties, innovation and risk
We are experiencing the deepest and most prolonged 
economic restructuring of the modern era.  Across the 
globe, the future of the next generation of school leavers 
depends on them acquiring skills over accelerating 
technology and rapidly changing business management 
styles, which too few are trained to master2.  We are in 
danger of creating a ‘lost generation’ out of step with 
preparing for a sustainable age unless we tap the essentials 
of entrepreneurship3. This damaging process could be 
worsened if observable inequality of income and career 
development becomes more widely recognized. Thomas 
Piketty believes that the asymmetry of wealth creation and 
accumulation will result in considerable social tension in the 
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coming years4. His policy prescriptions are controversial, but 
the basic argument is not disputed5. This prospect is leading 
to a vibrant examination of the links between wellbeing as a 
basis for judging economic and social betterment; for social 
investment as a contribution to assisting especially young 
people to become better equipped for a changing economy 
and democracy; and for greater equality to be given a 
higher profile in any consideration of a transition to greater 
sustainability6. Lying behind these themes are considerations 
of new forms of democracy; new forms of financing 
sustainability investments, especially at the sub-national level; 
and new forms of sustainability learning for leadership in 
schools and in higher education.
Official reports from the UK Office for National Statistics7 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development8 point to a widening of economic and social 
inequality in many parts of the developing and developed 
world. Opinion polls, though containing mixed messages, 
reveal a growing sense of despair in many developed 
economies among the lower-middle and middle classes  
(the beneficiaries of innovation and of political stability 
in the past) that the fortunes for their offspring will 
forever diminish9. This is a recipe for disenchantment and 
disengagement. Mobility and aspiration are the lifeblood of 
prosperity and democracy. Snatch these away and the scope 
for creative and effective dialogue over innovation and risk 
diminishes. If the benefits of innovation appear to apply 
selectively to the few (the entrepreneur, the well-connected, 
the expensively trained, and prosperous elderly), then 
any associated risks may become linked more to a sense 
of social disgruntlement than to apparent danger. If this 
disaffection is reinforced by anxiety (over the outcomes of 
climate change, or the failure of the shrinking public purse to 
protect the vulnerable) then the appetite for holding a wider 
conversation lessens. The debate about innovation and risk 
has to address the deepening concerns over the indecencies 
of ill-being and frustrated democratic intervention. This is 
part of the envelope for successful innovation introduced 
by Nick Stern and his colleagues in Chapter 1. They also 
emphasise skills training, encouragement of enterprise and 
trusting democratic procedures, which I will address in the 
case studies that conclude this chapter.
In a very challenging manner, the special theme for 
the emerging debates over innovation and risk lies in 
addressing the changing nature of economic success and 
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CASE STUDY
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RISK
Karen Hulme and Sabine Michalowski (University of Essex)
Human rights have an important role to play when considering regulatory responses to new technologies, because they provide a legally 
binding framework within which such decisions need to 
be made. 
Human rights are often defined in a rather general 
way, are far from absolute, and they can be limited 
by conflicting rights and societal interests.  As such, 
they do not necessarily provide clear answers to the 
question of how government should address risk and 
innovation. They can, however, set limits and provide a 
framework for conceptualising the relevant questions 
and responses, because any approach to risk regulation 
needs to take into account the rights of those who are 
potentially affected. 
When balancing these rights with those of potential 
beneficiaries, as well as the broader public interest, 
policymakers must ensure that any risks associated 
with an innovation are not disproportionately borne by 
vulnerable groups in society, who might be more likely 
to act as research subjects but are less likely to benefit 
from the associated scientific advances, for example; or 
they might live in areas that are negatively affected by a 
particular technology.
Governments have an obligation to protect 
individuals from risks that could put their life or 
health in danger, and from innovations that could 
adversely affect their privacy.  At the same time, 
however, the right to life and health might require 
innovative medical advances — in the form of 
mitochondrial replacement therapy, for example — 
while the right to private and family life may demand 
access to innovative reproductive techniques. 
Many advances in web technology also engender 
risks for human rights — specifically the right to 
privacy — such as the increasing availability of medical 
apps, especially related to the production, storage and 
handling of sensitive data. Key privacy issues raised 
by such technologies include: who has access to this 
information; what information is being uploaded for 
consumption by others; and how much control does 
the individual keep over their personal information? 
These advances create additional risks when people 
do not appreciate the limits of the technology — as 
a result, they may trust it beyond its capabilities, with 
consequent risks to the right to life and health.
 In the push to deliver innovative scientific 
solutions to global problems — such as using genetic 
modification, nanotechnology and geoengineering — 
there are equally obvious human rights implications 
that highlight the need for broad consultation (the right 
to information, and the right to a healthy environment). 
Those assessing the risks of innovation must give 
sufficient weight to any potentially disastrous impacts 
on health or livelihood, such as the impact of 
ocean acidification on fishing communities, for 
example. But these must be balanced with the 
potential for novel technologies to guarantee 
human rights such as the right to food and the 
right to health.
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social learning. This places much greater emphasis on the 
notion of wellbeing with its qualities of personal esteem, 
confidence building, leadership, enterprise, and cooperation 
as a basis for improving personal and public health; for 
enabling capabilities to flourish in everyone; and for offering 
meaningful ways to change local circumstances for the 
betterment of neighbours as well as of families. Only a 
flourishing and more equalizing society can converse across 
social space with confidence and compassion.
Science can play a vital part in this process.  Alex Ryan 
and Daniela Tilbury argue for new approaches to learning 
for sustainability leadership for young people10. They call for 
a fresh approach to critical analysis; to more cooperative 
forms of learning between students and faculty and all 
manner of stakeholders beyond the classroom; and for much
more creative approaches to combining the imaginings of 
all pupils in laying out future outcomes and consequences 
for the fair treatment of future generations. Theirs is a plea 
for much more student leadership in learning, and for much 
greater freedom to explore fresh approaches to analysing 
circumstances and devising ways forward. Here is a recipe 
for a science for sustainability in which holding a wider 
conversation plays a fascinating and creative role. 
This report covers all of the key features of relating 
innovation to risk. It especially concentrates on the many 
ways in which risks are judged, and the emerging global 
and local contexts in which decisions have to be made 
regarding innovation to better future societies the world 
over.  And it forces recognition of the requirement of 
resilience in the design of innovative success. Resilience 
is sometimes misapplied as a byword for sustainability 
because the essential ingredient of sustainability is self-
reliance. Self-reliance can best be visualized and attained by a
setting for innovation where wellbeing, fairness, adaptability 
and leadership enable everyone to converse with shared 
understanding for a much more fair and tolerable 
democracy in a limiting but forgiving planet.
Holding a wider conversation, therefore, has to take into 
account changing perceptions of democracy, fairness of 
treatment, opportunities for flourishing, and a culture of 
belonging to the ever-changing worlds of risk and innovation.
It is by no means confined to conversing. Nick Pidgeon 
observes in Chapter 8 that risk tolerance is a function of 
critical trust formation which arrives with creative forms 
of engagement and independent referentials of advice 
and commentary.  We shall see that such procedures 
are now being offered by the government in its recently 
revised consultation White Paper on geological disposal of 
radioactive waste11.
 
 
 
On widening engagement
The Lords’ Committee on Science and Technology reviewed 
the troubled relationship between science and society12. It 
noted strands that are carried forward in this report, namely 
that science is being dissected for its probity, its sources 
of funding and its intended audience. The Committee also 
examined how science is standing in the public dock over 
who seems to be gaining from its benefits and over what 
period of time, and to what degree science is attentive to 
various underlying public concerns that normally transcend 
scientific analysis. Two particular observations presented in 
the executive summary of the Committee’s report stand 
out:
• “Some issues currently treated by decision-makers as 
scientific issues in fact involve many other factors besides 
science. Framing the problem wrongly by excluding moral, 
social, ethical and other concerns invites hostility.”
• “Underlying people’s attitudes to science are a variety of 
values. Bringing these into the debate and reconciling them 
are challenges for the policy-maker.”
 
Four cases of risk in relation to both science and 
technological innovation emphasize these observations. 
One is the BSE scare, which highlighted the contentious 
links between bioscience and the commercial food industry 
(see Chapter 9).  Another similar theme, still very much in 
evidence, is the long running public hostility to genetically 
modified (GM) crops and food (see case study in Chapter 
11).  A third, also yet to be resolved, is the non-acceptance 
of safe disposal of long-lived radioactive waste (see below). 
The fourth, also still highly politically contentious, is the 
hydraulic fracturing of methane-containing shale formations 
(see case study on fracking at the end of Section 2). These 
case studies contribute to the evidence base of this chapter.
What characterizes all four of these typical but not 
exhaustive innovation-risk examples is the science-led 
initial development; the connection to a profitmaking 
commercial sector; an unbalanced distribution between 
those who gain and those who are exposed to the 
perceived risks; an inconsistency over the seemingly wide 
ranging general benefit of the technology and the localized 
or targeted exposure to any residual risks; complicated 
time frames of immediate gain and prolonged uncertain 
disadvantages, especially for future generations; and a deeply 
felt resentment amongst vociferous antagonists that their 
preciously held underlying values are being excluded from 
the final policy decision. In essence these case studies 
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give the impression that certain kinds of innovation are 
generated to an advanced stage of implementation without 
either democratic involvement, decency of treatment, 
fairness of distribution of gain and losses, or a truly listening 
political class.
The various examples that pervade this report require 
the attention of a wider conversation. Before and after the 
Lords’ Committee report, there was a general call for much 
more openness, honesty, transparency and participatory 
engagement in the whole process of shaping policy when 
science, technology, public policy and economic prosperity 
interact. This febrile ferment was also much influenced by 
an equally influential report by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution on incorporating public values in 
environmental standard setting and regulation13. Here the 
Commission pleaded for a much wider public involvement 
together with a more normative role for environmental 
regulation: 
• “Better ways need to be developed for articulating people’s 
values and taking them into account from the earliest 
stage in what have been hitherto relatively technocratic 
procedures” (page 119).
• “No method for determining or articulating people’s values 
whether traditional or novel provides a guaranteed solution. 
Novel approaches should be evaluated for their ability to 
elicit a full spectrum of values on the issue in question from 
representative participants. So that the procedures used can 
be refined in the light of experience and their full potential 
realised” (page 111).
The intellectual and political turmoil over innovation and 
risk led to a period of intensive academic research. This 
focussed on the need to look much more critically at the 
ethical and power-related settings which underpin the 
emergence of innovation14; over the need to place much 
more emphasis on the earlier discussion of any emerging 
discovery so as to clarify the ‘framing’ (biases) and the 
genuine human needs for any innovation15; and for new 
forms of facilitated dialogue, or ‘deliberative mapping’16, 17.
This corpus of research led in turn to important shifts in 
the institutional architecture of science-policy studies. The 
Royal Society created a Working Group on Nanotechnology 
and Nanoscience in 2004 (ref.18), and with its sister 
institution the Royal Academy of Engineering formed a 
wide-ranging consultation on geoengineering19. The UK 
government established Sciencewise in 2005, which took 
over the work of its Committee of the Public Understanding 
of Science.  And in response to the Council for Science and 
Technology, Science and Society Subgroup recommendation 
that the UK government should establish a “corporate 
memory” to improve dialogue with the public20, the 
Sciencewise Expert Resource Centre for Public Dialogue 
in Science and Innovation was created in 2008. Since then, 
Sciencewise has instigated a program of capacity building, 
learning, and embedding best practice in public dialogue 
across government and beyond. It has also supported and 
guided 17 experimental dialogue projects in the period 
2005 through 2011 on issues ranging from nanotechnology 
and stem cell research, to the uses of DNA in forensics and 
geoengineering to combat climate change21.
Jason Chilvers reports that much of this activity is 
based on professional practitioners often associated with 
consulting firms, as well as outsourced experiments on 
public consultation by regulatory bodies and governments17. 
Accordingly, there is a tendency towards a form of 
professionalized ‘closed shop’ in deliberation because of 
a format that relies on expertise and highly articulated 
communication. ‘Ordinary publics’ do not get a look-in. 
This practice flies in the face of a huge body of research 
instigated by Jurgen Habermas on “ideal speech”22, as 
commented on by James Johnson23. In essence the Habermas 
doctrine is that much of consultation (“communicative 
discourse”) is designed to meet particular objectives 
through the controlled use of structured reasoning.  As a 
consequence, those with deeper and wider value biases 
may be silenced. Hence any agreement is distorted.  A more 
democratic approach would be to ensure that all those 
involved are treated with respect and encouraged to speak 
authentically — namely, what they feel and believe to be 
their true moral expression.  As such, the Habermasian 
underpinning of deliberation is based on a much more 
empathetic and ethical approach to conversing. This opens 
up the scope for dialogue to be extended to the workplace, 
the neighbourhood centre, the household and the church.
For the social scientist this perspective creates a dilemma. 
On the one hand there is a strong academic demand for 
carefully managed methodologies designed to ensure 
some distance between observers and participants. On 
the other is an emerging normative belief that the role 
of facilitator should be to widen the basis of science to 
a much more transdisciplinary perspective, in which the 
translation process of the mix of values and knowledge 
is shared between facilitators and participants. This is the 
view promulgated in the practice of learning for leadership 
being undertaken by a new breed of sustainability science/
knowledge broker, as summarized by Ryan and Tilbury10:
• learner empowerment: by actively involving participants in 
learning development and in processes of ‘co-creation’ of 
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knowledge across disciplines and backgrounds.
• future-facing education: by refocusing learning towards 
engagement and change processes that help people to 
consider prospects and hopes for the future and to 
anticipate, rethink and work towards alternative and 
preferred future scenarios. 
• inter-cultural learning: by replacing dominant teaching that 
promotes only Western worldviews, in favour of experiences 
that extend inter-cultural understanding and the ability to 
think and work using globally-sensitive frames and methods. 
• transformative capabilities:  by creating an educational focus 
beyond an emphasis solely on knowledge and understanding, 
towards agency and competence.
• crossing boundaries: by taking an integrative and systemic 
approach to learning, to generate inter-disciplinary, inter-
professional and cross-sectoral learning, to maximize 
collaboration and shared perspective, while being 
empathetic to bias and differences of perspective. 
• social learning: by developing cultures and environments 
for learning that harness the emancipatory power of 
interactions outside of the formal curriculum and classroom, 
particularly through the use of new technologies and 
internship activities. 
We may be at the beginning of a fresh approach to learning, 
to meaningful engagement and to the role of the scientist/
facilitator in the fusion of knowledge and values through 
authentic processes of conversing. To get there we need to 
learn from sincere efforts to bring in a wider conversation 
over innovation and risk. 
This raises the matter of the degree to which education, 
particularly in schools, but also in higher learning, should 
address capacities for open-mindedness, flexibility in coping 
with many strands of disciplines and measurements, and 
citizenship in the form of a sense of moral responsibility 
for the wellbeing of both present and future generations. It 
may well be that this is one outcome of this assessment of 
innovation and risk, namely preparing all future young people 
for a world of coping and improving learned capabilities 
of empathy, resilience, compassion, determination, and 
adaptation.
The experiences of the GM and radioactive waste 
disposal consultations
In 2002/3 the government sponsored an unusually large 
scale public debate over the possible commercialisation of 
genetically modified crops in the UK. This process, called GM 
Nation?, was examined in considerable detail by Tom Horlick-
Jones and colleagues24 (2007). The government established 
an Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission 
(2001:12) which argued for a massive public discussion on 
the grounds that any public policy on GM should “expose, 
respect and embrace the differences of view which exist, 
rather than bury them”25 . The result was a complicated 
drama of many scenes and acts where a novel mix of “fact”, 
“value” and “learning” unsatisfactorily ill-combined.
The Horlick-Jones study24 concluded that the GM 
Nation? process was well meaning, sincerely attempted, 
but ultimately flawed. There was imperfect coordination 
between the various stages of scientific assessment and 
public engagement. The government’s own decision-making 
advisory procedures were complex and confusing. It was 
also breathless and rushed. The briefing materials provided 
for the public meetings were bland and incomplete. The 
broad mass of the mostly disengaged public was not involved 
(a Habermasian observation). The process heightened 
antagonism rather than reduced it. So the outcome 
indicated a higher status of outright opposition to GM than 
was observed in the general public from opinion polls (an 
observation that is admittedly very time dependent). 
These findings reveal the difficulty of creating a 
consultative process that meets everyone’s expectations. 
This is particularly so because the process was feeling 
its way, and there were powerful commercial interests 
involved, both in favour (on the biotechnology side) as well 
as opposed (on the food retail side). There were important 
legal features involving the European Union24.  All this is of 
great interest in the light of a fresh initiative favouring GM 
crops in the light of a growing and wealthier population 
seeking more environmentally and socially demanding food 
supplies in the face of declining biodiversity and climate 
change26. Even though the stakes are much higher today, 
it is unlikely that any rapid decision favouring GM crop 
production in the United Kingdom or the European Union 
more generally will prove imminent — despite the recent 
agreement from the EU’s Environment Council to give 
member states more flexibility over GM crop experiments 
and production. (This would need to be agreed by the 
European Parliament before coming into force.) This 
observation underscores the ambivalence with which the 
general public regard much of innovation and risk, favouring 
the broad benefits but wary of the uncertain long-term 
consequences, particularly where traditional science does 
not seem to have a clear answer. The case study by Phil 
Macnaghten in Chapter 2 endorses these conclusions. He 
argues persuasively for a more preparatory institutional 
capability to be much more aware and sensitive to various 
bodies of amassed bias in anticipation of ‘going public’ with 
an innovation.
This anomaly is particularly evident in the long running 
and tortuous process regarding the deep disposal of 
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radioactive waste in many countries (though not all, 
as is the case in France, Sweden, and Canada). In the 
United Kingdom, the decision track-ways are littered 
with frustrated consultations, innumerable public surveys, 
reports by countless advisory bodies and reinventions of 
inconsistent regulation.  At its heart lies a combination of a 
broad public recognition that there is a legacy of civilian and 
military nuclear waste that must eventually be disposed of, 
and an unsuccessful series of attempts to achieve an agreed 
resting site. Meanwhile the wider public enjoys the benefits 
of reliable base load electricity whilst expecting some 
particular community or other to absorb the disruption 
of traffic and possible danger of being neighbour to a deep 
repository of waste that is hot and treacherous unless 
wholly contained for over 25,000 years.
Here the government is listening to the kinds of 
arguments outlined above. It is facing five critical issues. 
One is that there can be no approved deep disposal site 
without agreement over a range of decision-making bodies 
from national government through regional and local 
government to the parishes and communities voluntarily 
selected.  A second is that the relative risks of permanent 
above-ground storage, especially for generations a long 
way into the distance, should be fully compared.  A third 
is that planning procedures should suitably combine 
national guidelines with local safeguards.  A fourth is that 
any discussion of community benefits should be additional 
to the direct financial benefits or incentives to the willing 
community arising from the investment and jobs creation. 
But if such benefits are also to address the scope for 
recognizing community pride in carrying responsibility for 
guaranteeing the long-term safety of this facility on behalf 
of the nation, then there may have to be some sort of levy 
on each unit of waste disposed. Such a levy would recognize 
the potential open-endedness of the additional waste from 
any new nuclear stations. It could also form a not-for-
profit community administered fund for the permanent 
betterment of all future generations who are neighbours to 
any selected site.
The fifth element applies to the focus of this chapter, 
namely finding ways to hold a wider conversation. 
Normal consultative procedures do not always work 
well for this kind of long-term contentious issue, because 
people often do not understand how their input into the 
consultation process works. There is also the broader issue 
of consultation fatigue: people do not want to keep on 
saying things they think they have said many times before, 
particularly when they do not know how much weight will 
actually be given to their response. 
One possibility is to instigate a process of decentralized 
deliberation. This would be specifically designed to build 
confidence and trust. Ideally, small teams of informed but 
essentially local people should be trained to converse with 
community groups in an empathetic approach. Training is 
vital, for the overall aim is to allow all participants to debate 
all issues (which they jointly establish) in terms of their 
own comfortable communication, and in meeting places 
that are familiar to them. Local authorities and experts 
are not ideally equipped to deal with this sort of intimate 
and more genuinely representative democracy, nor do 
local citizens perceive them to be so equipped. There are 
lessons to be learnt from the GM debate here. Chilvers 
admits that getting a more comforting and trust-building 
decentralized deliberative process right is very difficult27. It 
very much depends on the context and the characteristics 
of the participants and of the decision pathways (past and 
future). This extended deliberative process has to be proven 
to be independent. Even then, as indicated earlier, dedicated 
‘spoilers’ could subvert the most carefully designed 
processes unless they are identified and isolated by the 
participants whose trust in these innovative procedures has 
first to be won over.
There can be no guarantee that this community-based set 
of conversations will work out as intended. Much depends 
on the political and regulatory setting for the generic stage 
designed to reassure that there is a technological and 
geological safe means of disposal somewhere in England. 
But even more hangs on the mechanisms of creating a 
learning and listening atmosphere throughout the country, 
particularly in any locations where there is a willingness 
to be considered for community benefit, and where the 
deeper normative components of trusting involvement, 
authentic forms of conversing, and full consideration of the 
possible alternatives brings out the essence of informed and 
appreciated agreement.
Two additional possible obstacles remain. One is the 
apparently monolithic characteristics of the planning process, 
especially where “critical infrastructure projects” are 
externally labelled and treated as “in the national interest”, 
thereby seeming to bypass local protest and confining it 
to matters of local detail. The other is the social memories 
of historical resentment and past damaging treatment, as 
summarized by Bickerstaff28.
Such a concern with the relational geography of issues 
suggests a refocusing of attention away from the presences 
of controversy (the actors, framings, and outcomes), and 
towards the absences that mark the roots (or routes) of 
so-called ‘not in my back yard’ (‘Nimby’) disputes. It is an 
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approach that brings to the fore the role of distant things, 
people, and events in the sorts of questions we ask about 
how publics become involved with an issue; how the issue is 
articulated (spatially and historically); the power and politics 
at work; as well as the efficacy, fairness, and possibilities for 
change associated with siting policies oriented to the future. 
In a recent White Paper11, from the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, the government appears to 
have heeded the points made by various contributors to 
this volume. It has adopted the approach of consensual and 
voluntary acceptance across all forms of (especially local) 
government, with no pressures on time or exploration 
of evidence. It is to amend the planning acts to enable a 
much more national–to–local perspective of any “appraisal 
of sustainability” of a major national infrastructure facility 
to be reviewed and accepted. It will establish a working 
group on community representation to consider all forms 
of local engagement as outlined above.This working group 
will look at the principles and practices of the sustainability 
(wellbeing) test, and at the issue of determining community 
investment funds over and above all other local benefit 
streams, with the aim of building real community enterprise 
and pride over many generations. It will also create an 
independent reference group of authorative third-party, 
independent and trust-building advice. And it will only 
proceed when there is an agreed form of a “public test of 
support” for the actual siting of any facility. 
This should be a true process of holding a wider 
conversation. It is by no means guaranteed that the 
cantankerous history of this vexed process will result in 
a creative and purposeful outcome.The White Paper at 
least sets the test. What also remains to be seen if such 
a creative set of approaches can also be tailored to other 
contentious infrastructure projects such as fracking, the 
London airport saga, and to the final determination of the 
proposed high-speed rail route through the West Midlands 
and possibly further north and east. Ironically, by offering an 
innovative track for geological disposal of radioactive waste, 
the government may have also created a stick for its own 
back in the even more tumultuous arenas of fracking and 
airport runway siting. Given the evidence from the fracking 
case study in Section 2, it remains much more problematic 
for any form of community consensus to be reached over 
fracking, even if the procedures proposed for debating the 
geological disposal of radioactive waste are adopted. For 
here is where fundamental values over energy policy, climate 
futures, fairness of treatment, and love and identity of 
familiar landscapes impossibly clash. 
Concluding observations 
Holding a wider conversation about the links between 
risk and innovation will be seen from the examples in 
this report as being very demanding on science, ethics, 
trust, and empathetic conversations.This is relevant for 
a set of decisions involving established risk and genuinely 
uneven distribution of costs and gains. As noted in the 
introduction, this applies to a particular set of proposals. 
But there are important links to the themes of caring for 
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future generations, and of deliberating early when sufficien t 
information is ready for exploration. 
Yet these processes require a set of circumstances that 
are still not commonly found either in scientific or politica l 
circles (though the business world seems to be more 
amenable).This relates to frank honesty over what is kno wn 
and what is not known; agreed means for assessing future 
states on a ‘what if ’ basis; a more coherent mechanism for
taking into account the distributions of gains and losses 
for future generations; openness of listening and sharing 
outcomes; some form of acceptable community investmen t 
process to offset calculable costs; and a genuine willingnes s 
to commit to a process of trust building without deviation . 
These are not easy conditions to guarantee in the hectic 
modern world of hurly-burly politics and science. But 
it is the purpose of this report to create such felicitous 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE NEED 
FOR A COMMON LANGUAGE
In discussions about innovation, effective communication between 
stakeholders requires a ‘common language’ — a set of core 
principles regarding the presentation of arguments or analyses.
David Spiegelhalter 
(University of Cambridge)
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It is difficult to face up to the risk and uncertainty around innovation.  All actions, including inaction, may have benefits and harms, but we don’t know, nor can we 
even imagine, everything that might happen.  We cannot be 
confident about the valuations people might attach to the 
possible consequences. Nor can we confidently say how 
likely things are to happen — in fact, the whole meaning of 
such a statement can be contested.
There are also multiple players who have a stake in 
decisions about innovations — the public (which should not 
be treated as some homogenous mass, but as a diversity of 
‘publics’); the regulators and policy-makers; the innovators 
themselves; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
so on. There may be substantial problems of trust between 
these actors. 
Communication between these stakeholders, especially 
when channelled through media outlets that may not 
be concerned with balanced reporting, is fraught with 
difficulties.  Any progress that can be made in improving that 
communication should be beneficial, and hence the search 
for a ‘common language’.
What policymakers might like in an ideal world
The theory of rational decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty comprises four basic stages: 
• Structuring the list of actions, and the possible 
consequences of those actions.
• Giving a financial or other numerical utility to those 
possible future outcomes.
• Assigning a probability for each possible consequence, 
given each action.
• Establishing a rational decision that maximizes the 
expected benefit.
The real world is a messy place, however. The theory 
described above only holds in rarefied situations of perfect 
contextual knowledge, such as gambling on roulette when 
we know the probabilities of possible gains or losses. 
These pre-chance problems are the only type in which 
we might talk about the risk: and even then we need to 
make assumptions about the fairness of the wheel and the 
integrity of the casino.
What policy-makers actually get
In reasonably well-understood situations, numerical risk 
assessments can enable appropriate decisions for prioritising 
actions. The Health and Safety Executive’s Tolerability of Risk 
framework provides appropriate guidance: in this chapter, 
the case study Nuclear: The Submariner’s Perspective shows 
how societal valuations of potential consequences can be 
incorporated, while Adapting regulation to changing evidence 
on risks: delivering changes to pig inspection illustrates that risk 
assessment can form a basis for evidence-based regulation.
But in some areas of innovation there are likely to be 
different groups making claims about the risks, raising 
different issues with different values, and competing scientific 
claims based on different evidence. Even within a single 
group there will generally be a range of possible analyses 
based on different assumptions, while any predictions 
about how people will react to innovations must be fairly 
speculative.
Thus a policymaker will be faced with plural analyses 
that are both contingent on assumptions and inevitably 
inadequate, whether self-professed as such or not. The 
resulting uncertainty is far more than not being able to 
predict the future — it is as much about ‘don’t know’ as 
‘can’t know’.
The problems of language
1. Definition of terms
The crucial distinction between ‘hazard’ — the potential 
for harm if mitigation is not put in place — and ‘risk’ is 
well-known. But frank discussion about risk and uncertainty 
is not helped by the variety of language used by people in 
different domains, not least in the meanings of the terms 
‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. For example, many scientists would 
use the term ‘uncertainty’ for everything that was not 
certain, including a single coin flip, and only distinguish the 
extent to which the uncertainty was quantifiable. In contrast, 
those with an economics and social science background will 
often adopt the distinction made by Frank Knight between 
‘risk’ — in which extensive data and good understanding of 
a controlled environment leads to agreed quantification — 
and ‘uncertainty’, for when this quantification is not feasible. 
The term ‘ambiguity’ is also, ironically, ambiguous: some use 
it to refer to situations in which outcomes and values are 
contested or unknown (see Chapter 4), while in behavioural 
economics it refers to uncertainty about probabilities.
2. Communicating using numbers
Even when numbers are agreed, there is a wide variety 
of ways in which probabilities may be expressed: as 
percentages, odds, frequencies, in graphics and so on. For 
example, the Safety Cases for high-hazard installations 
provided to the Health and Safety Executive might mention 
that the individual risk per annum (IRPA) = 4 x 10-4: it means 
that each worker has a 4 in 10,000, or a 1 in 2,500 risk of 
being killed each year, but seems almost designed to prevent 
comprehension.
Research has shown that the way numbers are framed 
influences our perceptions. The 99% Campaign, an initiative 
that aims to dispel negative stereotypes about young people, 
offered one example of a positively-framed message when 
it issued advertisements proclaiming that “99% of young 
Londoners do not commit serious youth violence”. This, of 
The important lesson 
from numerical risk 
communication is that one 
size does not fit all.
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course, means that 1% are violent, and as there are roughly 
1,000,000 Londoners between the ages of 15 and 25, a little 
reflection suggests there are 10,000 seriously violent young 
people running around — not the image the communicators 
wanted to conjure up.
It is generally argued that using relative measures is a 
manipulative way of communicating risk, because it has ben 
shown to increase the apparent importance of a particular 
action. Being told that regularly eating a bacon sandwich 
increases your lifetime risk of pancreatic cancer by 20% may 
be somewhat unconvincing if the baseline is extremely low 
and the bacon sandwich is rather pleasant.
However, this situation can be reversed in acute low-
probability, high-impact events that occur regularly: we 
all take daily precautions when travelling, for example, 
which makes small risks even smaller. This point was also 
dramatically illustrated when Italian earthquake advisors 
were convicted of involuntary manslaughter for issuing 
unduly reassuring messages to the residents of L’Aquila in 
2009, a few days before more than 300 people were killed 
in a major earthquake. The advice correctly said that the 
overall risk was low, but should also have emphasized that 
the relative risk was high: this would have enabled residents 
to adopt their own chosen level of precaution (see case 
study in Chapter 1 for further discussion of L’Aquila). 
Clearly both absolute and relative risks are required. The 
important lesson from numerical risk communication is that 
one size does not fit all, and a variety of methods may be 
appropriate, with a hierarchy of numerical sophistication. 
CASE STUDY
NUCLEAR: THE SUBMARINER’S PERSPECTIVE
Rear Admiral Nigel Guild (Chairman, Engineering Council)
A nuclear submarine is one of the most complex engineering achievements known to man, 
and it contains a unique combination 
of potential hazards within a relatively 
small space. These hazards include structural and 
environmental issues common to all large ships, with 
the added problem that the vessel needs to remain 
stable under the water. To these challenges are added 
nuclear propulsion, explosives and, in the case of the 
deterrent submarine, nuclear weapons. 
The management of submarine safety is critical to 
the protection of submariners, the public and the 
environment. The Royal Navy’s approach to managing 
the risks presented by these potential hazards is 
to assess and mitigate them through the use of a 
probabilistic safety case. This safety case aggregates 
the assessment of risks, so that there is ultimately 
an overview of risk for the whole submarine. This 
process relies on normal definitions of acceptable 
risk used by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
along with widely used diagrams depicting the 
expectation of death per year against the number of 
people employed. HSE Basic Safety levels are used for 
the maximum risk that is normally allowable. Then 
the ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) 
principle is deployed to continually reduce risk from 
each potential hazard, until the cost of further effort 
would be grossly disproportionate to the extra safety 
achieved.
In practice, far greater resources are devoted to 
managing nuclear safety than for other potential 
submarine hazards with the same risk assessment. This 
is required by a public expectation of far greater risk 
reduction for a potential nuclear hazard, because it is 
not generally understood and it is held in significant 
dread. To take a non-nuclear example, the risk of a 
seamanship accident, such as falling into the sea while 
working on the casing when the submarine is on the 
surface, is assessed in a similar way to any workplace 
potential hazard. In contrast to this, a potential nuclear 
event requires risk mitigation to achieve two orders 
of magnitude smaller risk assessment than would 
be sought for conventional risks.  Another way of 
expressing this is by applying the ALARP principle: the 
effort required before it would be considered grossly 
disproportionate to the extra nuclear safety achieved 
is about 100 times more than for other risks.
Using this logical approach, a consistent set of 
safety assessments for the whole submarine can 
be assembled and used to minimize risks using the 
common language of health and safety assessment. 
Within the process, however, chosen risks such as 
nuclear can be managed to different levels of ALARP 
in accordance with society’s expectation.
3. Using words
It is important to realize that words such as ‘likely’ or 
‘possible’ carry meaning beyond mere magnitude, and 
depends crucially on context. For example, the UK’s 
Terrorism Threat Level scale defines SEVERE as meaning 
“that a terrorist attack is highly likely”, and yet when this 
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CASE STUDY
ADAPTING REGULATION TO CHANGING EVIDENCE ON RISKS: 
DELIVERING CHANGES TO PIG INSPECTION
Patrick Miller (Food Standards Agency)
The UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) has led efforts to reform pig inspection, drawing on evidence about the changing nature of health 
risks from meat — and about the behaviours of those 
involved in meat production — to introduce new 
controls that better reflect the risks and the realities of
inspection in practice.
Meat controls are currently based on a traditional 
inspection approach, developed over 100 years ago to 
tackle the public health concerns of that era, such as 
parasites and defects visible to the naked eye. Today, the
main causes of foodborne disease are microbiological. 
Pathogens such as Salmonella, Campylobacter and 
Escherichia coli cannot be tackled adequately using 
traditional inspection methods.
Meat controls are a key part of European Union food
safety controls and any changes need the support of 
the European Commission, EU member states, industry
and stakeholders.  As such, these changes must be 
based on solid evidence and reflect practical realities 
and stakeholder concerns in order to win confidence 
that any change will be more risk-based, effective and 
proportionate.
This takes time, but it ensures that we can be clear 
about our objectives and gather evidence on how best 
to meet them. For consumers, that means greater 
confidence in meat safety and better protection from 
risks from meat; as a regulator, it ensures the effective 
use of public funds in controlling foodborne pathogens 
and reducing costs for society from foodborne illness; 
for business, it lowers the cost of regulation; and for 
enforcers, it offers a more objective approach and 
better use of resources, according to risk and impact.
Developing the evidence base
The FSA’s research programme on modernizing meat 
controls aims to:
• establish the effectiveness of current and alternative 
approaches to meat inspection;
• build a robust evidence base 
to support a case for reform.
It includes veterinary 
and risk-assessment 
research, as well as social 
science research to understand 
attitudes and behaviours that affect 
the effectiveness of controls in practice. The European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) also provided a series 
of independent expert scientific opinions related 
to inspection of meat, and together with the FSA’s 
research these formed the basis for initial proposals for 
changes to pig meat inspection.
Openness and engagement
Alongside this process, FSA followed an active 
programme of engagement and communication with 
interested parties, including the European Commission, 
EU member states, European Parliament the meat 
industry, UK agricultural departments, EFSA experts, 
and consumers.
This engagement was aided by a high degree of 
openness, with information on the programme’s 
objectives, research, developing proposals, and the 
supporting evidence, published and discussed by the 
FSA Board in open meetings1.  A consultation on the 
proposed changes ran from March–May 2014, with 
extensive communication on formal introduction of 
the new inspection regime, and training to support 
implementation.
Outcome
The new package targets risks better by:
• Removing controls that did not help to reduce 
pathogen levels in meat, and in fact actually helped to 
spread contamination (through physical palpation and 
incision of carcases), thus increasing consumer risk — a 
serious unintended consequence of the old regime.
• Tightening controls that can reduce contamination 
levels in meat, including controls on Salmonella and risk-
based testing for the parasite Trichinella.
It therefore targets resources at the real risks in ways 
that will control them more effectively. The package has 
received broad support from stakeholders. The FSA is 
now funding research to help evaluate how the changes 
operate in practice, and how 
to monitor their impact. 
The FSA will explore 
the scope to extend this 
approach in other species 
(poultry, cattle and sheep), 
again following an open and 
evidence-based approach.
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level was announced on 22 January 2010 the government’s 
Home Secretary felt obliged to say: “This means that a 
terrorist attack is highly likely, but I should stress that there 
is no intelligence to suggest than an attack is imminent”1. 
This shows that using words to express uncertainty, without 
a numerical reference scale, can be misleading unless 
audiences fully understand their usage in the particular 
context.
Words can also be used as direct translations of 
numerical probability assessments.  For example, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
standardized its verbal terms for likelihood using the scale in 
Table 1 (ref.2).
The IPCC sometimes use these terms for communicating 
their confidence in scientific conclusions, for example in 
stating that: “It is extremely likely that human influence 
has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since 
the mid-20th century”.  The IPCC only uses these terms of 
likelihood in situations of  ‘high’ or ‘very high’ confidence 
(see below for the interpretation of this term), although it 
can be argued that such a restriction is unnecessary.
It is important that any numerical scale broadly reflects 
usage in that domain. The case study in this chapter, Accurate 
Communication of Medical Risk, notes that drug side-effects 
that are described as ‘common’ are intended to correspond 
to between 1% and 10%. This may be reasonable usage for 
pharmacologists, but not for patients.
4. Being imprecise about numbers
When it comes to expressing uncertainty in quantitative 
terms, a hierarchy of levels of precision can be assigned, 
appropriate to the confidence of the assessors. For example:
• Numbers to appropriate levels of precision.
• A distribution or range.  
• A list of possibilities.  
• A rough order of magnitude.
Term Likelihood 
 of the outcome 
 (probability)
Virtually certain 99–100%
Extremely likely 95–100%
Very likely 90–100%
Likely 66–100%
More likely than not 50–100%
About as likely as not 33–66%
Unlikely 0–33%
Very unlikely 0–10%
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1%
IPCC LIKELIHOOD SCALE
TABLE 1
5. Expressing (lack of) confidence in the science
Our uncertainty does not just concern the likelihood of 
future outcomes. For a whole modeling process, we may 
have to contend with assumptions about the inputs, the 
model structure, and the issues of concern.  Again, lists of 
possible values or scenarios can be provided as a sensitivity 
analysis. These can be supplemented by acknowledging that 
there are aspects that have been left out of the model, with 
a qualitative assessment of their potential impact.
Some domains have tried to use a summary qualitative 
scale to communicate the confidence in the analysis. For 
example, the IPCC uses the quality of the evidence, and 
the degree of scientific agreement, to assess a level of 
confidence in their scientific conclusions.  
Seeking a common language
There is room for substantial improvement in the quality 
of the discourse between the participants involved in 
innovation and risk, including the public, regulators, 
innovators, NGOs and the media. But “seeking a common 
language” does not refer to a restricted use of specific 
words, such as risk, uncertainty and ambiguity — that would 
be impossible to impose and counter-productive to try. 
Rather, by “common language” I mean the acceptance of a 
set of principles regarding the presentation of arguments or 
analyses. Five such principles are outlined below.
1. Acknowledge that any risk and uncertainty assessment is 
contingent and provisional. No analysis can claim to produce 
the risk of an innovation. Such assessments are constructed 
depending on assumptions, and may change in receipt of 
further information. The reasons for the uncertainty should 
also be given.  And since there will be competing opinions, 
not all of which will be based on an adequate consideration 
of the evidence, the pedigree of an analysis is also important. 
It would be useful to have an appraisal of the quality of 
the analytic framework: this could be self-assessed by the 
analysts (although this would require considerable humility) 
but also assessed by the team responsible for formulating 
the policy in question. The appraisal should be based on 
the quality, quantity, consistency and coverage of evidence, 
as well as the quality of the process that collected and 
analyzed the evidence, and the quality of deliberation. 
Policymakers can then make a holistic summary of the state 
of uncertainty and how it influences the confidence in the 
conclusion (see Table 2 for a possible rough categorization 
of such an assessment, roughly modeled on the Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
(GRADE) scale used in health3).
Clearly the strength of any recommendation does not 
No analysis can claim to 
produce the risk of an 
innovation.
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depend only on the scientific uncertainty: there may be very 
good evidence, but if the pros and cons are finely balanced 
then a strong recommendation cannot be given.
It is essential that the contingent nature of the assessment 
is retained throughout its passage through policymaking. It 
is all too easy for important caveats to be lost and for an 
assessment to become prescriptive, even if this was not 
the original intention.  The phrase ‘risk and uncertainty 
assessment’ might encourage this.
2. Multiple risk and uncertainty assessments should be 
encouraged. Policymakers should neither expect nor want a 
single analysis of the risks.  Analyses may come from multiple 
teams, or from a sensitivity analysis across single team.  
As US President Barack Obama recounted on the Channel
4 programme Bin Laden: Shoot to Kill on 7 September 2011: 
“Some of our intelligence officers thought that it was only 
a 40 or 30% chance that Bin Laden was in the compound. 
Others thought that it was as high as 80 or 90%.  At the 
conclusion of a fairly lengthy discussion where everybody 
gave their assessments I said: this is basically 50-50.”
Some have argued that alternative views should have 
been condensed into a single assessment before being 
presented to Obama4, but that could have been considered 
as withholding important information.
3. As far as is possible, uncertainty should be expressed 
quantitatively. But numbers do not speak for themselves: the 
manner in which numbers have been generated should be clear, 
and the framing acknowledged.
CASE STUDY
ACCURATE COMMUNICATION OF MEDICAL RISK
Chris Cummins (University of Edinburgh)
Health professionals have access to accurate, quantitative information about risk, such as the efficacy of a treatment or the probability 
of various side effects. Nevertheless, accurately and 
effectively communicating this information to patients 
or colleagues can be very difficult. Problems include 
how to frame information impartially; how to ensure 
that information is expressed understandably; and how 
to allow for people’s tendencies to draw additional 
inferences from the information they hear. The 
communication of medical risk is clearly very importan
in its own right — but it often offers more general 
guidance for risk communication in other domains.
Tversky and Kahneman first identified1 the 
importance of framing by using a fictitious medical 
example. In their story, 600 people have a fatal disease, 
and are offered two treatment options. Option one is 
introduced either as one that “saves 200 lives”, or as 
one in which “400 people will die”. Option two uses a 
probabilistic presentation, offering either a one-third 
probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-
thirds probability than no-one will be; or a two-thirds 
probability that 600 people will die and a one-third 
probability that no-one will. 
If the two options were presented in terms of 
how many lives they saved, 72% of readers preferred 
option one over option two. But if the options 
were introduced by stating the number of resulting 
fatalities, only 22% preferred option one. Crucially, the 
quantitative content of each option was the same. 
Research on framing can tell us how to present 
information in a positive or negative way, but it 
also raises the question of how we should frame 
information when we wish to present it purely 
objectively, so that the hearer can take 
a decision without undue influence.
People often have difficulty processing 
quantitative information, especially when it is 
presented in numerical terms — and in medical 
communication, this applies to professionals 
as well as laypeople2. One remedy is to 
gloss numerical information using verbal 
descriptors: for example, by describing side effects as 
“very common”, “common”, “uncommon”, “rare” or 
“very rare”3. These verbal descriptors are supposed 
to correspond to probabilities of, respectively, over 
10%, 1–10%, 0.1–1%, 0.01–0.1% and less than 0.01%. 
However, users systematically misunderstand them: 
both patients and doctors significantly overestimate 
the risk of side effects described in these terms4, 5. 
Presumably this biases patients against taking medicines 
(and doctors against prescribing them) to a greater 
extent than is rationally justified.
The nature of linguistic communication also clouds 
the picture. For instance, if we say that “More than 
10% of people taking this medicine will experience hot 
flushes”, a hearer would be entitled to infer that “not 
more than 20%” will do so, as otherwise the speaker 
would have said “more than 20%” (ref. 6). This natural 
inference is incorrect if, by “more than 10%”, we 
actually mean anywhere in the range 10%–100%. There 
is, nevertheless, ample evidence that hearers draw 
inferences of this kind, and if we are to communicate 
risk information objectively and responsibly, it is our 
duty to take this into account. We cannot defend 
descriptions that are practically misleading on the 
basis that they are technically true according to 
mathematical criteria.
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Even in situations with limited evidence and substantial 
disagreement between experts, it can still be possible to use 
numerical probability assessments — or at least ranges of 
probabilities — for well-defined future events.  
The analyses underlying the debate whether to introduce 
plain packaging for cigarettes, for example, could be fairly 
characterized as ‘2 star’. Nevertheless, a survey5 that elicited 
expert opinion about the possible impact of the policy on 
overall smoking rates, and on children starting smoking, 
showed that despite substantial variation in opinion there 
was an overall view that the impact would be positive but 
modest (see Figure 1). It is essential to remember, however, 
that these are subjective judgments with no direct evidence 
from data.
Transparent and open communication, which attempts to 
avoid framing effects, requires that the potential harms and 
benefits of innovations are reported in a balanced manner. 
For instance, new patient-information leaflets released by 
the NHS Screening Programme6 clearly report the numbers 
of women that would be expected to benefit and be harmed
among each 200 attending breast screening. These numbers 
relied to some extent on expert judgement, and their 
pedigree was reported using the phrase:  “The numbers 
on the next page are the best estimates from a group of 
experts who have reviewed the evidence”.
It is also crucial that that the potential impact of language 
and concepts is understood. Climate impact projections 
from the government’s Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) included an assessment 
of the upper 90% scenario in the distribution of possible 
temperature increases — that is, the outcomes judged to 
have a 10% chance of occurring7. The media has previously 
reported such extreme scenarios in terms such as 
“temperature rise could be as high as X”.  As a deliberate 
pre-emption of this style of coverage, DEFRA used the 
phrase “temperature rise is very unlikely to be greater than 
X”. This change from a negative to a positive frame was 
successful in deflecting undue attention from the extremes, 
although a balanced approach would have used both positive 
and negative frames.
4. A precautionary approach is a natural holding position in the 
face of scientific uncertainty. There is no need to promote it to a 
‘principle’.
There are many ‘precautionary principles’ — a weak 
version says that we do not need to be sure of harm 
before we take mitigating action (such as in climate change), 
whereas a strong version broadly says we should not take 
any action if there is a possibility of harm. The latter view 
can lead to unnecessary caution, since no actions can be 
guaranteed to be safe.  
But there is no need to cite additional ‘principles’ above 
reasonable risk and uncertainty assessment.  After weighing 
up risks in as quantitative a way as possible, if there is still 
considerable scientific uncertainty then it is reasonable 
to be cautious as a holding position, but to treat this as a 
temporary situation: amber, rather than red.  
In 2000, John Krebs, as head of the UK’s Food Standards 
 
Agency, held a press conference on the possible risk of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in sheep. He took 
the view that being open and transparent with consumers 
meant that he had to be completely honest, with no cover-
up.  At the press conference he made the following points:
• We do not know whether BSE has got into sheep.
• We are on the case. Here is what we are doing to try to 
find out.
• In the meantime we are not advising you to stop eating 
lamb. But if you are worried about it, change your diet.
• We shall get back to you when we have worked more on 
establishing the actual uncertainty and risk.
“And that worked very well,” Krebs later recalled8. “There 
was no panic in the industry, and no panic among consumers 
either.” This is an example of openly communicating scientific 
uncertainty, making clear that it is being remedied, and 
acknowledging that a precautionary approach may be taken as a 
temporary measure.
5. In the end, the decision-maker must make a judgement, using risk 
and uncertainty assessments as part of their inputs. They should not 
expect to be given a prescriptive analysis. 
Although these principles are aimed primarily at policymakers, 
they may also improve the general communication between the 
parties involved in innovation and risk.
A POSSIBLE SCALE OF THE JUDGED 
QUALITY OF A RISK ANALYSIS
TABLE 2
Meaning
We are fully confident of our 
understanding of the underlying 
process, so although we cannot 
predict what is going to happen, 
we can provide good numerical 
assessments.
We are reasonably confident in our 
analysis: we can expect numbers to 
change as we learn more, but not 
sufficient to justify major policy shifts.
New evidence could have a 
substantial impact on our assessment, 
although no major new surprises are 
expected: we encourage a robust 
decision-making approach with some 
precaution and adaptivity.
We have very limited understanding 
of the process or possibilities, and so 
resilience to unexpected occurrences 
is called for.
Star rating
HHHH
4 star
HHH
3 star
HH
2 star
H
1 star
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Assessments by international experts of their uncertainty about the impact of plain packaging on 
the percentage of children who start smoking. Diamonds represent the median and 99% interval 
for each expert.
FIGURE 1
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HIGH LEVEL CASE STUDY: 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
Steve Elliott (Chemical Industries 
Association), Harry Huyton 
(Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds), Robert Mair (University 
of Cambridge)
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chemical and
pharmaceutical industries
are the United Kingdom’s
biggest manufacturing
export earner. 
THE INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
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Steve Elliott (Chemical Industries Association) 
The chemical and pharmaceutical industries are the United Kingdom’s biggest manufacturing export earner. Our products and technologies support 
modern life, both directly and through the manufactured 
products that they enable. Our sector is also energy- and 
trade-intensive, however, so this contribution is critically 
dependent on secure and competitively-priced supplies 
of fuel, which provide both feedstocks (raw material) and 
energy. We are therefore concerned that, for energy-
intensive industries, UK energy costs are becoming 
increasingly uncompetitive and there is a growing reliance o n 
imported gas. Provided it is exploited in an environmentally 
safe way, we believe that the country’s indigenous shale gas 
resources offer a secure and potentially competitive source 
of feedstock and fuel. 
Until now, chemical businesses have relied on the North 
Sea for feedstock supplies, but these supplies are diminishing . 
We use this feedstock to make the basic chemicals that 
provide key building blocks for almost every sector of 
manufacturing and the wider economy. In the United States, 
the shale gas ‘revolution’ has triggered planned investments 
in chemical capacity worth $140 billion. While UK chemical 
businesses are installing facilities to import US feedstock, 
the development of indigenous shale-gas supplies could 
provide a more secure and potentially competitive source, 
and improve the business case for further investments in U K 
chemical capacity. 
We are also paying more for gas as a fuel than many 
competing production locations, with costs more than three
times higher than in the United States. Recent events have 
shown that the security and affordability of UK energy 
supplies is a concern both for households as well as large 
energy users like the chemicals industry. UK policy is driving
the replacement of old electricity-generating stock with a 
low-carbon generating mix, and this will significantly increase
electricity prices out to 2020. Far from our dependence on 
gas diminishing, more gas-fired generation will be needed 
during the transition if we are to ‘keep the lights on’, and it 
will then play a major role in backing intermittent renewable
power. Gas will also continue to be the main source of heat 
in homes and industry. But we already import over half our 
needs, and this reliance is set to rise to 80% by 2020.This 
makes the UK more vulnerable to supply uncertainties, with
gas prices particularly high and volatile in cold winters. The 
availability of shale gas could therefore be a key contributor 
to both secure and affordable energy. 
The development of shale gas will bring multiple economic
benefits to the United Kingdom.The development of shale 
gas will bring multiple economic benefits to the United 
Kingdom. It is a key enabler for our shared vision with 
government of a 50% growth by 2030 of the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries’ contribution to the country’s 
economy.  We already have a turnover of £60 billion and 
support 500,000 jobs both directly and indirectly. Such 
growth will enhance the provision of key building blocks 
for almost every sector of the economy — from cars and 
planes through to houses, medicines, televisions and mobile 
phones — products which also support our modern lives.  
Estimates suggest that UK shale gas development will 
require supply chain spending of £3.3 billion per annum and 
generate 64,500 jobs. Communities will also receive direct 
benefits from local shale gas development. 
However, it is vital for communities in the UK to 
be confident that shale gas can be developed in an 
environmentally safe way. There is now a substantive 
evidence base from government and independent expert 
bodies that addresses concerns on key issues including 
seismic activity, water use, impacts on ground water and 
emissions, and the use of chemicals in fracking fluid. The 
United Kingdom also has a strong regulatory framework for 
shale gas development. It is now time for government and 
industry to redouble their efforts to address environmental 
concerns and explain the economic benefits. 
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THE NGO PERSPECTIVE 
Harry Huyton (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds)
In March 2014, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) published a review of the ecological risks associated with hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in the 
United Kingdom, along with a number of recommendations 
to address these risks. The review was based on literature 
principally concerned with hydraulic fracturing in the 
United States, which we interpreted and applied to the UK 
situation. 
The key risks to the natural environment that we 
highlighted were: water demand in areas under water 
stress, causing low river flows; water contamination as a 
result of well-casing failures and surface spillages; pollution 
incidents as a result of waste handling and disposal; and 
the loss, fragmentation and disturbance of wildlife habitats. 
All of these risks increase significantly at the commercial 
extraction phase, but they are manageable if an effective 
policy and regulatory framework is put in place. 
Crucially, we also argued that this framework should be 
precautionary, given that the environmental impacts of the 
industry in the United States have been poorly studied, and 
because the geological and environmental conditions in 
the United Kingdom are quite different. Our assessment is 
that we do not currently have an effective and sufficiently 
precautionary framework.
It has been a source of frustration that the public and 
political debate about fracking in the United Kingdom has 
become so polarized that a discussion about risks and 
responses has been effectively impossible. 
The scope and approach taken by the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the current licensing 
round for onshore oil and gas illustrates this.  An SEA 
is an important policy tool that theoretically allows the 
environmental impacts of a plan or programme (and its 
alternatives) to be assessed, and improvements or mitigating 
measures to be identified and recommended. In practice 
they have too often become bureaucratic exercises that 
have little bearing on the policy, and this SEA was no 
exception.  
For example, no meaningful lower-risk alternatives were 
assessed. In fact, one alternative — reducing the licensing 
area by screening out the most ecologically vulnerable 
sites — was explicitly rejected on the grounds that it went 
against the overarching aim of “comprehensive exploration 
and appraisal of UK oil and gas resources and the economic 
development of identified reserves”. In effect, any response 
to environmental risks that result in any restriction on the 
industry was ruled out from the start.
The public cares deeply about the countryside and 
the wildlife that we share it with. That means they 
expect government to be diligent and precautionary in 
understanding and addressing risks, through open and 
responsible debate and by applying tools like SEA. If risks 
are instead downplayed, branded as myths or simply ignored, 
the opportunity for evidence-based debate and progress by 
mutual consent is quickly lost.
The public and political 
debate about fracking in 
the United Kingdom has 
become so polarized that 
a discussion about risks 
and responses has been 
effectively impossible.
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THE SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE
Robert Mair (University of Cambridge)
In 2012, the Royal Society (RS) and the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) published a joint report — Shale gas extraction in the UK: a review of hydraulic fracturing1 — that 
had been commissioned by the UK government.
The report independently reviewed the scientific and 
engineering evidence associated with hydraulic fracturing 
(often termed ‘fracking’). The report addressed two key 
questions in connection with fracking: (i) what are the 
risks of earthquakes? (ii) what are the environmental 
risks, particularly in relation to possible groundwater 
contamination? It concluded that these risks can be managed 
effectively in the United Kingdom so long as operational best 
practices are implemented and enforced through effective 
regulation. The report’s principal conclusions regarding these 
risks can be summarized as follows. 
Fracking is unlikely to contaminate drinking water. The 
available evidence shows that fractures can be constrained 
within shale formations effectively. To reach overlying 
freshwater aquifers, the fractures in the shale would have to 
propagate upwards towards the surface for many hundreds 
of metres. The risk of this happening is very low, provided 
that fracking takes place at great depths (operations are 
typically at depths of several kilometres). 
But it is important not to conflate fracking itself with shale-
gas well operations. Groundwater contamination is much less 
likely to be due to the fracking process than to faulty well 
construction. The only realistic way that any contamination of 
groundwater may occur is if operations are poorly regulated 
and faulty wells are constructed as a result — consequently, 
the bigger risk to drinking water would be leakage from a 
faulty well. The report therefore recommended that well 
integrity should be a top priority if the risk of contamination 
is to be kept to an absolute minimum. 
All wells are lined with steel casing, which is sealed into 
the ground by cement. If wells are properly constructed, 
sealed and managed, the risk of contamination is very low. 
Also, the Environment Agency does not currently permit any 
hydraulic fracturing near freshwater aquifers based on a risk 
assessment, taking into account the geology and depth at 
which fracking is proposed at the particular site.
The other main potential causes of environmental 
contamination are poor site construction, or control 
measures at the surface that include treatment and disposal 
of wastewaters. However, any risks can again be minimized 
by best practice and good regulation, which the United 
Kingdom has a good track record of upholding. 
The report also recommended that robust monitoring of 
groundwater should be conducted across the entire shale 
gas lifecycle: before, during and after operations. This is an 
important lesson to learn from the US shale gas experience: 
it has proved difficult to verify allegations of water 
contamination caused by fracking in the United States due to 
a lack of baseline monitoring. 
Earth tremors resulting from fracking are smaller than 
those caused by coal mining, and in this context ‘earth 
tremor’ is a much more appropriate term than ‘earthquake’. 
There are thousands of seismic events in the United 
Kingdom every year — those with a Richter magnitude 
of 1–2 are rarely felt. There are around 25 per year with 
magnitude 2 and about three per year at magnitude 3. 
Fracking can cause earth tremors, but these are likely to be 
small because shale is weaker than other rocks and yields 
before larger seismic events can occur.  
The United Kingdom has a history of induced seismicity 
from coal mining and the settlement of abandoned coal 
mines (up to magnitude 4). British Geological Survey records 
indicate that this mining-related seismicity is of smaller 
magnitude than natural seismicity; any seismicity induced 
by hydraulic fracturing is likely to be smaller still. To put 
fracking-related earth tremors in context, the two induced 
by hydraulic fracturing near Blackpool in 2011 had a Richter 
magnitude of 2.3 and 1.5. The RS/RAEng report concluded 
that these two minor earth tremors were due to the 
reactivation of a pre-stressed existing fault, and that it was 
very unlikely that future earth tremors caused by fracking 
would ever exceed magnitude 3 – and the effects felt would 
be no worse than a passing lorry. In other words, the risk of 
earth tremors of any real significance is very low.
The RS/RAEng report concluded that UK fracking and 
shale gas extraction can be adequately controlled with its 
existing strong regulatory system, combined with 60 years’ 
experience of regulating onshore and offshore oil and gas 
industries. Fracking is an established technology that has 
been used in the oil and gas industries for many decades, and 
the United Kingdom has considerable experience of fracking 
and horizontal drilling for non-shale gas applications. Over 
the past 30 years, more than 2,000 wells have been drilled 
onshore in the United Kingdom, approximately 200 of which 
have been fracked. There is nevertheless a need to ensure 
that the UK regulatory system is constantly reviewed and 
fit for purpose if shale gas extraction is to continue in this 
country with acceptably low risks. 
Fracking can be done safely in the United Kingdom, but 
not without effective regulation, careful management, robust 
environmental risk assessments and rigorous monitoring. It 
is also essential to build public confidence: local communities 
need to be involved and well informed, and to feel that their 
concerns are being fully addressed.
Fracking is unlikely to 
contaminate drinking water.
83
84
SECTION 3: FRAMING RISK 
— THE HUMAN ELEMENT
When a 7.0 magnitude earthquake 
devastated Port-au-Prince, the capital of 
Haiti, in 2010, relief agencies found that there 
were no detailed maps of the city. It took just 
two weeks for humans, machines and data — 
working together as a ‘social machine’ — to 
create these vital maps, using tools such as 
WikiProject and OpenStreetMaps together 
with data from GPS devices.
Over the past two years, 
the number of users of 
e-cigarettes and vaporizers 
has tripled.
In 2012, the UK’s 
Climate Change Risk 
Assessment identified 
an increase in the risk of 
flooding as the greatest 
threat to the country 
from climate change, 
requiring significant 
adaptation planning. 
Framing quantitative information in the negative 
(‘4 people will die’) or positive (‘saves 2 lives’) can 
lead to dramatic differences in people’s perceptions. 
People tend to overestimate the likelihood 
of high-impact, low-probability events in which 
many people die at once. In the aftermath of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks many individuals avoided 
travelling by plane — leading to an estimated 
additional 1,600 in the United States due to road 
traffic accidents. 
Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin 
attack on the Tokyo 
underground network 
in 1995 caused thirteen 
fatalities; about 5,000 
people were injured.
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61% 83%
One of the most effective examples of 
a ‘nudge’ is to change the way that a default 
option is set. When the UK government began
to automatically enrol people on to company 
pension plans (with the option to ‘opt out’), 
pension enrolment increased from 61 to 83%. 
Dramatic floods in the United Kingdom 
in the winter of 2013–14 caused flooding in 
about 7,000 properties — but some 1.4 million 
properties in England were protected by flood 
defences, and there was no direct loss of life.
Narrative can be more than 
a means of escaping from or 
mirroring situations of change — 
it is a powerful and effective style of 
thinking through risk and complexity. 
For climate change, images of extreme 
weather can have much more impact 
than technical presentations.
Potential concerns 
about the safety of 
driverless technology on 
the Docklands Light Railway 
were addressed in part by 
downplaying the novelty of 
the technology. 
DLR
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CHAPTER 7: HOW PEOPLE ESTIMATE 
RISKS IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Understanding how our instincts influence assessments of 
risk can help people to make better choices for themselves. 
David Halpern and Owain 
Service (Behavioural Insights 
Team, UK Cabinet Office)
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When professional scientists, insurers and risk assessors consider risks, they typically weigh up the impact of an event against the probability 
of it occurring over a given timeframe. Car insurers, for 
example, think about how likely it is that your car will be 
stolen given its usage and location, and what the cost of 
replacing or repairing it might be. The UK’s National Security 
Strategy considers what the consequences of numerous 
plausible worst-case scenario events might be (an attack 
on UK overseas territories, for example, or severe coastal 
flooding), and then considers the likelihood that these 
events might occur. 
But this is not the way that most people calculate or 
assess risk most of the time. Indeed, experiments have 
shown that it’s not even how most experts assess risk most 
of the time. Human beings instead generally use rules of 
thumb (heuristics) that help them take quick, instinctive 
decisions. The vast majority of the time, these mental 
heuristics serve us remarkably well. But there are also 
occasions when these same heuristics result in us (in the 
language of economists) failing to ‘maximize our utility’. 
The systematic study of how people actually estimate 
probabilities and risks has had major impacts in psychology, 
economics, and more recently, in policy. From the early 
1970s, the psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman began publishing a series of detailed studies 
on how people — from the ‘man on the street’ to 
trained professionals — estimated everyday examples of 
probabilities, frequencies and associations. Tversky and 
Kahneman were especially interested in those situations in 
which people fail to behave like professional risk assessors, 
and they gradually uncovered the nature of the mental 
shortcuts that people were using, and documented the 
circumstances under which these would lead to error.  
For example, Tversky and Kahneman found that people 
often estimate the probability of an event occurring by how 
easily they can recall or generate examples of it occurring. 
Try it yourself. Do you think that there are more English 
words that start with the letter ‘r’ or that have ‘r’ as the 
third letter? 
What you probably did, almost immediately, is to start 
thinking about examples of words that started with the 
letter ‘r’, which you’ll find that you can do quite easily. You 
also will have tried to think of words that have ‘r’ as a third 
CASE STUDY
SOCIAL MACHINES: MANAGING RISK IN A WEB-ENABLED WORLD
Nigel Shadbolt (University of Southampton)
The Kenyan election on 27 December 2007 was followed by a wave of riots, killings and turmoil. An African blogger, Erik Hersman, read a post 
by another blogger, Ory Okolloh, calling for a Web 
application to track incidents of violence and areas 
of need.  Within a few days, Hersman had organized 
Okolloh and two like-minded developers in the United 
States and Kenya to make the idea a reality. The result 
was Ushahidi, which allowed local observers to submit 
reports using the Web or SMS messages from mobile 
phones, and simultaneously created a temporal and 
geospatial archive of these events. It has subsequently 
been extended, adapted and used around the world in 
events from Washington DC’s ‘Snowmageddon’ in 2010, 
to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011. 
How did this happen?
On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake 
devastated the capital of Haiti.  As the world rushed to 
help, relief agencies realized that they had a problem: 
there were no detailed maps of Port-au-Prince. Too 
poor to afford a mapping agency, the country had 
never built this vital piece of digital infrastructure. 
Two weeks later, using tools such as WikiProject and 
OpenStreetMaps together with data from widely-
available GPS devices, relief workers, government 
officials and ordinary citizens had access to detailed 
maps of the entire capital. How did this happen?
As of July 2014, seven projects had contributed hundreds 
of millions of classifications to the citizen science astronomy 
website Galaxy Zoo. Beginning in 2007, astronomers at the 
University of Oxford had built a site that enabled people 
to quickly learn the task of classifying images of galaxies. 
The first project comprised a data set made up of a million 
galaxies imaged by the Sloan Digital Sky Survey — far 
more images than the handful of professional astronomers 
could deal with.  Within 24 hours of launch, the site was 
achieving 70,000 classifications an hour. More than 50 million 
classifications were received by the project during its first 
year, contributed by more than 150,000 people and resulting 
in many scientific insights. How does this happen?
The answer lies in emergent and collective problem 
solving — the creation of ‘social machines’ that integrate 
humans, machines and data at a large scale. In the case of 
Galaxy Zoo, researchers had built the world’s most powerful 
pattern-recognition super-computer.  As one of the co-
founders noted: “it existed in the linked intelligence of all the 
people who had logged on to our website: and this global 
brain was… incredibly fast and incredibly accurate”.
The essential characteristics of all of these examples 
are:
• Problems are solved by the scale of human participation 
and open innovation on the World Wide Web.
• They rely on access to (or else the ability to generate) 
89
large amounts of relevant open data.
• Confidence in the quality of the data 
and the processes that underpin the 
systems is crucial.
• They use intuitive interfaces. 
The examples above are dramatic 
demonstrations of an approach to 
risk management that the Web can engender and 
enable. It is an approach that supports the timely 
mobilization of people, technology and information. 
It is an approach in which the incentive to participate 
increases as more people participate. It is an approach 
that is efficient, effective and equitable. 
One challenge to this approach includes maintaining 
confidence and trust in the quality of data and 
processes. The very scale of participation means 
that some will supply bad, wrong or indifferent data. 
Fortunately, methods have evolved to evaluate and 
calibrate the results of the crowd.  Another is to 
maintain the Web infrastructure in the face of the 
problems tackled. However, in an age of satellites, 
wireless communications and mesh networks the 
ability to maintain a Web infrastructure has never 
been greater.
Using the Web, we can build social machines that 
demonstrate open innovation, managing risks through 
transparency and wide engagement. The Web enables 
previously unimagined solutions to some of the 
world’s greatest challenges.
letter and discovered that this is rather harder. 
On this basis, most people instinctively conclude that 
there are probably more words that begin with ‘r’, whereas 
in fact there are around three times more words that have 
‘r’ as the third letter. Tversky and Kahneman called this an 
‘availability heuristic’, and you can see why it often works, 
but also how it can lead us astray1.
The availability heuristic helps to explain why in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, Californians are more likely to 
purchase insurance2. It leads us to overweight the probability
of high-impact, low-probability events in which many people 
die at one time. Paul Slovic coined the term ‘dread risks’ 
to refer to these phenomenon, which are at play in the 
case study on nuclear submarines in Chapter 6: far greater 
resources are devoted to managing these risks than for 
other potential submarine hazards with the same risk 
profile. 
One sobering study, for example, shows that in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, miles driven on 
roads jumped by as much as 5% as individuals avoided 
travelling by plane. It has been estimated that as many as 
1,600 US citizens lost their lives as a result of the road 
 
traffic accidents associated with this increase in car travel — 
six times higher than the total number of passengers who 
died on the planes themselves3. 
Another example is our tendency to overweight positive 
outcomes that are certain relative to those that are very 
likely (the ‘certainty effect’); and we seek to avoid losses to 
a far greater extent than we prefer equivalent gains (‘loss 
aversion’)4. Tversky and Kahneman used pairs of gambles 
(or ‘prospects’) to illustrate these phenomena. Consider 
one such pair, which illustrates the certainty effect and loss 
aversion in combination (the percentage of people selecting 
each option is shown in square brackets):
1.  Would you prefer an 80% chance of winning £4,000 
[20%], or the certainty of £3,000 [80%]?
2.  Would you prefer an 80% chance of losing £4,000 [92%], 
or the certainty of losing £3,000 [8%]?
 
As you can see, the preference for each of these gambles 
are the mirror image of one another, depending on whether 
they are framed as losses or gains. In the positive domain 
(prospect 1), the certainty effect contributes to a risk-
averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is 
not certain — most choose the certain £3000. But in the 
negative domain (prospect 2), the same effect leads to a risk-
seeking preference for a loss that is merely probable over 
a smaller loss that is certain — most choose the uncertain 
£4000.
This example illustrates the importance of how risks are 
framed. The case study on the communication of medical 
risks in Chapter 6 uses another example from Tversky and 
Kahneman, which demonstrates that framing quantitative 
information in the negative (‘400 people will die’) or positive 
(‘saves 200 lives’) can lead to dramatic differences in people’s 
perceptions. 
 Understanding how people estimate risks has important 
implications for public policymakers and regulators. 
The above finding, for example, has potentially profound 
implications for financial regulators trying to understand 
why investment bankers might respond to the prospect of 
losing a large sum of money by becoming more risk-seeking 
in order to avoid the loss.  Alongside some of the other 
lessons in relation to the banking crisis documented in the 
above case study, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority has 
now established a team devoted to the understanding of 
behaviour. 
There are many of these rules of thumb or heuristics that 
shape how human beings estimate risk.  Another important 
issue, though, is how emotions impact our decision-making 
and estimates of risk. This is rarely considered by those 
who manage risk professionally. In a now classic study, 
George Loewenstein and colleagues developed the ‘risks 
as feeling’ hypothesis, pointing out that there are numerous 
emotionally-driven factors that help to explain how human 
beings react to risky situations, which cannot be explained 
by accounts that seek to weigh up coolly the probabilities 
and outcomes of a given situation5. 
One such factor is the vividness with which these 
outcomes can be described or represented mentally. 
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Loewenstein observed that in the United States, people tend 
to be underinsured for hazards that evoke relatively pallid 
mental images (such as flooding), which are less capable of 
causing worry or concern than events that have the ability 
to evoke more vivid images (such as an act of terrorism). 
For example, studies have shown that people are more 
willing to pay for airline travel insurance covering death from 
‘terrorist acts’ (a vivid event) than death from ‘all possible 
causes’ (which of course includes terrorist acts). 
Emotions do not just affect how we think about the 
outcome of an event, but also influence how we weight 
the probabilities of those outcomes occurring.  When an 
outcome is relatively pallid (losing $20, say), participants in 
a study were relatively sensitive to probability variations: 
they were prepared to pay $1 to insure against a 1% chance 
of losing $20, and this rose to $18 to insure against a 
99% chance of loss – an 18-fold difference. But when the 
outcome evoked emotion (for example, receiving an electric 
shock), the participants were extremely insensitive to 
probability variations. They were prepared to pay a hefty $7 
to avoid a 1% chance of being shocked, but this rose to just 
$10 to avoid a 99% chance of shock — less than 1.5 times 
as much.
Another fascinating observation from the literature is the 
research on ‘evolutionary preparedness’, which results in 
people reacting with little fear to certain types of objectively 
dangerous stimuli that evolution has not prepared them for, 
such as hamburgers, automobiles, smoking and unsafe sex, 
even when individuals recognize the threat at the cognitive 
level. In contrast, other types of stimuli that people are 
evolutionarily prepared to fear (spiders, snakes or heights) 
evoke a visceral response even when adequate safety 
CASE STUDY
ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES: TRADE-OFFS 
AND ACCEPTABILITY THRESHOLDS
Fabian Schuppert (Queen’s University Belfast)
Regulating risks often requires policy-makers to carefully balance competing objectives and values; trade-offs need to be made and justified in order 
to arrive at viable acceptability thresholds. Most new 
technologies and social practices cannot be labelled as 
either risky, or completely risk-free (in other words, 
100% safe). Instead, in most cases new technologies 
must be considered risky or safe to a degree, since 
absolute certainty regarding a technology’s safety 
is — scientifically speaking — virtually unattainable. 
Therefore, as regulators, it is our task to assess which 
risks are acceptable and how to regulate the use and 
consumption of available technologies. In doing so, one 
needs to carefully weigh different considerations and 
values, trying to reconcile competing concerns.
Take, for instance, the case of electronic cigarettes 
and vaporizers. Over the past two years, the number 
of users of e-cigarettes and vaporizers has tripled, a 
trend which some hail as the end of traditional tobacco 
smoking, while others warn of unknown health risks 
and a renormalization of smoking. Both sides make valid 
points: on the one hand, e-cigarettes and vaporizers are 
innovative technologies that allow their users to quench 
their desire for nicotine without exposing themselves 
and others around them to the most harmful risks 
connected with traditional tobacco smoking. On the 
other hand, e-cigarettes and vaporizers are not regulated 
in the same way as tobacco products, meaning that 
advertisements for e-cigarettes glorifying nicotine use 
are ubiquitous and a possible risk for teenagers. This 
obviously raises the question of how regulators should 
respond to the introduction and widespread use of 
e-cigarettes and vaporizers.
E-cigarettes and vaporizers are less harmful than 
traditional tobacco cigarettes, so it seems clear that 
treating them all in the same way would be misguided. 
One of the key arguments for the strict regulation 
of tobacco smoking was the major health risks for 
smokers (and also exposed non-smokers), an argument 
which does not apply in the same way to e-cigarettes 
and vaporizers.  While nicotine is highly addictive, its 
immediate health risks are not greater than those of 
caffeine. However, this does not mean that e-cigarettes 
and vaporizers should go unregulated. 
Many scientific studies prove the pervasive effects of 
targeted advertising on young people and their risk-
taking behaviour, so it seems advisable to build regulative 
norms around such knowledge. In so doing, regulators 
need to carefully balance their interest in protecting 
vulnerable groups (particularly young people) with 
concerns over paternalistic interventions in people’s 
free decision-making. Moreover, regulators can take their 
bearings from the regulation of other substances, such 
as alcohol (which comes with an age limit), coffee and 
smokeless tobacco products (such as snus in Sweden). 
Thus, while electronic cigarettes and vaporizers are 
indeed novel technologies, their regulation and the 
associated questions of finding acceptability thresholds 
based on making trade-offs can draw on existing insights 
and experiences.
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Changing the way that we 
communicate messages 
in areas from tax letters 
to organ donation can 
increase compliance and 
sign up rates.  
measures have been put in place and they are recognized 
to be harmless. Some people interpret these findings from 
behavioural science as demonstrating that ordinary people 
are irredeemably irrational, or incapable of understanding 
risks. But the framing of human thought as irrational is itself 
potentially misleading for a couple of reasons. 
Firstly, many of these same effects enable us to process 
information and act quickly without the need to analyze 
information comprehensively. Think about how complex 
your life would be if you had to calculate the trajectory 
of a falling ball you would like to catch using mathematical 
equations rather than intuition and simple rules of thumb. 
Secondly, lessons from behavioural science do not just 
show us those situations in which individuals are prone to 
making errors. They can also show us how to devise systems 
and processes that support people (professionals and non-
specialists alike) in making better decisions for themselves. 
This was the central premise behind Richard Thaler and 
Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge6. They show how policymakers 
can change the ‘choice architecture’ to help  people to make 
choices which are better for them and that they are less 
likely to later regret. For example, one of the best and most 
effective examples of a ‘nudge’ is to change the way that 
a default option is set, in order to overcome our natural 
tendency to prefer rewards today rather than those that we 
receive in the future (‘hyperbolic discounting’), and more 
practically, our dislike of doing paperwork. Recognition of 
this tendency was behind the UK government’s decision to 
automatically enrol people on to company pension plans, 
so that the default switched from having to ‘opt in’ to 
having the option to ‘opt out’. The result: overnight, pension 
enrolment increased from 61 to 83% — and to more than 
90% among those who were eligible. 
The Behavioural Insights Team has, over the past four 
years, put in place dozens of randomized controlled trials, 
encompassing hundreds of variations, which show how 
apparently small changes such as these can have dramatic 
impacts on how people take decisions.  We have shown, 
for example, how changing the way that we communicate 
messages in areas from tax letters to organ donation can 
increase compliance and sign up rates.  
We have also shown how to begin embedding this same 
kind of thinking in the broader policy making process. For 
example, the midata project, which we launched with the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, will enable 
consumers to access information about themselves that 
is held by firms.  We believe this will herald the start of a 
consumer revolution, as third-party developers design apps 
and websites to support consumers’ decisions based on easy-
to-access data: for example, your energy consumption data 
will reveal which new tariff is best for you. (See the case study 
on ‘social machines’ for further discussion of web-enabled 
data sharing).
We have also worked with the Department of Health on 
areas such as electronic cigarettes (see case study), precisely 
because the behavioural evidence shows it is easy for people 
to quit smoking if they can substitute cigarettes for another 
product that feels and looks the same.  
Some behavioural scientists rightly argue that we can 
educate people to become ‘risk savvy’ by providing people 
and professionals with information in ways that they can 
intuitively process and understand. Gerd Gigerenzer, for 
example, has shown how doctors and patients routinely 
misunderstand information about cancer screening. In a study 
of prostrate cancer in the United States, Gigerenzer found 
that many people, including health professionals, routinely 
misunderstand the relative risks of different procedures. 
For example, ‘survival rate’ data is often used to show the 
relative efficacy of screening, but this can be highly misleading 
as individuals diagnosed earlier than they would otherwise 
have been as a result of screening will naturally tend to have 
a higher survival date, but not necessarily a lower mortality 
rate. 
Screening for prostrate cancer in the United States does 
not appear to reduce the overall age-adjusted deaths, partly 
because it increases the number of people who have a 
false positive diagnosis that results in unnecessary surgery. 
Presenting information in terms of relative risks and survival 
rates turns out to be confusing and unhelpful. In contrast, 
simple tools like icon boxes that show a population of 100 
men and what happens to each can radically improve people’s 
understanding of the relative risks of particular actions 
In conclusion, the systematic study of how people 
estimate risks and probabilities in everyday life has proven 
to be extremely rich territory. It has revolutionized several 
academic fields and led to Daniel Kahneman being the first 
psychologist to be awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences. It has also served as a key element of the 
work of the Behavioural Insights Team, established in 2010 
in the UK Cabinet Office, and increasingly being applied by 
governments across the world.
It should also serve as a subtle caution to all of us: 
policymakers and experts ourselves use these same mental 
shortcuts.  We are prone to overconfidence; to hold to 
previous estimates and beliefs, even if arbitrary; and to be 
strongly influenced by the dynamics of the group around us. 
That is why the Behavioural Insights Team was established 
in the first place: to help policymakers understand how 
they could draw on ideas from the behavioural sciences to 
encourage, support and enable people to make better choices
for themselves. 
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CASE STUDY
AUM SHINRIKYO AND THE MOVE TO VIOLENCE
Matthew Francis and Kim Knott (Lancaster University)
The case of Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) demonstrates the complex and dynamic factors that contribute to explaining extreme 
criminal behaviour.  Aum began in 1984 as a small yoga 
group, but within ten years it had grown to over 10,000 
members with the facilities to produce weaponized 
chemicals, templates for AK47s and even a military 
helicopter. In 1995, it released the nerve agent sarin on 
the Tokyo underground network. Due to an error in its 
production, fatalities were limited to thirteen, with 5,000 
injured.
Aum had used scientists among its membership to 
produce the sarin (as well as anthrax and botulism 
spores), whilst simultaneously elevating the idea of 
sarin as a ‘sacred weapon’ within the group’s beliefs 
and practices. This fitted within a wider narrative of 
impending apocalypse that Aum members believed only 
they would survive, and that led to a culture of group 
paranoia.
Accusations of kidnapping and murder had been made 
against Aum in the early 1990s, but law enforcement 
authorities were indisposed to act because of the 
constitutional protections given to religions in Japan at 
the time (which were subsequently amended).
What can we learn?
1. Discursive markers can be identified in Aum’s 
ideological development, and these can be 
compared to those of other threat groups.
Aum’s beliefs were publicly accessible (in Japanese and 
English), and included repeated mention of sarin and 
increasing focus on apocalyptic conflict. They made 
reference to Aum’s dichotomous world view (good 
versus evil, ‘them’ versus ‘us’); its apocalyptic sense of 
emergency; its lack of common ground with wider 
society; the symbolic significance attributed to its 
actions and methods; its violent traditions; and the denial 
of the innocence of its victims. Not all groups planning 
violent action will display every trait in their public 
discourse, but where present they may signal a 
cause for concern.  Although it is undoubtedly 
easier to reconstruct a developmental 
trail after the fact, lessons may 
nevertheless be learned from this 
example that can be applied to 
future cases.
2. Beliefs are not enough — 
context is important.
In the Japanese context,  Aum appealed to a young 
audience dissatisfied with perceived materialism and 
the strongly rationalist ethic of work and education. 
Different factors operate in the United Kingdom, which 
lead to different kinds of risks. The special protections 
given to religions under the Japanese constitution 
before the Aum incident have never applied in the 
United Kingdom, and law enforcement agencies would 
have been able to act sooner on evidence of violence, 
kidnapping and murder. The Aum case shows the 
importance of understanding contextual as well as 
cultural factors in the move to extreme beliefs and 
behaviours.
3. Beliefs are not enough — resources are 
important.
 As with other violent groups,  Aum’s actions and their 
timing were influenced by external events: the attack 
on the Tokyo underground was an attempt to deter an 
impending police investigation. Sarin was identified as a 
sacred weapon not because it had particular theological 
significance, but because it was available. Having tried 
and failed to source the ebola virus and nuclear material, 
Aum worked with what was to hand. 
4. Uncertainty leads to greater extremism.
Aum’s pessimism, apocalyptic predictions and violence 
grew in tandem with increasing uncertainty about 
members’ commitment and disillusionment, legal threats, 
police attention and media lampooning. Psychological 
research on extremism suggests that individuals are 
attracted to extreme movements during times of 
personal uncertainty, and that groups develop sharper, 
more negative contrasts between members and non-
members at times of collective uncertainty.
In summary 
• Groups faced with uncertainty are 
attracted to more extreme beliefs;
• Extreme movements are attractive 
to those afflicted by personal 
uncertainty;
• Risks are very much a product 
of ideological, historical and 
environmental contexts;
• The resources available to a group affect the 
nature of their threat; 
• Regulatory approaches to risk can themselves 
create risks of their own.
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CHAPTER 8: PERCEPTIONS OF RISK
As trust cuts across all of the main approaches to risk perceptions, 
policymakers need to develop novel strategic capacity and skills in 
risk communication and public engagement with science.
Nick Pidgeon and Karen 
Henwood (Cardiff University)
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Although philosophers and social scientists have a long history of raising questions about the appropriate relationship between science and 
wider society, such questioning is more widespread today as 
policymakers and members of the public face controversies 
over potential risks to the environment, to their health 
and financial futures, and from the introduction of new 
technologies. Disputes that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s 
over the risks of chemicals and nuclear power have been 
followed by concerns in some countries over industrial and 
transport-related pollution, genetically modified (GM) crops 
and foods, and latterly so-called ‘upstream’ technologies 
such as nanotechnology and climate engineering.  Although 
mathematical descriptions of risk focus upon establishing 
measures of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘outcome severity’, Kates and 
Kasperson1 offer a very different conceptualization in terms 
of “threats to people and things that they value”.  What 
people care about in relation to risks consequently affects 
how they view them, and whether they are acceptable or 
not. 
If we take this broader concept of risk as our starting 
point then it inevitably sets an epistemological and 
ontological dilemma, being at once an expression of possible 
material damage such as deaths, injuries and losses, and 
at the same time a socially constructed concept in that 
our knowledge of risk — even that derived from expert 
assessments — is always mediated through social and 
psychological lenses and judgement processes2.  A social 
sciences approach to risk and risk perceptions therefore 
aims to map out the social and contextual considerations 
through which people come to comprehend and respond to 
what they believe is hazardous or not, and helps us to begin 
to understand why some risks deemed highly significant 
through expert analysis and risk assessment are seen as 
unimportant by ordinary people, or vice versa3. 
 
BOX 1
Qualitative Characteristics of Perceived 
Risk.  Adapted from the Department of 
Health’s Communicating About Risks to 
Public Health: Pointers to Good Practice.  
Revised Edition. (London: The Stationery 
Office, 1998). 
All other things being equal, risks are generally 
more worrying (and less acceptable) if 
perceived:
• to be involuntary (e.g. exposure to pollution) 
rather than voluntary (e.g. dangerous sports or 
smoking)
• as inequitably distributed (some benefit while 
others suffer the consequences)
• as inescapable by taking precautions.
• to arise from an unfamiliar or novel source
• to result from man-made, rather than natural 
sources
• to cause hidden and irreversible damage, e.g. 
through onset years after exposure
What people care about 
in relation to risks affects 
how they view them, 
and whether they are 
acceptable or not.
The Psychometric Paradigm
Research on individual risk perceptions and risk 
communication first developed during the 1970s and 1980s 
in response to rising environmental and safety concerns 
amongst Western populations in particular about industrial 
chemicals and nuclear technologies. Psychologists of the 
time aimed to gain an empirical understanding of some of 
the judgements and beliefs underlying a number of highly 
visible and complex social and public policy issues. Since 
then, risk perception and communication research has 
embraced a diverse set of both disciplines (anthropology, 
sociology, human geography) and hazards (electromagnetic 
fields, air pollution, food hazards, climate change, bio- and 
nanotechnologies, climate engineering).  Although the 
objectives of the researchers are primarily theoretical and 
empirical, their work touches on significant public policy 
issues surrounding conflicts over particular environmental, 
health or technological developments4.
During the decades spanning the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s, risk perception research was framed either within a 
cognitive science or a socio-cultural approach, with relatively 
little interaction between the two. More recent theorising 
has stressed an increased awareness of and interest in 
more interpretative approaches which are sensitive to 
the symbolic qualities of risk perceptions as grounded in 
context, and which seek to step beyond simple oppositions 
such as ‘cognition’ or ‘culture’.
Early risk perception studies were dominated by the 
experimental psychology investigations of Kahneman and 
Tversky into the mental heuristics or short-cuts which 
people use in estimating probabilities and rapidly making 
decisions (see Chapter 7). Over time, some of that work 
migrated from the psychology laboratory into the field, to 
encompass study of a richer set of issues within the so-
called ‘psychometric paradigm’5. This work, using primarily 
quantitative survey methodology, demonstrated that 
perceived risks were sensitive to a range of qualitative 
factors, including the controllability of an activity, the fear it 
evoked, its catastrophic potential, voluntariness of exposure, 
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equity of risk distribution, the perceived unnaturalness of 
the hazard, observability of the risk and so on. Box 1 shows 
some of the characteristics which make risks more or less 
acceptable to people.  As a result, a new and unfamiliar risk 
that people feel that they have little control over, as in the 
driverless train in the Docklands Light Railway case study, 
may require special actions and communications to be in 
place to reassure people of safety measures. Subsequent 
to this early work, we also know that the way people think 
about and judge risks is influenced by the way they respond 
to the affective resonances and feelings that it evokes, and 
analytic information6, 7. 
While it is tempting to view affect, or emotion, as an 
irrational process that only afflicts people who differ in 
view from us, we also know that rational decision-making 
requires elements of both analysis and affect. For example, 
without emotional commitment in decision-making we 
would not remain committed to important choices8. Benefits 
also matter to people, as risk is more acceptable if it holds 
perceived benefits that are equitably distributed, as does 
trust in risk managers and institutions, an issue to which we 
return below.  
The early psychometric studies provided a model for an 
extensive research programme and literature3, 5, 9. However, 
while the basic approach of psychometric risk perceptions 
research provided extensive empirical descriptions of the 
psychology of risk perceptions, it did not initially yield 
substantive theoretical progress towards explaining those 
beliefs, or people’s behaviour in the face of risks. 
Values, Culture and the Risk Society
Social and cultural factors are important to risk perception 
because the perceiver of risk is rarely an isolated individual, 
but a ‘social being’ defined through a range of relationships 
with others10, raising the question of how societal values 
shape risk perceptions. The best known socio-cultural 
approach to risk, that of Douglas and Wildavsky11, develops 
the worldview idea in conceptual terms, positing that 
human attitudes towards risk and danger vary systematically 
according to four cultural biases: individualist, fatalist, 
hierarchist and egalitarian. 
These biases are held to reflect modes of social 
organization, thought and value, all of which serve the 
function of defending individuals’ favoured institutional 
arrangements and ways of life, and in particular who to 
blame when those arrangements become threatened from 
outside12. Risk perception becomes central to the process 
of institutional defence, with cultural biases orienting 
people’s selection of which dangers to accept or to avoid, 
the fairness of distribution of risks across society, and 
who to blame when things do go wrong. Cultural theory 
has also been valuable in stressing the neglect, within the 
early psychometric studies, of a concern for the political 
dimensions of risk, although it suffers from the fact that its 
categories of worldview are top-down in nature, and from 
difficulties in measurement13. 
More recent work on ‘cultural cognition’, however, 
draws on this thinking to demonstrate why certain risk 
issues (handguns, abortion) have become deeply polarized 
across US society14. Contemporary investigations of energy 
issues15,16, and climate change17 also show how deeper values 
are bound up with our risk perceptions.  We know that 
individuals with political affiliations to right-leaning political 
parties tend to identify with less egalitarian and more 
individualistic values, and as a result are more likely to be 
sceptical about the claims of climate change scientists and 
risks18. However, this work also suggests how some values 
that are widely endorsed can be incorporated as important 
components of narratives about risk (see case study on 
climate change narratives). For example, recent research 
with US conservatives found that they were more favourable 
towards environmental messages when these focused on 
pollution, and the ‘purity’ of the natural environment, rather 
than the more conventional set of arguments about a moral 
responsibility to avoid harm19. 
US conservatives were 
more favourable towards 
environmental messages 
when these focused 
on pollution, and the 
‘purity’ of the natural 
environment, rather than 
arguments about a moral 
responsibility to avoid 
harm.
Contemporary 
investigations of energy 
issues and climate 
change show how deeper 
values are bound up with 
our risk perceptions.
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Similarly, a recent report for the Climate Outreach and 
Information Network20 argued for the importance of 
identifying the overlap between the values underpinning 
centre-right conservatism in the United Kingdom and 
those which are congruent with sustainability, such as an 
emphasis on community well-being, intergenerational duty 
and a representation of the environment not as a ‘service 
provider’ but as something that people have a duty to 
protect. Social values and discourses also shape how men 
and women orient towards science and technology, and are 
being explored as explanations for the so-called ‘gender 
effect’ in risk perception — the observation that some men 
come to see environmental and technological risks as less 
threatening than other groups in society, including most 
women21, 22.      
Arguably just as important to thinking about cultural 
issues and risk has been the work of Ulrich Beck23 and 
Anthony Giddens24 in their discussion of ‘Risk Society’. 
Risk society theory starts from an analysis of the macro-
structural conditions and consequences of contemporary 
(late-modern) industrialized Western society. The claim 
is that late-modernity has been accompanied by the 
emergence of new classes of all-pervasive and ‘invisible’ 
risks, experienced only indirectly through expert systems 
of knowledge — we may be exposed to risks, but can never 
fully comprehend their technological and environmental 
causes. 
According to Beck and Giddens, the consequences for the 
 
CASE STUDY
MANAGING RISK PERCEPTION OF AUTONOMOUS 
TECHNOLOGIES: THE DOCKLANDS LIGHT RAILWAY
Mike Esbester (University of Portsmouth)
Introducing autonomous technologies — those which are not directly controlled by human operators — poses significant challenges, particularly
regarding people’s perceptions of the dangers to 
which they might be exposed. This case study focuses 
on London’s Docklands Light Railway (DLR), and 
considers how the automatic technology of driverless 
trains was presented to the public. It explores how the 
risks conceivably posed by the lack of human drivers 
were perceived and addressed, and is used to suggest 
lessons for the introduction of future autonomous 
technologies.
The DLR is an urban mass transit system, proposed 
in the early 1980s and opened in 1987. It operates on 
a track separated from other transport users — unlike 
a tram, for example, it does not run along streets. This 
meant that it was possible to run driverless trains 
controlled by computer programs, though a single 
member of staff travelled on board to operate doors 
and check tickets.
Driverless trains brought with them the potential 
perception that they were in some way dangerous, as 
nobody was in control. However, the records available 
show no great public concern about the driverless 
technology. There were fears, but they were mitigated 
or addressed by those promoting the DLR both before 
and during the system’s introduction, until the DLR’s 
safety record was established in practice.
Proactive communication was key: explanations of 
the system, its technology and the associated fail-
safes tried to remove concerns about the lack of 
drivers. Exhibitions of trains and promotional literature put 
forward both the positives of the DLR and the negatives 
of traditional surface level transportation. They noted (but 
didn’t stress unduly) the potential for human control if need 
arose. Leaflets and newspaper features noted that it was 
possible for the member of staff on board to drive the train 
and that the system was overseen by humans in the control 
centre.
Potential concerns about the safety of driverless 
technology were addressed by publicity surrounding 
the trials of the DLR, which stressed their extensive 
and thorough nature. Significantly, the novelty of the 
technology was downplayed. Instead, the DLR’s proponents 
acknowledged the debts owed to existing automatic 
technologies that the public might be familiar with, in a bid 
to demonstrate the tried and tested nature of such systems. 
This included the Victoria underground line, which had used 
a version of automatic train operation since 1968.
Finally, perceptions of risk were ameliorated by placing 
the system under the regulation of the Railway Inspectorate, 
the state agency responsible for overseeing safety (including 
granting permission to operate new lines). The state, 
effectively, acted as guarantor on the safety of the DLR.
These factors suggest a number of aspects to explore 
when introducing new autonomous technologies, in order 
to address public concerns about potential negative impacts. 
The public is likely to be interested in new technologies, 
and may well approach them with an open mind and 
sophisticated (and varied) perceptions of risks. Therefore 
providing information at each stage of the process is likely 
to be beneficial. Concerns should be acknowledged and 
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addressed without playing-up the potential negative 
aspects, and presented alongside the potential benefits. 
Factors that might usefully be communicated include: 
the relationship of new technologies to existing 
technologies that people have experienced; testing of 
new systems; the regulatory system that will protect 
people; and the fail-safes built into autonomous 
technologies to prevent harm.
DLR
The public is likely to 
be interested in new 
technologies, and may 
well approach them 
with an open mind and 
sophisticated (and varied) 
perceptions of risks.
individual include the emergence of new forms of anxiety 
and existential uncertainty associated with the privatization 
of risk decision-making (from the state and institutions to 
individuals) alongside the fragmentation of traditional social 
categories such as gender, the family and class. Risk society 
theorists also point to an interaction between new global-
local environmental risks and social changes: in particular, 
a shift in the locus of responsibility for dealing with risks 
from state to individual citizens, coupled, paradoxically, with 
a need to place greater trust in experts in a technologically 
sophisticated and connected world. Erosion of traditional 
social identities, such as the certainties offered formerly 
by class, profession, gender or family units, are also held to 
make the individual more responsible for the risks that they 
face (technically termed the reflexive risk subject), who must 
as a result chart his or her own identity (who I am and who 
I want to be) and risk biography (what risks must I worry 
about in the everyday) in an ever more uncertain world25 
Risk society theory represents, then, a set of arguments 
about the way changing socio-economic conditions are 
impacting people’s individual risk perceptions and risk 
identities26. Interestingly, while Beck and Giddens highlight 
environmental risks as the domain where risk society is 
most acutely felt by people, it may ultimately prove to be 
the 2008 financial crisis, alongside the ‘unwinding’27 of the 
traditional social contracts between citizens and the State in 
many Western Nations, that provides the acid test of their 
thesis28. 
Interpretive Approaches to Risk Perception
Very recently a range of interpretative approaches to 
everyday risk perceptions have arisen, stressing the 
symbolic and locally embedded nature of the socio-
cultural element to risks, as well as the ways in which 
people actively construct their understandings of risk 
issues. These elements of an interpretive approach can 
be used to understand the complexly-gendered nature of 
environmental risk perceptions, and how it can illuminate 
current ethical debates and philosophical reflections on 
nuclear energy29, a matter that has become of particular 
policy concern in the UK post-Fukushima. Drawing on 
hermeneutic, phenomenological and discursive traditions, 
such perspectives recognize the central roles of meaning 
and interpretation in structuring our social interactions and 
identity (see also Chapter 9). 
Approaches within such a tradition often take a more 
locally grounded approach to both the content and origins 
of risk perceptions, and seek to explore discussions and 
understandings of risk where people are directly exposed 
to a hazard such as industrial environmental pollution, 
a local chemical or nuclear plant, or a disease outbreak 
which affects their everyday lives30, 31, 32. The emphasis here 
is upon understanding the localized logics and rationalities 
that people bring to bear upon an issue, rather than with 
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reference to an externally imposed concept of technical, 
psychological or culturally determined ‘risk’. During the 
2001 UK foot and mouth epidemic, for example, local 
people in the affected areas in marginal rural communities 
often understood the risk of transmission in terms of the 
geographical relationships between infected and uninfected 
farms, which in turn depended upon their knowledge of 
local geographical features.  When those understandings did 
not correspond with the quarantine zones around infected 
farms as defined by the culling policy devised centrally 
in London, it generated considerable mistrust in risk 
management and the authorities33. 
Interpretive approaches share considerable common 
ground with more psychologically-based approaches to 
perceptions and risk communication design, based upon 
the mental models technique34, while a recent development 
in this area is the use of more biographical and narrative 
approaches to understand risk perceptions, risk framing and 
risk valuation35, 36. The interpretive approach also forms the 
foundation for much of the work documenting the social 
amplification of risk — the idea that both risk controversies, 
and conversely situations where risk perceptions become 
attenuated, emerge and are sustained by the dynamics of 
institutional and media actors who process, transforming 
and shape our collective understandings of risk. 
A recent example of risk amplification comes from the 
CASE STUDY
TELLING THE STORIES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Esther Eidinow (University of Nottingham), Nicky Marsh (University 
of Southampton) and Patricia Waugh (University of Durham)
“Please don’t tell me how the story ends” 
(Cormac McCarthy, The Road) 
One of the most powerful narrative images for climate 
change is that of the urban apocalypse: Manhattan 
submerged by snow or rain. These familiar narratives, 
predicting and often preventing disaster, rehearse the 
conditions of contemporary agency in situations of 
risk. They make technocratic knowledge accessible 
and personal: the risk analyst saves his girlfriend, the 
scientist his son. The subjunctive qualities of narrative 
also structure time, exploring and modifying the 
causalities between past, present and future that 
risk analysis requires. Popular narratives of disaster, 
informed by the certainty of their ending, structurally 
both enact and contain the uncertainties of risk. 
Yet the dramatic scale of these apocalyptic texts also 
makes the agency that they produce seem implausible. 
The ability to prevent the apocalypse is the preserve 
of the hero, and some of the clichés of contemporary 
fiction can threaten the very agency they appear to 
enable, because they encourage us to identify with 
the effects but not with the solutions to the crisis. 
This summer, as ‘cli-fi’ went viral, and stories about 
climate change and its effect multiplied across different 
media, the New York Times on 29 July 2014 asked the 
key question: “Will Fiction Influence How We React to 
Climate Change?”
Hollywood aims to thrill us, but the realities of 
climate change require a different kind of story-telling. 
The mobilizing effect of Rachel Carson’s 1962 book 
Silent Spring has been widely touted, but narrative’s 
role in comprehending the extraordinarily complex 
social and environmental challenges of the moment 
go beyond a mere call to action. Recent interdisciplinary 
research across narratology and the cognitive sciences 
has shown that human cognition functions not just in a 
logico-empirical mode, but inherently draws on narrative 
structures to make sense of the world and to understand 
how it is embedded in an environment that it helps to 
construct. Think about the kind of cognitive workout we get 
from reading complex novels attentively: we are educated 
out of confirmation bias, required to revise hypotheses in 
the light of new evidence, consider multiple perspectives, 
note the agency of metaphors in reorganizing the real, and 
understand our errors as unexpected perspectives emerge 
towards a hoped-for convergence with an already-written 
ending (which never turns out to be quite what we’d 
expected). Narrative is more than a means of escaping from 
or mirroring situations of change — it is a powerful and 
effective style of thinking through risk and complexity.  After 
all, there is no narrative without change and surprise.
The discipline of planning has long recognized that 
narrative presents a powerful tool for describing complex 
future challenges, such as climate change, where multiple 
uncertainties preclude simple linear predictions. This is 
reflected in the increasing use of scenarios for planning, 
both around climate change itself and related challenges 
(including food security, land planning, and water sourcing). 
Such stories can allow technical information to be made 
comprehensible in terms of lived experience, and help to 
develop a context of shared understanding for decision-
making. But perhaps most importantly, they can offer a 
method for exploring possibilities: in place of finished 
narratives, story-telling as a dynamic and creative process 
can invite engagement and encourage a sense of agency.
But who will tell these stories? Building long-term capacity 
for collaborative decision-making faces the challenge 
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We tend to trust people 
who share our values or 
are members of our own 
social group, especially 
when information about 
a risk is either uncertain 
or sparse. 
of creating multi-stakeholder scenarios — stories 
about the future that bring together different actors 
and decision-makers with diverse perspectives and 
expertise. Part of the answer may lie in rethinking our 
approach to narrative in this context. For effective 
public engagement we need not just one, but many, 
simultaneous story-tellings, told not just once, but 
many times.
domain of biosecurity risks. In the autumn of 2013, when it 
became clear that ash trees were vulnerable to the spread 
of the Chalara fraxinea pathogen to the United Kingdom, 
government and society alike did not anticipate the strong 
media and political focus on the issue that would follow. 
Pidgeon and Barnett have documented how a range of 
cultural and institutional factors underlay this controversy37. 
Climate change, on the other hand, has long been recognized 
to be an ‘attenuated’ hazard38, a risk where people are often 
resistant to the scientific evidence of its gravity precisely 
because many of the proposed solutions will threaten some 
of our most deeply held values regarding the relationship 
between society, lifestyles and economic growth. This again 
points to the importance of constructing the right narratives 
about risk to address such deep-seated value-based and 
identity issues (see case study on climate change).  
Risk Perception and Trust
The past 20 years have seen a surge in interest in the 
role of trust in people’s responses to environmental and 
technological risks, from both the academic and policy 
community. In Europe, the crisis over bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) in particular was seen as an event 
that reduced public trust in risk management processes. 
Accordingly, rebuilding trust in the science policy 
process through processes of public engagement and 
transparency has been a core policy objective of public risk 
communication and stakeholder engagement processes39. 
The question of trust and risk perception is not a new 
one, however.  As early as 1980, the sociologist Brian 
Wynne40 argued that differences between expert and lay 
views of risk might depend upon the public’s evaluation 
of the trustworthiness of risk management, and of the 
authorities to act both in the public interest and with regard 
to best possible technical standards and practice.  And 
indeed one interpretation to be placed upon several of the 
qualitative dimensions of risk identified in the psychometric 
studies (for example, control over risk, equity of impacts, 
whether a risk is known to science etc.) is that they tap 
more fundamental value concerns about the institutional 
processes of hazard management. Such concerns are not 
strictly divorced from the hazard process itself, either. 
We have to trust risk management and managers to keep 
modern risks (transportation, energy systems, environmental 
stressors) within acceptable bounds, and any evidence of a 
failure to fulfil such a duty means that the risk might indeed 
be more serious than we thought.
Survey studies have repeatedly shown that trust in risk 
managing institutions is positively correlated with the 
acceptability of various technological and environmental 
risks. For example, with the exception of gender (see above), 
most socio-demographic and ideological variables are only 
weakly related to concern about a potential nuclear waste 
repository or nuclear power, while trust variables have 
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It is entirely rational not 
to wish to place complete 
blind faith on any 
organization or individual 
who holds the power of 
life or death over us or 
over the environment.
substantially higher predictive power3, 41. In the United States, 
distrust in repository management was mainly linked to 
opposition to the proposed siting of the Yucca mountain 
radioactive waste repository, because of the perceived 
risk of the waste site42. Other studies show that trust is 
significant across a range of hazards and risks43, although the 
precise underlying reasons for trust and distrust may vary 
in different risk cases and contexts. In the case of GM crops, 
for example, it was the ambiguity of risks (see Chapter 4) 
alongside concern about the activities of large multinational 
corporations imposing risks on people without their 
consent; for foot and mouth disease, it was the insensitivity 
to local impacts of the central management strategies.
In conceptual terms, trust cuts across all of the main 
approaches to risk perceptions described above, while 
a number of recent risk controversies — including BSE 
and GM crops — have made policymakers aware that the 
public have become key players in many controversial risk 
issues, and that (dis)trust may be a core component of 
this39, 44. Trust is often conceptualized as a set of cognitive 
judgements along discrete dimensions that are primarily 
related to the (presumed) behaviour of risk managers, 
particularly around their care, competence and vested 
interest43, 45.  We trust people, experts and institutions if they 
act in a caring way towards us, are knowledgeable about 
the domain at hand, and are demonstrably free from any 
self-serving interest or partisan bias (and ideally those who 
simultaneously exhibit all three!). These three dimensions 
help to explain why ‘independent scientists’ remain some of 
the most trusted social actors in relation to communicating 
about controversial risk issues. Other more recent work 
suggests that social trust and cooperation can also be built 
on the identity-based concepts of value similarity. That is, we 
tend to trust people who share our values or are members 
of our own social group, especially when information about 
a risk is either uncertain or sparse46.
Walls et al47 point out that these different components 
of trust can exist in tension, with social trust likely to 
emerge as multidimensional and fragmented, as a product 
of a reconciliation of competing ideas, knowledge and 
impressions. They introduce the important concept of ‘critical 
trust’ as an organising principle, something which lies on 
a continuum between outright scepticism (rejection) and 
uncritical emotional acceptance. Such a concept attempts 
to reconcile a situation in which people actually rely on 
risk managing institutions while simultaneously possessing 
a critical attitude toward the effectiveness, motivations or 
independence of the agency in question43,48.  Again, from 
a policy perspective it is entirely rational not to wish to 
place complete blind faith on any organization or individual 
who holds the power of life or death over us or over the 
environment.  And although for many policymakers the 
‘reclamation of trust’ has become an explicit objective, this 
suggests that risk communication efforts that are aimed 
at directly increasing trust may not be universally effective 
in solving risk controversies49. Such policies could well be 
counterproductive where they are based on the incorrect 
assumption that trust can be simply manipulated in order 
to increase the acceptance of a controversial risk. If Beck 
and Giddens are right about the emergence of a risk society, 
risk communicators will have to find new ways of working 
under conditions of permanently eroded trust.  Accordingly, 
policy advice today tends to stress the importance of 
analytic-deliberative engagement and dialogue as the 
means for exploring the values and perceptions underlying 
risk controversies and for exploring routes to better 
risk communication and conflict resolution50, 51 (see also 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 9).  Although such methods have 
an established empirical track-record when used to resolve 
local site-based facility siting and other controversies, scaling 
up to national-level questions such as national energy 
strategies or policies to tackle global environmental risks 
set a range of very difficult conceptual and methodological 
challenges52. Pidgeon and Fischhoff8 argue, in the context 
of climate change risks, that all of this points to the need 
in the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, to develop novel 
strategic capacity and skills in risk communication and 
public engagement with science. This requires us to bring 
together expertise from fundamental domain sciences such 
as radiation protection, climate change, or biosciences, with 
the appropriate social sciences of decision analysis and risk 
communication.   
‘Independent scientists’ 
remain some of the 
most trusted social 
actors in relation to 
communicating about 
controversial risk issues.
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THE SOCIAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVE
We know more than we think we do. Through research by 
social scientists over the past few decades, we have learnt 
a great deal about how people gather information on risks 
such as flooding, how they respond to it, and how it informs 
their actions as individuals and as groups of citizens. But it 
is hard to translate these insights — some of which have 
now been known for a long time — into practical advice for 
individuals and policymakers, mainly because the lessons are 
that risk is often denied and action is rather less than might 
be expected. This is a key challenge facing decision makers. 
Denial remains a common reaction from those at risk 
of flooding, even among those with flood experience. The 
oft-repeated suggestion is that “It will not happen to me”, 
and “I will not be here when the next flood comes”. These 
reactions are not driven principally by ignorance, but by an 
anxiety about future flooding that people want to minimize1. 
The language of risk is also a barrier: public understanding of 
return periods or even annual probabilities is poor.   
Whatever the risks, the decisions that individuals and 
communities make are influenced by the traditional social 
contract with the state: “We pay our taxes and we expect 
the government to act”. Communities at risk are unlikely 
to respond with community risk-reducing initiatives and 
innovations until after a major event — known as the 
“prisoner of experience” phenomenon — rather than in 
anticipation of a hazard. Moreover, these responses are often 
limited to areas where existing social capital is extensive, 
and in relatively affluent and predominantly rural areas 
rather than inner cities.
Flood events themselves are often followed by a loss of 
trust in those who manage risk, as well as dissatisfaction at 
the apparent lack of interventions to reduce risk, which is 
influenced by the perceived unfairness of the governance 
process. People have a poor understanding of ‘who is 
in charge’, which is unsurprising given the fragmented 
governance arrangements related to the different sources 
of flooding (rivers; surface water; groundwater; the sea). 
They also have a poor grasp of statutory duties and available 
resources, and of the time taken to implement interventions. 
Small-scale remedies by individuals or community groups are 
not trusted to be effective. 
Research shows that it is important for decision makers 
to present the information on quantifiable risks clearly, and 
to put it in context. Uncertainties need to be explained, and 
risk-reducing measures ‘owned’ by those at risk rather than 
imposed upon them. Denial needs to be understood, rather 
than brushed aside. Trust in the skills of those in authority 
— and those with special knowledge and expertise — needs 
to be carefully nurtured. Human behaviours need to be 
understood and seen in their cultural context — specifically, 
political cultures, religious cultures and national cultures 
— along with the historic tolerance to risk that this brings. 
We must also appreciate the types of issues that arise when 
science gets deeply embedded in culturally contentious 
areas (such as climate change), and how these issues play 
out in the various international governance structures for 
risk and innovation.
THE ANALYSTS’ PERSPECTIVE
“All models are wrong — some are useful”
(George Box, 1987)
‘Risk’ is a rich term, including notions of the chance of harm, 
consequence and opportunity. In all but the simplest of 
settings, judgement or intuition are not enough to establish 
a meaningful understanding of present and future flood risk, 
so decision makers must rely upon models. 
Flood risk management resources are limited and, even 
if we wanted to, it is not possible to reduce all flood risks 
for all people to a common level2.  Any biases within the 
modelling approach that leads to an over- or under-estimate 
of risk therefore have the potential to misdirect these 
limited resources. But in recent years, flood risk analysts 
have made significant progress in developing models to 
support better design, planning and emergency response 
decisions. This has involved reducing modelling bias and 
incompleteness. But in doing so, a number of significant 
issues and challenges associated with understanding risk and 
managing it appropriately continue to be exposed3.
The ‘whole system’ challenge
The flood risk system consists of all of the important sources
of flooding, all of the potential receptors that may be affected
(either directly or indirectly), and the performance of the 
intervening system of physical pathways (the land surfaces, 
channels, beaches and engineered channels, defences, 
barriers and pumps). It also includes the interactions with 
society (individuals; emergency response teams; businesses 
and so on) and the broader interaction with physical, 
ecological and human systems. Traditional modelling 
approaches have typically focused on individual components 
of this ‘whole system’, and thereafter we have tended to 
manage the analyzed risks and not the complex reality.
Whole system thinking provides a significant challenge 
to the analyst. The chance of harm is not, as it is often 
mistakenly supposed, equivalent to the chance that a 
particular storm event occurs. Equally, the consequence 
of a flood is not simply the direct material damage, but 
reflects the inherent susceptibility of a receptor to a flood, 
its ability to recover unaided in a timely manner, and the 
value society places on the harm incurred.  Whole system 
modelling approaches are in their infancy but are now, at 
least, recognized as a worthwhile endeavour.
 
 
The fallacy of reductionism and the truth of 
uncertainty
The behaviour of flood risk systems is intrinsically stochastic 
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— that is, governed by random processes. Yet significant 
research is devoted to produce ever more detailed models 
of single elements in the ‘whole system’ (featuring, for 
example, better representations of the hydrodynamic 
processes, or increasingly fine-grained terrain models). The 
results of such reductionist models are easily communicated, 
but they fail to support risk-based choices — for although 
they simulate inundation in fine detail, they are based on 
gross assumptions such as the location, timing, and growth 
of a breach in the relevant flood defences.
But analysts increasingly recognize the need to support 
robust decisions4, and to do this their models must 
represent all important aspects of that decision and be 
truthful about the uncertainty of the evidence presented. 
Here lies a bear trap.  Any presentation of uncertainty is 
typically viewed as ‘comprehensive’, yet it often reflects only 
a few easily-described uncertainties (known unknowns). 
These uncertainties may lie in the data, such as errors 
in the measured height of flood defences, or in model 
components such as the assessment of defence overtopping. 
Although significant progress is now being made5, the ability 
to communicate uncertainty meaningfully — in a way that 
reflects data, model, and crucially model-structure errors — 
remains poor. 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
PLANNER’S PERSPECTIVE
The planner of flood risk-management infrastructure 
faces a significant and growing risk, but also considerable 
uncertainty. Both coastal and inland flooding remain high on 
the UK’s National Risk Register, with significant concerns 
around the three main sources of flooding: rivers, surface 
water and especially the sea. In 2012, the UK’s Climate 
Change Risk Assessment identified an increase in the risk of 
flooding as the greatest threat to the country from climate 
change, requiring significant adaptation planning6.
The challenge of flooding in the United Kingdom was 
also demonstrated dramatically in the winter of 2013–14, 
which saw unprecedented levels of rainfall in southern 
England and the largest tidal surge in 60 years. Transport 
infrastructure was widely disrupted, and some agricultural 
land was flooded for several weeks. Yet although some 7,000 
properties were flooded, some 1.4 million properties in 
England were protected by flood defences over the course 
of the winter storms, and there was no loss of life as a 
direct result of the December 2013 surge. The 1953 surge 
of a similar magnitude killed 307 people along our east coast 
and caused losses that were the equivalent of at least £1 
billion in today’s money.
There have been some notable infrastructure successes. 
The past 50 years have seen substantial investment in flood 
risk management, with significant outlay on forecasting, flood 
warning and a range of flood defences. These worked well in 
2013–14, although they were tested to the extreme in many 
cases, with approximately £140 million of damage caused 
to our flood defences. Moreover, controversy remains a 
constant theme: there were claims that agricultural land and 
livelihoods were sacrificed to protect assets within urban 
areas, allegedly the result of a transfer in the risk burden 
from the town to the country.
Flood infrastructure planners have been innovative in the 
past, and this is continuing.  Improved forecasting models, 
better flood warning and world-class defence systems 
such as the Thames Barrier have all involved innovation 
in response to risk, requiring political commitment, 
time and investment7.  As leaders on this issue, the UK’s 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and 
the Environment Agency are embedding a consideration 
of long-term risks in their planning, because infrastructure 
investments are required to meet changing risks up to 100 
years into the future. The Thames Estuary 2100 Plan is an 
excellent example of such foresight7.
However, the improvements in defences have led to 
significant developments of homes, businesses and the 
infrastructure that supports them (water, electricity and 
telecommunications) in flood risk areas. This in turn changes 
the risk because the consequences of flooding are now 
greater. Looking forward, socio-economic growth across 
Europe is estimated to account for about two-thirds of the 
change in risk of flooding by 2050, with the remaining one-
third coming from climate change.
 Managing this changing risk requires a long-term vision 
for flood risk management and the ability to respond to 
changing circumstances on a shorter-term basis. It requires 
us to decide what level of risk we are prepared to accept 
in protecting existing properties from flooding, and the 
extent to which we should veto development on flood 
plains to prevent risk escalation. This demands a robust 
and transparent implementation of spatial planning policy. 
The government’s new ‘partnership funding’ approach 
to flood defence spending also requires new forms of 
local involvement in order to secure the maximum risk 
reduction8. Meanwhile, effective risk reduction is being 
greatly assisted by a continuation of the research-led 
innovation that has served us so well over the past 50 years.
Coastal and inland flooding 
remain high on the UK’s 
National Risk Register, with 
significant concerns around 
the three main sources of 
flooding: rivers, surface 
water and especially the sea.
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SECTION 4: CONTEXT AND FUTURES
Geoengineering — altering planet-scale 
characteristics of the Earth, such as its 
climate — illustrates one of the characteristic 
features of extreme technological risks: powerful 
technologies put more power into fewer hands.
Responses to GM crops 
illustrate the power of fear 
of threats to basic values. 
In 2012, measles cases rose 
to levels that had not been 
seen in England and Wales since 
1989, reaching a peak of 1912 
confirmed cases. 
‘Not in My Back Yard’ responses to potentially 
hazardous facilities and technologies are strongly driven 
by a preference for the status quo: such as preserving the 
same view from your window, the same level of background 
noise, or protecting the value of your property.  Arguments 
around statistically assessed risks are sometimes used as a 
form of surrogate for these concerns.
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Media scare stories 
linking MMR with autism 
caused vaccine coverage to 
fall from over 90% in 1994 
to around 80% in England 
in 2003–4.
Direct occupational 
experience of acute harm 
from chemical exposures 
can hamper workers’ 
understanding of less 
visible and more chronic 
risks such as cancer. 
90% 80%
Technological 
advances have helped 
to bring unprecedented 
improvements in health 
over the past 150 years, 
with life expectancy in 
the United Kingdom 
steadily increasing by 
two to three years each 
decade. From a starting 
point of about 40 years, it 
has doubled to 80 years. 
300 MILLION DEATHS
Smallpox was responsible for more than 300 
million deaths in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  As the ongoing Ebola epidemic reminds 
us, disease outbreaks remain a potent threat today.
$120
In 2011, the global insurance industr
,000,000,000
y 
suffered the worst year of natural catastrophe 
losses on record — in excess of US$120 billion 
— from seismic events such as the Great East 
Japan (Tohoku) and Christchurch earthquakes, 
and from weather losses such as the Thailand 
floods and a severe US tornado season. 
Model-based methods are now 
embedded within the regulation of 
insurance in the United Kingdom, and 
similar approaches are being adopted 
around the world: earthquake insurance in 
Canada, for example, is required to meet a 
1-in-500 year test.2514
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CHAPTER 9: CONTEXT MATTERS 
TO HUMAN PERCEPTION AND RESPONSE
People may choose not to tolerate an innovation for perfectly logical reasons 
that have little to do with worries about potential risks — instead, their concerns 
stem from disquiet about institutional motives and behaviour, and perceived 
threats to the things that they value. 
Judith Petts 
(University of Southampton)
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From Chapter 8, we know that the basis of individual responses to risk is multidimensional. The fear of potential physical harm is only one factor driving 
these responses, and sometimes it is the least important. 
Concerns about risks are most often based on worries 
about the adequacy and motives of the institutions that 
produce, predict and manage them, and of perceived threats 
to the status quo, social relations, identity and everyday 
experience. 
The concept of ‘perceptions of risk’ has been challenged 
for a long time1. Technically, risks cannot be ‘perceived’, 
just as they cannot be ‘sited’. Rather it is the activities or 
technologies that create the potential for risk that people 
can be concerned about. But, fundamentally, it is the 
institutions that are responsible for developing and managing 
them that are questioned, often from a position of distrust.  
Once these underpinning dimensions of human response 
are understood, it is important to consider how and why 
responses vary in different cultural (ethnic or national), 
political, and economic settings (countries, regions, or areas 
at risk). In a highly connected world, technologies, goods 
and services (and therefore potential risks) are traded and 
transferred widely with varying degrees of openness and 
control. The underpinning science is increasingly generated 
through international collaborations operating in multiple 
political, cultural and belief settings. Technological, health 
(human, animal and plant) as well as natural hazards can 
cross borders and boundaries. Therefore it is important to 
understand if, and how, attitudes and responses are likely 
to vary, not least as the mechanisms and modes of control 
become trans-national. 
Over the past three decades, cross-cultural surveys of 
risk responses have found that differences depend on the 
political, cultural and socio-economic bases of different 
countries2. The ‘worry beads’3 of different societies 
around differing risks require detailed characterization if 
communication, engagement and appropriate mitigation 
responses are to be developed and encouraged. This chapter 
considers the key dimensions of perceptions and response, 
and the impact of context, drawing on different risk 
examples. It concludes with a discussion of the implications 
for responsible innovation and engagement. 
 
Experience, Intuition and Networks
Studies across the full spectrum of industrial, environmental 
and health risks have shown that the collective memory 
and expertise that comes from direct, personal experience 
combined with the influence of everyday social and 
cultural practices and networks are key contexts in which 
responses to risk develop, mature and are actioned (or 
not). Social interactions, context and setting (spatial/physical, 
experiential and social) all play a role in shaping how people 
make sense of and construct any risk issue4.
Judgement and choice under uncertainty usually operate 
intuitively and quickly. Simple and tangible associations 
are crucial — including the emotional reactions or rules 
of behaviour that have been acquired through experience 
of events and their consequences, and enhanced through 
cultural and social networks. People’s intuitive assessment 
of a risk is based on the ease with which instances of 
occurrence can be brought to mind: in other words, its 
‘availability’5 (see also Chapter 7). The latter is impacted 
strongly by the location, and the social and economic 
context, in which someone lives and works. Intuitive 
responses can develop and mature as opportunities for 
learning occur (including through engagement in risk 
decision-making). 
For example, natural hazards are experienced not only 
through the physical harm they can cause, but as a result of 
learning processes. Second-hand experience (information) 
about flood risk has been found to be less likely to produce 
action than direct knowledge and social interaction6. 
An underestimation of low probability events (such as 
typhoons, floods or droughts) and decisions about how 
to respond to them (for example, whether to continue 
to buy insurance) are strongly impacted by experience. 
‘Wait and see’ reactions to the appropriateness of taking 
personal protective actions can be strong when a serious 
event has not occurred or not reoccurred. Such reactions 
can be particularly important when economic imperatives 
require risk tolerance, not least when people do not have 
the resources to respond. This helps to explain why people 
remain in high hazard areas despite repeated experience 
of the physical harm. Dependency on an area and lack of 
personal ability to respond negate risk mitigation.   
Direct experience makes climate a particularly strong 
and salient feature amongst indigenous communities 
(such as in Australia, Pacific Islands and the High Arctic7). 
These communities often have highly connected daily 
lives as part of relatively small social networks, as well as 
a close dependence on their environment. Knowledge 
passes from generation to generation and is embedded in 
story and belief, in value systems and institutions.  Where 
climate change impacts directly and tangibly on the ability 
to continue to undertake basic daily practices — such as 
fishing, hunting or travelling — then experience is direct and 
can supplement scientific knowledge. 
Such local ‘expert’ knowledge derived from direct working 
experience of environmental systems has been seen to show 
up the weaknesses of expert assessments based on desk-
top modelling (for example, among Lake District farmers 
following the Chernobyl nuclear accident8). The intensity 
of understanding in locally, closely-networked communities 
differs from the weaker relationships and shared knowledge 
of more transient communities in large cities where cultural 
beliefs and socio-economic dependencies may be shared to 
a lesser extent.  
When weather and climate are confounded then 
responses to extreme weather events are often either slow 
or partial.  Acceptance that the event may become more 
frequent is low. Even after the devastating hurricane seasons 
of 2004 and 2005 in the United States, a large number of 
residents in the high-risk areas still had not invested in 
loss-reduction means9. Their response to risk was actually 
the same as those in low-risk areas. But the underpinning 
reasoning was fundamentally different.
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The impact of intuition on responses to local proposals 
for hazardous technologies can be seen in relation to more 
positive responses to nuclear facilities in different locations 
in the United States. These responses have been identified 
as corresponding with local experience of alternative energy 
sources (no direct contact with alternatives leads to higher 
tolerance), and even experience of related nuclear industries
that bring economic advantage locally10.  
Finally, direct occupational experience of acute harm 
from chemical exposures has been seen to interrupt the 
potential for workers to understand less visible and more 
chronic risks such as cancer. Furthermore, the learning that 
occurs between workers (particularly in small companies) 
tends to compound this bias in understanding. Such 
evidence confirms that notions of hazard and risk must be 
communicated more directly and personally in the specific 
work context rather than relying solely on generic safety 
information11. 
 
The Status Quo and Surrogacy
A common feature of many cultures is our preference 
for the status quo, which is a strong support to intuitive 
responses. Keeping with what you know and are familiar 
with is generally the easier, less stressful option in life. 
Overriding the status quo requires commitment to change. 
Generally, change takes effort and may offer uncertain 
benefits12. Denial of potential risks can serve to protect 
feelings of security and lower anxiety, both in low- and high-
risk areas (for example, in relation to flooding13).   
It is well known that ‘Not in My Back Yard’ (‘Nimby’) 
responses to potentially hazardous facilities and 
technologies are strongly driven by a preference for the 
status quo (such as preserving the same view from your 
window, the same level of background noise, the same visual 
amenity, protection of the value of your property, and so 
on). But this innate desire to protect the current and the 
personal can be a difficult argument to put or defend in 
contentious decision processes. Evidence from multiple 
cases in different locations in the United Kingdom of 
proposals for waste facilities suggests that arguments around 
statistically assessed risks are sometimes used as a form 
of surrogate for very local and personal concerns about 
impact on amenity and the status quo, as well as concern 
about the robustness of the risk control institutions and 
regulation, and the extent to which public interests are 
protected. Subjective notions of distrust or locally-important 
ways of life and amenity can be more difficult to argue in 
expert-led decision processes. Therefore, local residents 
can find it easier to focus attention on scientific weakness 
and statistical uncertainties and assessments of risk to 
vulnerable populations14. Fundamentally, Nimby attitudes to 
siting and new technologies need to be more productively 
understood as reflecting public demands for greater 
involvement in decision-making, and not regarded as risk 
battles between the public and experts that merely require 
better communication to correct perceived deficits of lay 
knowledge. 
Risk is so intricately embedded in its social context 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify it a priori. 
One intriguing example of the often unexpected power 
of context was the responses to multiple house fires in a 
small town in the French Jura. More than a dozen apparently 
spontaneous house fires occurred over the period 
November 1995 to January 1996, destroying property and 
killing two people.  While eventually understood as arson, a 
form of psychological defence mechanism became evident 
amongst residents who sought to blame a buried high-
voltage cable. Repressed and highly-localized concerns about 
this ‘technological installation’ were privileged as reasoning 
rather than the more likely but perhaps banal explanation 
of arson. This search for a surrogate — which might allow 
people to more readily attach blame to an institution — 
prompted detailed expert and official investigations, and 
became a major national media story15.  
Ideology and Values
Risk responses are often attenuated by context, rather than 
amplified — people do not appear to be concerned about 
hazards that experts regard as significant. In seminal work, 
involving a large comparative consideration of 31 ‘hidden 
hazards’ including handguns, deforestation, pesticides and 
terrorism16, ideological and value-threatening reasons were 
identified as two explanations for the failure of hazards to 
raise political and social concern. Handguns are one example 
of an ideological hazard: despite the rising annual toll of 
death, being able to bear arms to defend oneself and one’s 
family has remained an inalienable American right. Contrast 
this with the opposite ideology in Britain. 
The same study also identified ideological impacts on 
risk regulation.  At the time, there were differences in 
the approaches to protect public health compared with 
occupational health. Public health standards for airborne 
toxic substances were tighter than occupational protection 
in 13 industrialized countries; the same was true in socialist 
states, which ideologically tended to be less permissive of 
industry (see below). 
Responses to genetically modified (GM) crops illustrate 
the power of fear of threats to basic values. People respond 
negatively to GM crops not primarily because they fear the 
risks, but because genetic modification drives to the heart 
of concerns about ‘mucking around with nature’. Media 
Notions of hazard and risk 
must be communicated 
more directly and 
personally in the specific 
work context.
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headlines about ‘Frankenstein foods’ intuitively resonated 
with these concerns at the height of the GM debate in the 
United Kingdom. 
The perceived inability of governments to impose 
adequate controls mixes with these concerns. Such 
perception is based on clear evidence of regulatory and 
management controls (and their failures) across multiple 
apparently unrelated hazards. For example, the fact that 
GM crops have met with such vehement public reaction 
in the United Kingdom compared to the United States 
has been linked, at least in part, to people’s experience of 
the mismanagement of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE). That disease involved risks that obviously are entirely 
unrelated to GM — yet both speak to issues around 
the intensification of agriculture and the trans-boundary 
movement of hazards.    
Recent comparative work17 looking at responses to GM 
crops in Mexico, Brazil, and India confirms the strength 
of cultural and political factors (see also case study in 
Chapter 2). In Mexico, for example, maize has a deep 
cultural resonance with long-held traditional practices of 
food preparation, and a symbolic resonance with plants and 
seeds in everyday lives. Negative reactions to GM maize 
are therefore a complex mix of concerns about the insult 
to tradition, and a lack of credibility in seed companies, 
regulatory bodies and government. In India, negative reaction 
has particularly been symbolized as a struggle against 
multinational companies and globalization. In relation to a 
deeply traditional and important non-food crop — cotton 
— the deliberate importation of Bt cotton led to fears of 
increased dependency on certain seed companies. 
For the United Kingdom, the current rise in local 
conflicts around proposals to extract shale gas by hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) appears to reflect a combination 
of Nimby-esque responses to the local impacts on the 
environment (such as noise and water pollution); threats 
to the social and economic status quo; and a sense of 
decision-making isolation from the potentially affected 
communities. Importantly, there is a lack of saliency in terms 
of the national need for alternative energy supplies (see the 
fracking case study in Section 2 for more on this issue).  
Fracking is viewed primarily as an environmental rather 
than an energy issue, as differences in responses by socio-
economic status and rural versus urban locations in the 
United States have confirmed18. However, in local contexts 
where new exploitation of gas supplies has seen rapid ‘boom 
town’ change in rural areas that have endured extended 
periods of economic decline, risk can be associated with 
opportunity19. 
The fracking debate resonates with the divergent 
responses to energy-from-waste incineration. In countries 
like Denmark and Sweden, the technology is often part of 
the mix in the local supply of heat and energy. In the United 
Kingdom it is primarily a waste management solution, and 
has frequently sparked local concern about the need for 
large-scale plants with all of the perceived local dis-benefits. 
In Scandinavia, plants tend to be smaller because they 
are sized to meet local heat-supply needs, and to process 
Genetic modification 
drives to the heart of 
concerns about ‘mucking 
around with nature’.
lower volumes of feed material that arise within reasonable 
travel distances. In general, a more nuanced understanding 
of ‘place based’ as opposed to ‘project based’ concerns 
seems important, not least when national policies need to 
be implemented locally (such as in relation to large-scale 
energy infrastructures20).   
Regulatory Cultures 
Normal and sustained cultures of trust can be dramatically 
challenged by new risks. This is evinced by the differing 
regulatory approaches to interpreting ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’, and 
to dealing with uncertainty, that reflect cultural scientific 
differences. 
The difference between the UK approach to risk 
management and the European precautionary regulatory 
approach to hazards has long been evident. One well-
known and particularly economically-damaging impact of 
this difference was seen in the response to BSE.  When this 
previously unknown cattle disease erupted in the United 
Kingdom in the mid-1980s, it was acknowledged that a new 
variant (nv) of the human encephalopathy, Creutzfeldt-Jacob 
disease (nvCJD), might be caused by exposure to BSE. This 
led the European Union to impose a ban on the worldwide 
export of beef products from the UK, plunging the country’s 
beef industry into potential disaster. 
At the heart of the regulatory response was a cultural 
difference in the approach to scientific uncertainty. The 
British approach traditionally excludes abstract uncertainties 
or knowledge limitations and applies a pragmatic, 
instrumentalist approach. The continental European tradition 
is founded in a culture that tends to integrate natural 
and human sciences more directly. Hence, precautionary 
regulatory intervention is often taken in response to a 
plausible risk, even though pathways of exposure cannot be 
demonstrated21.
Differences in agricultural policy between the European 
Union and the Unites States underpin their divergent 
approach to GM crop risks. Regulatory differences have 
been analyzed in terms of the different cultural and 
economic meanings of agriculture22. US farms have more 
often been seen as analogous to factories, separate from 
wilderness and nature conservation areas. In Europe, 
however, farmland is widely regarded as an integral 
component of the environment — an aesthetic landscape, 
wildlife habitat, and part of the local heritage. Importantly, 
farms are a traceable guarantee of food quality. So EU 
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policy has moved towards less-intensive production and is 
more cautious of biotechnology. The United States, on the 
other hand, has seen a drive by companies to expand high-
productivity agriculture. 
In the BSE case, UK consumers could choose whether 
to purchase British beef based on the information available 
to them. However, trust in scientific and government 
institutions was severely impacted by the failure to inform 
people of the risks at an early stage. In the case of GM 
crops, confidence in the scientific understanding of the risks 
and distrust in the profit motives of the seed companies at 
the expense of the environment has similarly had a strong 
impact on acceptance. The similarities of public response 
to BSE and GM emphasize the need to understand linkages 
between responses to unrelated risks — indeed, responses 
can be predicted between risks. 
There has long been awareness and concern about the 
different cultural definitions of ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ that play-
out through regulatory regimes. This is particularly evident 
across European member states, and it also varies between 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals and food (where risk 
assessment is the dominant approach) and environmental 
regulation (where hazard identification and assessment is 
prioritized)23. The GM case study in Chapter 11 highlights 
how the European Union’s regulatory approval process for 
the commercial release of a GM trait — which is based 
on the presumption of hazard — is prohibitively expensive 
compared with the United States.
Political and regulatory differences in focus between 
hazard and risk have been attributed to strategic game-
playing by stakeholders who are well-aware of the semantic 
difference between the terms. So, it is argued, risk responses 
have as much, if not more, to do with political interests and 
strategic positioning as the objective assessment of the risk, 
with all of its uncertainties24. Such institutional variability 
is one important factor influencing public mistrust in 
management and control regimes.  
Context and Responsibility
Personal agency and institutional trust are deeply rooted 
and connected factors that determine how people respond 
to risk25. Trust and agency interact at different spatial and 
temporal scales, and we often see the most powerful 
responses at the local level. 
Studies of the responses to natural hazards (flooding, sea 
level rise and radon) in different locations in the United 
Kingdom26, on air quality27, and on thresholds of response 
to climate change28, have determined that even when 
people appear to understand the hazards and the risks to 
themselves and have the personal resources and capacity 
to respond, they may choose not to if they consider that 
the responsibility to reduce the risk lies elsewhere. The 
same has been evident in responses to flood risk in other 
countries. In high-risk areas where people take responsibility
and acquire clean-up experience, risk awareness tends to 
remain high compared to those who have chosen to deny 
their vulnerability and responsibility29.  Active investment 
of personal resources, even if no more than time, tends to 
 
support ongoing responsibility.   
Choice and responsibility are sources of stress for 
people when information about risks appears confused 
and conflicted. The initial response to the MMR (measles, 
mumps and rubella) vaccination in Britain in the late 1990s 
provides one example of this.  A preliminary study of a 
small group of children — which could prove no causal link 
between the vaccination and autism, but which left open the 
possibility — generated media coverage that sparked a huge 
controversy. The immediate response focused on, indeed 
proactively played upon, the parental fear of autism; this led 
to a dramatic drop in the uptake of MMR, with some areas 
of the country falling below the health protection target 
(see case study for details).  As communications from the 
government’s Department of Health did not specifically 
negate the relevance of the study, the wide-scale response 
— which was fed through parental networks — was able to 
have damaging impact.
Socio-economic differences were strongly evident in the 
responses. Higher socio-economic groups that were better 
able to access a wider range of information sources, or 
could choose to pay for the alternative single vaccinations, 
were more likely to avoid MMR. It became evident that 
embedded social responsibility — through a long process 
of normalization of childhood vaccination — was very 
much secondary to individual maternal responsibility in 
relation to a child’s health, when mothers in particular were 
faced with uncertainty and disruption to acquired trust in 
immunization30. 
Responsible Innovation, Context and Engagement
The notion of responsibility in innovation has grown in 
importance over the past decade and notably in European 
policy circles. The possibilities and opportunities of emerging 
technologies are of course accompanied by uncertainty and 
indeed sheer ignorance. These uncertainties are not purely 
around the possible harms, but also in the kind of futures 
societies wish for. Innovation takes place over multiple scales 
(increasingly global) and the range of actors (from individuals 
to corporations to states) are often acting in different 
cultural and economic contexts, which impact directly on 
notions of what is the ‘right’ and ‘responsible’ thing to do.  
Governance of responsible innovation is being discussed 
in terms of a new adaptive framework, implying a move away 
from top-down, risk-based regulation to a system in which 
Choice and responsibility 
are sources of stress for 
people when information 
about risks appears 
confused and conflicted.
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CASE STUDY
MMR, BOWEL DISEASE, AUTISM AND MEASLES
David Salisbury (former Director of Immunisation, Department of Health)
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In 1993, Dr Andrew Wakefield reported his observationthat natural measles virus infection was implicated in the cause of Crohn’s Disease1. Common sense 
suggested that this was highly unlikely: Crohn’s Disease 
had been increasing in industrialized countries at the 
same time that measles had been decreasing through 
vaccination.  Wakefield then went on to propose that 
attenuated measles vaccine virus was actually the cause of
Crohn’s Disease. 
Both of these theories were soon demonstrated to be 
wrong. Other researchers pointed out that he had failed 
to carry out the manufacturer’s recommended positive 
and negative controls for immunogold histology staining, 
and better epidemiological studies showed no association 
between measles vaccination and Crohn’s Disease2, 3. 
Despite this,  Wakefield persevered with his belief that 
measles virus caused bowel disease.
In 1998, he published a case study purporting to 
associate onset of autism and bowel disease with receipt 
of combined measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine4. 
Twelve cases were reported, many of whose parents 
were involved in litigation against the manufacturers 
of MMR vaccine. Despite no evidence for benefit, he 
strongly advocated the cessation of MMR vaccination in 
favour of single measles, mumps and rubella vaccination. 
Even though Wakefield’s own team showed that there 
was no measles vaccine virus in bowel specimens from 
inflammatory bowel disease cases5 or autistic children6, 
he continued to promote his views against MMR despite 
multiple studies that failed to confirm that it was a risk 
factor in autism7–14.  
Although each of Wakefield’s pronouncements was greeted 
with scepticism among relevant experts or expert review 
groups, they were given unprecedented coverage by uncritical 
or inexpert media, partly due to Wakefield’s use of a public 
relations expert. Some health professionals colluded with 
anxious parents, who thought that avoiding the MMR vaccine 
would somehow protect their children from autism, and 
tried to offer six injections of separate vaccines (to equal 
the recommended two MMR doses). Private clinics sprang 
up offering expensive imported single vaccines that may not 
have been licensed, or indeed were known to cause mumps-
meningitis and had been removed from the UK programme.
The results from repeated media stories linking MMR vaccine 
with autism and other adverse outcomes led to progressive 
loss of confidence in the safety of MMR vaccine among health 
professionals and parents15–17.  As a consequence, MMR vaccine 
coverage fell from over 90% in 1994 to around 80% nationally 
in 2003–4, but with much lower figures in some parts of the 
country, especially in London and South Wales18, 19. Since 2005, 
however, MMR coverage has progressively increased as anti-
MMR stories faded from the media, and as local campaigns 
improved vaccination uptake (see Figure 1)20. 
Measles had been eliminated from England and Wales 
between 1994 and 2001 (ref. 21) but by 2006 there were 
resurgences of localized measles outbreaks (although no 
national level outbreaks occurred). Despite the apparently 
reassuring increases in MMR coverage, exceeding 90% by 2011, 
there was still a high risk of measles resurgences, owing to the 
cohorts of under-vaccinated children born during the years 
when MMR coverage was lowest.  As these cohorts began to 
attend school, they started to come into contact with many 
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more children, raising the risk of measles transmission. In 2012, 
measles cases rose to levels that had not been seen in England 
and Wales since 1989, reaching a peak of 1912 confirmed cases 
(see Figure 2). Multiple outbreaks were detected, especially 
in the North East, the North West and in South Wales. Cases 
continued to rise up to the first quarter of 2013.
The highest numbers of cases were in children and young 
people who had been born during the years of lowest MMR 
vaccine coverage, when anti-MMR rhetoric was at its height 
(see Figure 3).  A national MMR vaccine catch-up campaign was 
therefore rolled out, targeted at those who had had no MMR 
vaccine (those aged ten to sixteen years were the highest 
priority), followed by those who had only had a single dose of 
MMR. By the midpoint of the 2013 campaign, coverage in the 
ten- to sixteen-year-old group was estimated to have reached 
more than 95%. Since the completion of the campaign, measles 
cases have reverted to extremely low levels.
On 20 September 2003, Mark Henderson wrote in The 
Times: “Health scares such as this protect no one, whatever the 
sanctimonious claims of the zealots behind them. The MMR 
panic is more likely to cause deaths from measles than it 
is to save a single child from autism”.  How true that has 
turned out to be. In 2010, the General Medical Council 
removed Dr Wakefield’s name from the UK Medical 
Register on the grounds that he had “acted dishonestly 
and irresponsibly in conducting his research”, and that 
“his behaviour constituted multiple separate instances of 
serious professional misconduct”22.
The loss of public and health professionals’ confidence 
in the safety of MMR incurred a heavy cost to child 
health. But it has also been accompanied by huge costs to 
health research resources, which were diverted to negate 
false claims, as well as the additional time and money 
spent preventing, containing or treating measles cases. 
Clearly there are lessons for all involved in how scientific 
claims are reported; how media balance should reflect 
certainty and uncertainty, rather than simply giving equal 
coverage to both sides; how risks are communicated and 
interpreted by the public; and how research should be 
managed and published.
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people and institutions behave such that innovation achieves 
desired outcomes31. This framework privileges anticipation, 
reflection, deliberation and response32, placing an onus on 
innovators to reflect and listen to societal concerns and 
governance systems that develop social intelligence around 
the direction and control of technology33. 
The UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution34 
introduced the concept of continual ‘social intelligence’ 
gathering as a preferred approach to understanding 
how societal views and responses to new technologies 
are developing, viewing one-off public engagement as 
often being limited by time and, importantly, context. 
The recommendation resonated with the international 
experience of participatory technology assessment — such 
as Real-Time Technology Assessment (RTTA)35, for example, 
an approach practised for over ten years by the Centre 
for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University 
— and the various attempts by technology-assessment 
organizations in Europe to open up assessment to more 
inclusive approaches. The Danish Board of Technology, 
for example, sought to combine its more formal role of 
assessing technologies with proactive efforts to foster 
public debates, particularly using consensus conferences. It 
is disappointing that RTTA and similar approaches have not 
gained real decision-making traction. 
Other chapters in this report highlight the important, 
indeed essential, role for communication and engagement 
in risk decision-making. In Chapter 5, Tim O’Riordan’s plea 
to hold a ‘wider conversation’ is tinged with concern for 
the demands that opening-up decisions on innovation and 
risk inherently implies. These demands are not simply in the 
effective discussion of the science, and the need for honesty 
about the uncertainties. Indeed, all of our evidence confirms 
that through discussion-based engagement, members of the 
public can readily engage with science and appreciate that 
certainty about outcomes is not possible. 
Conclusion – Responding to Culture and Motive
This chapter has sought to show that social, economic, 
cultural and political contexts are fundamentally important 
to how people and institutions respond to risk. How 
institutions behave in the public interest has a significant 
impact.  As Sykes and Macnaghten note: “opening a dialogue 
is never a public good in itself: its value depends on the 
political culture in which it is enacted”36. This was strongly 
evident in the case of the waste-strategy development in 
Hampshire and East Sussex, two geographically-close local 
authorities in the United Kingdom. In each area, the same 
waste management company attempted public engagement 
around the detailed planning of energy-from-waste plants. 
In Hampshire, there was strong political support, and the 
need for the technology had been subject to extensive 
public engagement — but in East Sussex the opposite was 
true. This background meant that it was more difficult for 
the company to engage with the public in East Sussex. Public 
engagement is never merely a suite of methods that can be 
rolled out from place-to-place, regardless of context37.  
The metaphor of the ‘field of play’ has been applied to 
Public engagement is 
never merely a suite of 
methods that can be 
rolled out from place-
to-place, regardless of 
context.
the idea of mediated risk communication38. Developed in 
response to the over-simplified view of the role of the 
media as perpetrators of the social amplification of risks, the 
model sees audiences as active rather than passive receivers 
of messages. Government and state agencies, opposition 
parties, campaigning groups, corporations, scientific and 
expert communities as well as the media engage in a 
continual contest for public position and advantage. 
Communication and engagement has to be design-based and 
user-centered; that is based on an understanding of existing 
(and hence inherently changing) knowledge and beliefs. This 
requires detailed analysis over time of how different publics 
talk about and respond to highly specific and context-
dependent risk issues. 
This is far easier to say than to do (as discussed in 
Chapters 5, 7 and 11).  Although a ‘new governance agenda’ 
(see Chapter 11) is evident, closing the gap between 
listening to views and concerns, and developing publicly-
trusted policy responses around innovation, remains a 
serious challenge not only nationally but particularly in a 
trans-national context. This is because the opening up of 
decisions on innovation challenges preferred and embedded 
positions of expertise, power and authority. 
Ultimately, innovation may not be tolerated at a particular 
point in time for perfectly logical reasons that have far less 
to do with concerns about the potential risks than with 
disquiet about institutional motives and behaviour, and 
perceived threats to the things that people value. There is 
an onus on decision-makers to proactively enhance their 
understanding of the power of context and to appreciate 
the common dimensions of responses, even between 
apparently unrelated risks. There is an essential need to 
gather social intelligence over time rather than merely 
supporting one-off public engagement exercises, particularly 
where these have more to do with trying to persuade the 
public of the benefits and the safety of technology. Effective 
innovation will require a partnership between decision-
makers and the public that is characterized by listening, 
open and ongoing discussions, and trust. Of course, such 
characteristics take time and resources to develop and 
perfect. But expending such effort is likely to be more 
efficient and effective in supporting innovation.
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CHAPTER 10: MANAGING EXISTENTIAL 
RISK FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Despite the political and organizational challenges, policymakers need to 
take account of low-probability, high-impact risks that could threaten the 
premature extinction of humanity.
Nick Beckstead (University of 
Oxford) and Toby Ord (University 
of Oxford)
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Historically, the risks that have arisen from emerging technologies have been small when compared with their benefits. The potential exceptions are 
unprecedented risks that could threaten large parts of the 
globe, or even our very survival1.
Technology has significantly improved lives in the United 
Kingdom and the rest of the world. Over the past 150 
years, we have become much more prosperous. During this 
time, the UK average income rose by more than a factor 
of seven in real terms, much of this driven by improving 
technology. This increased prosperity has taken millions 
of people out of absolute poverty and has given everyone 
many more freedoms in their lives. The past 150 years also 
saw historically unprecedented improvements in health, with 
life expectancy in the United Kingdom steadily increasing 
by two to three years each decade. From a starting point of 
about 40 years, it has doubled to 80 years2. 
These improvements are not entirely due to technological 
advances, of course, but a large fraction of them are.  We 
have seen the cost of goods fall dramatically due to mass 
production, domestic time freed up via labour saving 
machines at home, and people connected by automobiles, 
railroads, airplanes, telephones, television, and the Internet. 
Health has improved through widespread improvements 
in sanitation, vaccines, antibiotics, blood transfusions, 
pharmaceuticals, and surgical techniques. 
These benefits significantly outweigh many kinds of risks 
that emerging technologies bring, such as those that could 
threaten workers in industry, local communities, consumers, 
or the environment.  After all, the dramatic improvements 
in prosperity and health already include all the economic 
and health costs of accidents and inadvertent consequences 
during technological development and deployment, and the 
balance is still overwhelmingly positive.
This is not to say that governance does or should ignore 
mundane risks from new technologies in the future. Good 
governance may have substantially decreased the risks that 
we faced over the previous two centuries, and if through 
careful policy choices we can reduce future risks without 
much negative impact on these emerging technologies, then 
we certainly should do so.
However, we may not yet have seen the effects of the 
most important risks from technological innovation. Over 
the next few decades, certain technological advances may 
pose significant and unprecedented global risks.  Advances 
in the biosciences and biotechnology may make it possible 
to create bioweapons more dangerous than any disease 
humanity has faced so far; geoengineering technologies 
could give individual countries the ability to unilaterally 
alter the global climate (see case study); rapid advances in 
artificial intelligence could give a single country a decisive 
strategic advantage. These scenarios are extreme, but 
they are recognized as potential low-probability high-
impact events by relevant experts. To safely navigate these 
risks, and harness the potentially great benefits of these 
new technologies, we must continue to develop our 
understanding of them and ensure that the institutions 
responsible for monitoring them and developing policy 
Technology has 
significantly improved 
lives in the United 
Kingdom and the rest of 
the world.
responses are fit for purpose.
This chapter explores the high-consequence risks 
that we can already anticipate; explains market and 
political challenges to adequately managing these risks; 
and discusses what we can do today to ensure that we 
achieve the potential of these technologies while keeping 
catastrophic threats to an acceptably low level.  We need 
to be on our guard to ensure we are equipped to deal 
with these risks, have the regulatory vocabulary to manage 
them appropriately, and continue to develop the adaptive 
institutions necessary for mounting reasonable responses.
Anthropogenic existential risks vs. natural 
existential risks
An existential risk is defined as a risk that threatens the 
premature extinction of humanity, or the permanent and 
drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future 
development. These risks could originate in nature (as 
in a large asteroid impact, gamma-ray burst, supernova, 
supervolcano eruption, or pandemic) or through human 
action (as in a nuclear war, or in other cases we discuss 
below). This chapter focuses on anthropogenic existential 
risks because — as we will now argue — the probability of 
these risks appears significantly greater.
Historical evidence shows that species like ours are not 
destroyed by natural catastrophes very often. Humans 
have existed for 200,000 years. Our closest ancestor, 
Homo erectus, survived for about 1.8 million years. The 
median mammalian species lasts for about 2.2 million 
years3.  Assuming that the distribution of natural existential 
catastrophes has not changed, we would have been unlikely 
to survive as long as we have if the chance of natural 
extinction in a given century were greater than 1 in 500 or 
1 in 5,000 (since (1 – 1/500)2,000 and (1 – 1/5,000)18,000 are 
both less than 2%). Consistent with this general argument, 
all natural existential risks are believed to have very small 
probabilities of destroying humanity in the coming century4.
In contrast, the tentative historical evidence we do have 
points in the opposite direction for anthropogenic risks. 
The development of nuclear fission, and the atomic bomb, 
was the first time in history that a technology created 
the possibility of destroying most or all of the world’s 
population. Fortunately we have not yet seen a global 
nuclear catastrophe, but we have come extremely close. 
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CASE STUDY
POLICY, DECISION-MAKING AND EXISTENTIAL RISK 
Huw Price and Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh (University of Cambridge) 
Geoengineering is the deliberate use of technology to alter planet-scale characteristics of the Earth, such as its 
climatic system. Geoengineering techniques have 
been proposed as a defence against global 
warming. For example, sulphate aerosols 
have a global cooling effect: by 
pumping sulphate aerosols into 
the high atmosphere, it may be 
possible to decrease global 
temperatures.  Alternatively, 
seeding suitable ocean 
areas with comparatively 
small amounts of iron might 
increase plankton growth 
sufficiently to sequester 
significant quantities of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide. 
These technologies are 
already within reach, or 
nearly so (although their 
efficacy is still difficult to 
predict).  As global warming 
worsens, the case for using 
one or more of them to 
ameliorate the causes or 
avert the effects of climate 
change may strengthen. Yet 
the long-term consequences 
of these techniques are 
poorly understood, and 
there may be a risk of global 
catastrophe if they were to 
be deployed, for example 
through unexpected effects 
on the global climate or the 
marine ecosystem.
This example illustrates 
the policy dimensions of 
existential risk in several ways.
1. It involves potentially beneficial 
technologies that may come with a small (though 
difficult to assess) risk of catastrophic side effects.
2. These risks are associated with the fact that the 
technology is global in impact. If we choose to employ 
it, we are putting all our eggs in one basket. This is 
especially obvious in the case of geoengineering, 
because the technology is intended to have planet-
level effects. But it is also true of other potential 
sources of existential risk, such as synthetic biology or 
artificial intelligence, in the sense that it is unlikely that 
these technologies could be deployed merely locally 
— within a single nation, for example.
3. Some of the potential risks are associated with 
lock-in costs. If we choose one path now, it may be 
difficult or impossible to retreat later if unintended 
consequences become apparent — for example, 
there might be a risk of catastrophic sudden warming 
if the use of stratospheric aerosols was suddenly 
discontinued.
4. Once the technology is 
available, making a choice 
on its use is unavoidable 
— even a decision to do 
nothing is still a decision. 
Whatever we decide, our 
choice will have long-term 
consequences. However, 
geoengineering technology 
differs from some other 
potential sources of 
existential risk in that not 
using it is a feasible option, 
perhaps even the default 
option (at least for the 
time being). In other cases, 
various short-term benefits 
and associated commercial 
factors are likely to provide 
strong incentives to develop 
the technologies in question, 
and the task of managing 
extreme risks is to find 
opportunities to steer that 
development in order to reduce 
the probability of catastrophic 
surprises.
5. The decision to deploy 
geoengineering technology could, in 
principle, be made by a single nation or even a 
wealthy individual. In this respect, too, geoengineering 
illustrates one of the characteristic features of 
extreme technological risks: they are associated with 
the fact that powerful technologies put more power 
into fewer hands. 
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US President John F. Kennedy later confessed that during 
the Cuban missile crisis, the chances of a nuclear war 
with Russia seemed to him at the time to be “somewhere 
between one out of three and even”. In light of this 
evidence, it is intuitively rather unclear that we could survive 
500 or 5,000 centuries without facing a technologically-
driven global catastrophe such as a nuclear war.  We argue 
that in the coming decades, the world can expect to see 
several powerful new technologies that — by accident or 
design — may pose equal or greater risks for humanity. 
1. Engineered Pathogens
Pandemics such as Spanish flu and HIV have killed tens of 
millions of people. Smallpox alone was responsible for more 
than 300 million deaths in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  As the ongoing Ebola epidemic reminds us, disease 
outbreaks remain a potent threat today. However, pressures 
from natural selection limit the destructive potential of 
pathogens because a sufficiently virulent, transmissible 
pathogen would eliminate the host population.  As others 
have argued, and we reiterate below, bioengineering could 
be used to overcome natural limits on virulence and 
transmissibility, allowing pandemics of unprecedented scale 
and severity.
For an example of an increase in fatality rates, consider 
mousepox, a disease that is normally non-lethal in mice. 
In 2001,  Australian researchers modified mousepox, 
accidentally increasing its fatality rate to 60%, even in mice 
with immunity to the original version5. By 2003, researchers 
led by Mark Buller found a way to increase the fatality rate 
to 100%, although the team also found therapies that could 
protect mice from the engineered version6. 
For an example of an increase in transmissibility, 
consider the ‘gain of function’ experiments on influenza 
that have enabled airborne transmission of modified 
strains of H5N1 between ferrets7. Proponents of such 
experiments argue that further efforts building on their 
research “have contributed to our understanding of 
host adaptation by influenza viruses, the development 
of vaccines and therapeutics, and improved [disease] 
surveillance”8. However, opponents argue that enhancing 
the transmissibility of H5N1 does little to aid in vaccine 
development; that long lag times between capturing and 
sequencing natural flu samples limits the value of this work 
for surveillance; and that epistasis — in which interactions 
between genes modulate their overall effects — limits our 
ability to infer the likely consequences of other genetic 
mutations in influenza from what we have observed in gain-
of-function research so far9.
Many concerns have been expressed about the 
catastrophic and existential risks associated with engineered 
pathogens. For example, George Church, a pioneer in the 
field of synthetic biology, has said: 
“While the likelihood of misuse of oligos to gain access to 
nearly extinct human viruses (e.g. polio) or novel pathogens 
(like IL4-poxvirus) is small, the consequences loom larger 
than chemical and nuclear weapons, since biohazards are 
inexpensive, can spread rapidly world-wide and evolve on 
their own.”10
Similarly, Richard Posner11, Nathan Myhrvold12, and 
Martin Rees13 have argued that in the future, an engineered 
pathogen with the appropriate combination of virulence, 
transmissibility and delay of onset in symptoms would 
pose an existential threat to humanity. Unfortunately, 
developments in this field will be much more challenging 
to control than nuclear weapons because the knowledge 
and equipment needed to engineer viruses is modest in 
comparison with what is required to create a nuclear 
weapon14. It is possible that once the field has matured over 
the next few decades, a single undetected terrorist group 
would be able to develop and deploy engineered pathogens. 
By the time the field is mature and its knowledge and tools 
are distributed across the world, it may be very challenging 
to defend against such a risk.
This argues for the continuing development of active 
policy-oriented research, an intelligence service to ensure 
that we know what misuse some technologies are being put 
to, and a mature and adaptive regulatory structure in order 
to ensure that civilian use of materials can be appropriately 
developed to maximize benefit and minimize risk.
We raise these potential risks to highlight some worst-
case scenarios that deserve further consideration.  Advances 
in these fields are likely to have significant positive 
consequences in medicine, energy, and agriculture. They 
may even play an important role in reducing the risk of 
pandemics, which currently pose a greater threat than the 
risks described here. 
2.  Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the science and engineering of 
intelligent machines. Narrow AI systems — such as Deep 
Blue, stock trading algorithms, or IBM’s Watson — work 
only in specific domains. In contrast, some researchers 
are working on AI with general capabilities, which aim to 
think and plan across all the domains that humans can. This 
general sort of AI only exists in very primitive forms today15. 
Many people have argued that long-term developments in 
artificial intelligence could have catastrophic consequences 
for humanity in the coming century16, while others are 
more skeptical17.  AI researchers have differing views about 
when AI systems with advanced general capabilities might 
be developed, whether such development poses significant 
risks, and how seriously radical scenarios should be taken. 
As we’ll see, there are even differing views about how to 
characterize the distribution of opinion in the field.
In 2012, Müller and Bostrom surveyed the 100 most-cited 
AI researchers to ask them when advanced AI systems 
Reduction of the risk of an 
existential catastrophe is 
a global public good.
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Over the next few 
decades, certain 
technological advances 
may pose significant and 
unprecedented global 
risks.
might be developed, and what the likely consequences 
would be. The survey defined a “high-level machine 
intelligence” (HLMI) as a machine “that can carry out most 
human professions at least as well as a typical human”, 
and asked the researchers about which year they would 
assign a 10%, 50% or 90% subjective probability to such 
AI being developed. They also asked whether the overall 
consequences for humanity would be “extremely good”, “on 
balance good”, “more or less neutral”, “on balance bad”, or 
“extremely bad (existential catastrophe)”.
The researchers received 29 responses: the median 
respondent assigned a 10% chance of HLMI by 2024, a 50% 
chance of HLMI by 2050, and a 90% chance of HLMI by 
2070. For the impact on humanity, the median respondent 
assigned 20% to “extremely good”, 40% to “on balance 
good”, 19% to “more or less neutral”, 13% to “on balance 
bad”, and 8% to “extremely bad (existential catastrophe)”18.
In our view, it would be a mistake to take these 
researchers’ probability estimates at face value, for several 
reasons. First, the AI researchers’ true expertise is in 
developing AI systems, not forecasting the consequences 
for society from radical developments in the field. Second, 
predictions about the future of AI have a mixed historical 
track record19. Third, these ‘subjective probabilities’ 
represent individuals’ personal degrees of confidence, and 
cannot be taken to be any kind of precise estimate of an 
objective chance. Fourth, only 29 out of 100 researchers 
responded to the survey, which therefore may not be 
representative of the field as a whole.
The difficulty in assessing risks from AI is brought 
out further by a report from the Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), which came 
to a different conclusion. In February 2009, about 20 leading 
researchers in AI met to discuss the social impacts of 
advances in their field. One of three sub-groups focused 
on potentially radical long-term implications of progress 
in artificial intelligence. They discussed the possibility of 
rapid increases in the capabilities of intelligent systems, as 
well as the possibility of humans losing control of machine 
intelligences that they had created. The overall perspective 
and recommendations were summarized as follows:
• “The first focus group explored concerns expressed by lay 
people — and as popularized in science fiction for decades 
— about the long-term outcomes of AI research. Panelists 
reviewed and assessed popular expectations and concerns. 
The focus group noted a tendency for the general public, 
science-fiction writers, and futurists to dwell on radical long-
term outcomes of AI research, while overlooking the broad 
spectrum of opportunities and challenges with developing 
and fielding applications that leverage different aspects of 
machine intelligence.”
• “There was overall skepticism about the prospect of an 
intelligence explosion as well as of a “coming singularity,” 
and also about the large-scale loss of control of intelligent 
systems. Nevertheless, there was a shared sense that 
additional research would be valuable on methods for 
understanding and verifying the range of behaviors of 
complex computational systems to minimize unexpected 
outcomes.”
• “The group suggested outreach and communication to 
people and organizations about the low likelihood of the 
radical outcomes, sharing the rationale for the overall 
comfort of scientists in this realm, and for the need to 
educate people outside the AI research community about 
the promise of AI for enhancing the quality of human life in 
numerous ways, coupled with a re-focusing of attention on 
actionable, shorter-term challenges.”20
This panel gathered prominent people in the field to 
discuss the social implications of advances in AI in response 
to concerns from the public and other researchers. They 
reported on their views about the concerns, recommended 
plausible avenues for deeper investigation, and highlighted 
the possible upsides of progress in addition to discussing the 
downsides. These were valuable contributions.
However, the event had shortcomings as well. First, 
there is reason to doubt that the AAAI panel succeeded 
in accurately reporting the field’s level of concern about 
future developments in AI. Recent commentary on these 
issues from AI researchers has struck a different tone. For 
instance, the survey discussed above seems to indicate more 
widespread concern. Moreover, Stuart Russell — a leader in 
the field and author of the most-used textbook in AI — has 
begun publicly discussing AI as a potential existential risk21.
In addition, the AAAI panel did not significantly engage 
with concerned researchers and members of the public, 
who had no representatives at the conference, and the AAAI 
panel did not explain their reasons for being sceptical of 
concerns about the long-term implications of AI, contrary to 
standard recommendations for ‘inclusion’ or ‘engagement’ in 
the field of responsible innovation22. In place of arguments, 
they offered language suggesting that these concerns 
were primarily held by “non-experts” and belonged in the 
realm of science fiction. It’s questionable whether there is 
genuine expertise in predicting the long-term future of AI 
at all23, and unclear how much better AI researchers would 
be than other informed people. But this kind of dismissal 
is especially questionable in light of the fact that many AI 
researchers in the survey mentioned above thought the risk 
of “extremely bad” outcomes for humanity from long-term 
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progress in AI had probabilities that were far from negligible. 
At present, there is no indication that the concerns of the 
public and researchers in other fields have been assuaged by 
the AAAI panel’s interim report or any subsequent outreach 
effort.
What then, if anything, can we infer from these two 
different pieces of work? The survey suggests that some 
AI researchers believe that the development of advanced 
AI systems poses non-negligible risks of extremely bad 
outcomes for humanity, whilst the AAAI panel was skeptical 
of radical outcomes. Under these circumstances, it is 
impossible to rule out the possibility of a genuine risk, 
making a case for deeper investigation of the potential 
problem and the possible responses and including long-term 
risks from AI in horizon-scanning efforts by government.
Challenges of managing existential risks from 
emerging technology
Existential risks from emerging technologies pose distinctive
challenges for regulation, for the following reasons:
1. The stakes involved in an existential catastrophe are 
extremely large, so even an extremely small risk can carry 
an unacceptably large expected cost24. Therefore, we should 
seek a high degree of certainty that all reasonable steps have
been taken to minimize existential risks with a sufficient 
baseline of scientific plausibility.
2. All of the technologies discussed above are likely to be 
difficult to control (much harder than nuclear weapons). 
Small states or even non-state actors may eventually be able
to cause major global problems.
3. The development of these technologies may be 
unexpectedly rapid, catching the political world off guard. 
This highlights the importance of carefully considering 
existential risks in the context of horizon-scanning efforts, 
foresight programs, risk and uncertainty assessments, and 
policy-oriented research.
4. Unlike risks with smaller stakes, we cannot rely on 
learning to manage existential risks through trial and error. 
Instead, it is important for government to investigate 
potential existential risks and develop appropriate responses
even when the potential threat and options for mitigating it 
are highly uncertain or speculative.
As we seek to maintain and develop the adaptive institutions
necessary to manage existential risks from emerging 
technologies, there are some political challenges that are 
worth considering:
1. Reduction of the risk of an existential catastrophe is a 
global public good, because everyone benefits25. Markets 
typically undersupply global public goods, and large-scale 
cooperation is often required to overcome this. Even a 
large country acting in the interests of its citizens may have 
incentives to underinvest in ameliorating existential risk. For
some threats the situation may be even worse, since even a 
single non-compliant country could pose severe problems.
2. The measures we take to prepare for existential risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stakes involved in an 
existential catastrophe 
are extremely large, 
so even an extremely 
small risk can carry 
an unacceptably large 
expected cost.
from emerging technology will inevitably be speculative, 
making it hard to achieve consensus about how to respond. 
3. Actions we might take to ameliorate these risks are likely 
to involve regulation. The costs of such regulation would 
likely be concentrated on the regulators and the industries, 
whereas the benefits would be widely dispersed and largely 
invisible — a classic recipe for regulatory failure.
4. Many of the benefits of minimizing existential risks accrue 
to future generations, and their interests are inherently 
difficult to incorporate into political decision-making.
Conclusion
In the coming decades, we may face existential risks from a 
number of sources including the development of engineered 
pathogens, advanced AI, or geoengineering. In response, 
we must consider these potential risks in the context 
of horizon-scanning efforts, foresight programs, risk and 
uncertainty assessments, and policy-oriented research. This 
may involve significant political and coordination challenges, 
but given the high stakes we must take reasonable steps 
to ensure that we fully realize the potential gains from 
these technologies while keeping any existential risks to an 
absolute minimum.
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THE SCIENTIST’S PERSPECTIVE
Julia Slingo (Met Office Chief Scientist)
Protecting life, livelihoods and property is a fundamental responsibility of national governments. Weather-related hazards, including coastal and inland 
flooding, are high priorities in the UK government’s National 
Risk Register of Civil Emergencies1. The atmospheric, ocean 
and land-surface observations and forecasts provided by the 
Met Office play a central role in helping to mitigate these 
risks.
Our world is increasingly and intricately interdependent, 
relying on global telecommunications, efficient transport 
systems, and the resilient and reliable provision of food, 
energy and water.  All of these systems are vulnerable to 
adverse weather and climate. The additional pressure of 
climate change creates a new set of circumstances and poses 
new challenges about how secure we will be in the future. 
More than ever, the weather and climate have considerable 
direct and indirect impacts on us — our livelihoods, 
property, well-being and prosperity — and increasingly we 
rely on weather forecasts and climate predictions to plan 
our lives.
Uncertainty is an inherent property of the fluid motions 
of the atmosphere and oceans, which determine the 
weather and climate at the regional and local level. This 
was recognized in 1963 by Ed Lorenz in his seminal paper 
Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow2, in which he introduces the 
concept of the atmosphere as a chaotic system subject to 
small perturbations that grow through non-linear processes 
to influence the larger scale: as Lorenz said, “the flap of 
a seagull’s wings may forever change the course of the 
weather”. 
It is important to understand that a chaotic system is not 
the same as a random system. Chaos is manifested through 
the physical processes that allow energy to cascade from 
one scale to another and influence the final state of the 
system. The evolution of a chaotic system depends on the 
current state of the system, whereas a random system has 
no knowledge of the current state and assumes that each 
subsequent state is independent.
The concept of the weather and climate as chaotic 
systems has had a profound impact on the way in which 
forecasting has evolved over recent decades. No longer do 
we produce a single, deterministic forecast, but instead we 
perform an ensemble of forecasts that seek to capture the 
plausible range of future states of the weather and climate 
that might arise naturally from ‘the flap of the seagull’s 
wings’. This enables the forecaster to assess the probability 
of certain outcomes and to couch the forecast in terms of 
likelihoods of hazardous weather. In some circumstances the 
weather is highly predictable, and in other circumstances 
there is a wide degree of spread and hence a high level of 
uncertainty.
There are two major sources of uncertainty in the 
prediction process. The first involves the certainty with 
which we know the current state of the atmosphere 
(and ocean), known as initial condition uncertainty. Despite 
remarkable progress in Earth observation this uncertainty 
will always be present, because instruments have 
inaccuracies and we cannot monitor every part of the 
system at every scale. Tiny perturbations are therefore 
introduced in the initial state of the forecast, which then 
grow and cause the forecasts to diverge. 
The second source of uncertainty comes from the model 
itself — model uncertainty — and recognizes that there are 
unresolved ‘sub-grid scale’ processes that will affect the 
evolution of the system. These include turbulent processes 
in the atmospheric boundary layer, the initiation and 
evolution of cumulus convection, the formation of clouds 
and the production of precipitation. The sub-grid scale 
variability in these processes is represented by random 
perturbations at the resolved scale, and increasingly draws 
on information from detailed observations and fine-scale 
models that seek to characterize the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of this sub-grid scale variability. 
Uncertainty in climate prediction follows the same 
principles that are used in weather forecasting, incorporating 
both initial condition and model uncertainty. In climate, 
however, initial condition uncertainty is only important 
out to a few years ahead; beyond that, model uncertainty 
dominates. Indeed, both model uncertainty and the 
uncertainty in future emission scenarios dominate the range 
of possible climate change outcomes towards the end of 
the century. In this situation, model uncertainty goes beyond 
the unresolved, sub-gridscale processes, and includes the 
uncertainty in key physical parameters in the climate system, 
such as the response of the carbon cycle to a warming 
world and how readily cloud droplets are converted to rain 
drops through cloud microphysics.   
The reliability of ensemble forecasting depends on 
whether the forecast probabilities match the observed 
frequencies of predicted outcomes. In weather forecasting, 
a reliable ensemble is one in which the ensemble spread is 
representative of the uncertainty in the mean. In the context 
of climate prediction, a reliable ensemble tends to be one in 
which the ensemble forecasts have the same climatological 
variance as the truth. This means that probabilistic 
forecasting systems require substantial re-forecasting of past 
cases to characterize the reliability of the system. In climate 
change, of course, the past is not an analogue for the future, 
and therefore gauging reliability depends much more on 
scientific assessment. 
One recent development in weather forecasting and 
climate prediction is the translation of these probabilities in 
terms of risk. The UK’s National Severe Weather Warning 
Service warns the public and emergency responders of 
severe or hazardous weather (rain, snow, wind, fog, or heat) 
that has the potential to cause danger to life or widespread 
disruption. Since 2011, the severity of the warning (yellow, 
amber or red) depends on a combination of both the 
likelihood of the event happening, and the impact that 
the conditions may have at a specific location (flooding, 
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transport disruption, wind damage, airport closures, or 
health effects), rather than any pre-defined meteorological 
thresholds.  Although the uncertainty in the weather (and 
climate) variables is quantified using probabilistic forecast 
systems, uncertainty in the downstream models tends not to 
be included in determining these risks. For that to happen, 
much more research needs to be done in delivering an end-
to-end assessment of uncertainties, and therefore of risk.
THE INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 
Rowan Douglas (Chairman, Willis Research Network)
As a focal point for risk, it is unsurprising that the global insurance sector has grappled with the challenges of understanding and managing 
extremes. Indeed, the past quarter of a century provides 
an informative journey of how the sector has achieved far 
greater resilience to catastrophic risks through the interplay 
of reforms in the scientific evaluation, prudential regulation 
and capital management of natural disaster risk.
Following a period of unprecedented losses from the 
mid-1980s, culminating with Hurricane Andrew (which hit 
the United States in 1992), the insurance industry faced a 
near-existential crisis. Confidence in the global risk-sharing 
mechanism was in structural disarray as firms across private, 
public and mutual sectors became insolvent or impaired. 
After approximately 300 years of successful operation, the 
insurance sector’s modus operandi of relying on historical 
experience to evaluate risk was unsustainable.
As a consequence, traditional sources of insurance 
capital dried up and insurance capacity retreated: coverage 
became unavailable, unaffordable or severely restricted. 
But insurance is a necessity — it is a prerequisite for many 
forms of economic activity — so there was no shortage of 
demand for the situation to be resolved. Over the next five 
years, three seemingly unrelated forces converged to create 
the conditions for a transformation in how the insurance 
sector confronted extreme risk.
The first was the intervention of new ‘smart’ capital. The 
shortage of capacity had sharply increased prices and there 
was money to be made from underwriting risk, but this new 
capital demanded a new approach to risk evaluation, and 
to managing risk within more tolerable parameters at an 
individual policy and portfolio level.
The second was a quantitative revolution that embraced 
the developments in mainstream software and computing, 
as well as specialist expertise in emerging software firms 
known as catastrophe risk modelling companies. These firms 
began to develop robust methodologies to understand the 
potential locations and forces of threats such as extreme 
windstorms or earthquakes; the locations, characteristics 
and vulnerabilities of exposed buildings; and potential 
financial losses.
The third force was a regulatory trend.  An insurance 
contract is a promise to pay money when a defined loss 
event occurs, but if there is no money to pay a claim the 
written promise is worthless. Until the mid-1990s, nobody 
had asked what level of tolerance an insurance contract 
should be designed to meet, for the simple reason that 
in general they had worked well up to that point. Should 
contracts operate to the 1-in-100 year risk, or 1-in-1000? 
Over a period of approximately five years, an emerging 
convention developed among regulators that insurance 
contracts should tolerate the 1-in-200 year level of 
maximum probable annual loss — that is, to perform at a 
99.5% level of confidence. This level meant that insurance 
companies should have enough capital to meet all their 
policyholder obligations.
There was initially some confusion about what these 
terms meant, let alone how to assess risks at these 
extreme levels. It presaged a revolution in the industry, 
which not everyone was able to adapt to. Slowly but surely, 
the techniques and methodologies that were required to 
respond to these new demands began to be developed, 
applied, tested and refined, and quite quickly the results 
began to show.
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma (KRW) hit 
the US Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, causing unparalleled levels 
of losses at over US$50 billion.  While the insurance and 
reinsurance market was put under severe stress, with major 
question marks over the accuracy of the modelling these 
specific events, there were very few insolvencies. Over the 
13 years since Hurricane Andrew, the industry had allocated 
a greater proportion of capital against potential natural 
disaster loss events, which may have lain beyond previous 
underwriting experience. Ultimately there was sufficient 
capital in the system. If KRW had hit in 1995 before such 
reforms had taken effect, the impact on the sector and 
affected populations seeking support would have been 
catastrophic.
By 2011, the global industry suffered the worst year 
of natural catastrophe losses on record — in excess of 
US$120 billion — from seismic events such as the Great 
East Japan (Tohoku) and Christchurch earthquakes, and from
weather losses such as the Thailand floods and a severe 
US tornado season. Yet despite this, and the wider global 
financial crisis, the re/insurance sector carried on almost 
unaffected.  While there was still much to learn, it had begun
to properly account for risk via the medium of the modelled
world.
Finally, in the aftermath of Super Storm Sandy’s impact 
on the New York region in 2012, the confidence in the 
modelling and assessment of natural disaster risk liberated 
over US$50 billion of new capital to respond to US 
disaster risk. Over a period of a quarter of a century, a 
new relationship between science, capital and public policy 
had delivered a paradigm shift in risk management and 
highlighted to many the dangers of overconfidence in past 
experience.
The international agenda for 2015 includes the renewal 
of the United Nations’ (UN) Hyogo Framework for Action 
on disaster risk reduction in March, the UN’s updated 
Sustainable Development Goals, and the UN Framework 
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Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties 
in Paris in December. In this context, there is a growing 
recognition that the insurance industry’s experience may 
provide essential ingredients for dealing with the overall 
challenges of natural disaster and climate risk, and also 
shed light on how we confront other risks of resilience and 
sustainable growth.
Under the auspices of the UN Secretary General’s Office, 
a consortium including scientists, regulators, human rights 
experts, credit rating agencies and financial institutions have 
propelled an initiative that will integrate natural disaster risk 
and resilience into the financial system.  What was once an 
existential risk to the insurance sector has now become a 
material risk across the wider economy, and should now be 
appropriately encoded into decision making. The outcome 
will influence how we build and operate our cities, arrange 
our companies and protect our populations. In the coming 
decades, millions of lives and livelihoods and billions of 
dollars of assets are at stake.
The initiative proposes that securities (including listed 
equities and bonds) and bank debt (including mortgage 
portfolios) should be exposed to the following stress tests 
to assess their exposure to natural disaster risk:
• 1-in-100 year maximum probable annual loss to natural 
disaster risk (as a survivability/solvency test).
• 1-in-20 year maximum probable annual loss to natural 
disaster risk (as an operational risk / profits test).
• The Annual Average Loss (AAL) to natural disaster risk.
The application of these metrics by insurance companies 
has been instrumental in the effective transformation of the 
industry’s performance. In essence, risk discounts the value 
of assets and resilience increases the value of assets in the 
eyes of buyers and investors. 
There is a growing recognition that many of the systemic 
changes that are necessary to confront our major challenges
cannot be progressed until the costs of ‘business as usual’ 
are accounted for proportionately. Current levels of natural 
disaster risk seem to be a good place to start. Once 
properly informed, the invisible hand of the market has the 
power to transform urban landscapes, corporate operations 
and public policy to underpin resilience and sustainable 
growth. 
This all rests on improvements in science that have 
enabled natural hazards to be understood as foreseeable, 
quantifiable and (in non-seismic risks) often forecasted 
events. But this scientific knowledge must be transformed 
by financial and legal mechanisms to have optimum 
impact on systemic risk-management and the protection 
of populations. This requires a common language and 
modelling framework to enable the communication and 
interoperability needed to manage risk.
This recent statement by the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights illustrates how the 
language of science, engineering and risk management is 
now informing the development and operation of social 
protections against excess losses:
“All states have positive human rights obligations to 
protect human rights. Natural hazards are not disasters, in 
and of themselves. They become disasters depending on the 
elements of exposure, vulnerability and resilience, all factors 
that can be addressed by human (including state) action. 
A failure (by governments and others) to take reasonable 
preventive action to reduce exposure and vulnerability 
and to enhance resilience, as well as to provide effective 
mitigation, is therefore a human rights question.” 
THE INSURANCE MARKET’S 
PERSPECTIVE
Trevor Maynard (Head of Exposure Management and 
Reinsurance, Lloyd’s of London)
Lloyd’s of London is a specialist insurance and reinsurance marketplace consisting of multiple competing entities (known as syndicates) with a 
mutualized central fund at its heart. To ensure that the 
fund is as safe as possible, the Corporation of Lloyd’s sets 
capital requirements for these syndicates and has a suite of 
minimum standards covering every aspect of doing business, 
from claims management to catastrophe modelling.  As such, 
the Corporation regulates the Lloyd’s market with a small 
‘r’; the true financial regulator is the Prudential Regulation 
Authority, as it is for all other insurers in the United 
Kingdom.  
Natural disasters are an important issue for Lloyd’s; it 
actively seeks to take catastrophe risks from businesses, and 
also other insurers (called reinsurance).  When disasters 
strike, the Lloyd’s market will often pay a significant 
 proportion of the insurance claims and so the risks need to 
be well understood and managed. This short case study will 
consider the management of natural disasters before, during, 
after and long after they occur.
Before the disaster, the Lloyd’s market must estimate 
how much risk it has taken onto its balance sheet in order 
to ensure that premium rates and additional capital are 
sufficient to pay the claims that might arise. Policyholder 
security is paramount and we seek to hold assets well 
in excess of regulatory minima. However, no insurer’s 
resources are infinite and some events could exhaust our 
funds. There is a trade off, though: the more funds that 
are held, the more expensive the insurance becomes, 
because shareholders need rewarding for the capital they 
make available to support the business. This is the first 
key regulatory decision that must be made in the face of 
uncertainty: what level of confidence should policyholders 
have a right to expect?  
The Lloyd’s approach largely follows the current 
regulatory approach in the United Kingdom. In simple terms, 
we estimate the size of claims that could only be exceeded 
with 0.5% probability over the coming year, and then deduct 
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the premiums that we have received from customers — 
these premiums are the first line of defence when paying out 
insurance claims. The residual amount, known as the value at 
risk, is the minimum regulatory capital that we must hold as 
additional assets.  We hold at least enough capital to survive 
a disastrous year that we might statistically expect to see 
only once in every 200 years.  We then uplift this minimum 
capital further to provide a buffer. 
Finally, we model any claims that are larger than the 
combined funds of any syndicate to see how the central 
fund would be affected. Then we ensure that this fund is 
large enough to survive all events with a probability greater 
than 0.5%, and add more buffer assets. This combination of 
mathematically-modelled amounts buffered with additional 
prudence helps us to handle the inevitable uncertainties in 
the models.  
Lloyd’s sells policies to many different businesses, including 
aviation, shipping, energy, property and liability business. 
Natural disasters directly affect many of these sectors, but 
claims can come from other causes such as litigation or 
terrorism. The capital calculation described above has to 
consider all those risks, while the modelling approaches vary 
depending on the type of business.  
The modelling of natural disasters in particular has 
become more sophisticated over the past two decades. 
Losses were previously estimated using illustrative scenarios, 
but this approach suffers from many flaws. The scenarios 
may miss important exposures, may not be aligned with 
a specific probability of failure, and may overlook certain 
risks (such as contingent covers) completely. Today, we use 
catastrophe models that take simulated events such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes and estimate the damage caused 
to a portfolio of properties based on their age and building 
characteristics. Multiple disciplines come together to create 
these models, including actuaries, engineers and scientists. 
Regulators allow these models to be used, but must be 
convinced that they are built using sound principles and on 
reasonable and justifiable assumptions. 
Over the years, these models have incorporated many 
features of natural catastrophes.  These include issues such 
as ‘post-loss amplification’, where shortages of raw building 
materials and services (such as plumbers and engineers) can 
inflate rebuilding costs.  Another feature is ‘contract leakage’, 
where judicial decisions grant payments to policyholders 
outside of the insurers’ usual interpretation or intentions 
of a policy’s terms and conditions. Regulators are keen to 
ensure that all material features are included in the models 
so that they are ‘complete’.
During a disaster, insurers will observe the catastrophe 
and start to gear up their claims operations. Loss adjusters 
will get ready to assess the level of claims. Regulators will 
want initial estimates of the potential losses, to decide 
whether the affected firms have any potential solvency 
issues. Initial estimates are usually made using the same 
models that set the capital — there is significant uncertainty 
in these estimates, but they give a reasonable guide to the 
financial cost of the event.
Shortly after a disaster, insurers must set up reserves to 
pay the expected claims.  At this stage many claims will not 
have been notified, so the losses must be estimated.  And 
because there is always uncertainty about the impact of the 
event, Lloyd’s typically takes a scenario approach to assess 
the damage.  We usually ask for each syndicate to provide 
its own estimate of loss, but we also specify at least two 
scenarios with consistent assumptions that they must all use. 
This ensures a set of results that can be aggregated to form 
a consistent whole-market estimate.
Some time after the disaster, the underwriters have to 
consider how to incorporate the new information into their 
prices and into the next generation of models. In the case of 
earthquake insurance, for example, the buffer capital has to 
cover very large events. Prices (or ‘premium rates’) have to 
cover the long-run average claims, plus expenses, and also 
provide a return on the capital held in excess of reserves. 
Therefore the premiums must exceed the average losses in 
order to be risk-based.  
The insurance industry understands clearly that much 
uncertainty remains. Many models are based on a few 
centuries of data, much of it inferred from proxy sources 
rather than being directly observed.  We can quantify some 
of this uncertainty, though, by incorporating statistical 
distributions of the key parameters in to the models.
Notwithstanding their limitations, models have significantly 
aided the insurance industry’s decision-making about 
inherently uncertain events. They incorporate and naturally 
illustrate the range of possible outcomes in a way that 
would not be highlighted by single deterministic scenarios.
Model-based methods provide a probability-weighted 
approach for decisions and are now embedded within the 
regulation of insurance in the United Kingdom. If new EU 
‘Solvency II’ regulation comes into force, this approach will 
be adopted across the European Union. Indeed, we already 
see similar approaches around the world: earthquake 
insurance in Canada, for example, is required to meet a 1-in-
500 year test.
The modelling of natural 
disasters has become 
more sophisticated over 
the past two decades.
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SECTION 5: MOVING THINGS 
FORWARD — GOVERNANCE 
AND DECISION-MAKING
£300m
£1bn
Between 2011 and 2014, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority led 
an extended consultation process on the use 
of mitochondrial replacement procedures to 
eliminate faulty genetic material.
The HFEA consultation consisted of: 
Deliberative workshops; a public representative 
survey; open consultation meetings; a patient focus 
group; an open consultation questionnaire.
Towards the end of the 
twentieth century, the 
governance of technology 
has shifted from top-down 
regulation to include greater 
participation by non-
governmental actors. 
RISK
HAZARD
A revised strategy for innovation in 
GM crops would have a more risk-rather 
than hazard-based structure than the 
current process. It would take into account 
the evidence that there is no inherent 
environmental or nutritional hazard in the 
process of genetic modification, 
and it would also consider the 
risks associated 
with the failure 
to innovate. 
HFEAREPORT
Thanks to more rigorous regulation, 
the products around us have never been 
safer. But regulatory systems have become 
more complex, more time consuming 
and considerably more expensive for the 
companies that need to work with them: 
it now takes approximately 10 years, and 
up to £300 million, to cover the regulatory 
requirements for a new GM crop 
variety, and up to £1 billion for 
a new drug.
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Only three GM crops have been approved for 
commercial cultivation in Europe since 1990; in the 
United States, there have been 96 commercial GM 
approvals since 1990;  Australia has approved 12 GM 
crops since 2002.
More complex, lengthy and 
expensive regulatory systems mean 
that innovation is dominated by large 
multinational companies. 
96 3
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In 2004, the 
British Standards 
Institution pioneered 
the development of 
the first international 
standards committee on 
nanotechnologies. 
128
129
CHAPTER 11: BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER
The complexity of innovation governance systems — from the focus on risk-
related policies and public engagement, to the rigidity of product regulatory 
frameworks — helps us to avoid potentially hazardous developments, but it also 
stifles potentially useful innovation.
Joyce Tait 
(University of Edinburgh)
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Risk and innovation are contested topics in most fields of human endeavour.  As the preceding chapters have shown, wherever one looks there is great variation, 
between and within nations and societies, in the ways we 
perceive the risks and benefits from innovations and in the 
ways we govern them. However, the prevailing expectation 
in most societies is that there will be a continuing trend in 
the development of innovations that will improve our lives 
through economic, health-related or environmental benefits1.
And the risk governance processes we choose to put in 
place for innovative technologies will determine not just 
which products and processes are developed, but also what 
scale of company can participate in their development and 
ultimately the competitive advantage of nations and regions2.
Given the importance of innovation to us all, we need 
a good understanding of how public and stakeholder 
pressures interact with risk regulatory systems and of how 
both stakeholders and regulators then guide innovation, 
encouraging some developments and closing off others. 
Specialist expertise is required in a range of contexts: to 
provide the evidence needed to make competent decisions 
on risk regulation, to conduct fair and equitable stakeholder 
engagement, or to develop an innovative product or process.
But there is also an important requirement for a balanced 
generalist overview to understand how these specialisms 
and influences interact with one another in ways that can 
either be detrimental to, or support, particular innovations. 
In making decisions on risk regulation for advanced 
innovative technologies, regulators have often ignored 
the impacts of their decisions on innovative capacity and 
have, until very recently, given little consideration to how 
‘smarter’ regulatory approaches could deliver safety and 
efficacy more cheaply and rapidly than current regimes. This 
is particularly the case for companies developing chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, health care products based on regenerative 
medicine, pesticides, genetically modified (GM) crops and 
products based on nanotechnology and synthetic biology. 
This chapter considers how issues of risk, trust, politics, 
benefits, engagement and regulation have combined to 
create the environment in which today’s innovators must 
operate. The two decades spanning the transition from the 
twentieth to the twenty-first centuries saw the emergence 
and implementation of a new governance agenda that has 
had very considerable political influence. It has radically 
altered the innovation environment, particularly in areas 
of technology development that are likely to be publicly 
contested, with mixed outcomes and in many cases 
suboptimal delivery of public benefits from new scientific 
discoveries3.
 
 
Regulation and the new governance agenda
Towards the end of the twentieth century, building on 
research in the social sciences, the concept of governance 
(the process of governing) began to shift in response to 
pressures from: the emergence of unexpected problems 
with technologies previously considered safe; a decline in 
public trust of government bodies and industry; the rapid 
pace of scientific development and technological change; the 
difficulties policymakers had in keeping up with this pace of 
change; and commercial pressures arising from globalization4. 
Two distinct academic disciplinary perspectives contributed 
to the development of this new governance agenda with 
little overlap among academic participants or literature cited, 
but with a common focus on the development of more 
participative, democratic decision making processes.
The first, led by academic policy researchers, envisaged 
a change in the role of the state from top-down regulation 
to a new governance style based on greater participation 
by non-governmental actors. The state changed from being 
the main implementer and controller of policy outcomes 
to facilitating and coordinating interaction between the 
various interests involved5, giving rise to metaphors such as 
the ‘hollowing out of the state’6 or ‘steering not rowing’7. 
The presumption was that government, having set the 
parameters in terms of the policy goals, then delegated 
to others how those goals were to be achieved. These 
ideas were developed in a general policy context and the 
literature makes little reference to risk and innovation, but 
they were influential across all policy areas and created 
a receptive policy space for the ideas emerging from the 
second academic perspective. 
The second strand of academic thinking that contributed 
to the new governance agenda arose in science and 
technology studies (STS) and focused very strongly on issues 
of risk and innovation. It challenged the authority of science, 
particularly its presumed impartiality and its role as provider 
of public benefits. This strand of STS thinking was concerned 
about the undemocratic nature of this dominance of science 
on government decision making and sought to change the 
political landscape, again towards greater public participation 
in regulatory decision making8. Two related factors in 
STS thinking were particularly important in delivering 
the political influence they sought: (i) questioning the 
authority of scientific expertise and the validity of scientific 
The prevailing expectation 
in most societies is that 
there will be a continuing 
trend in the development 
of innovations that will 
improve our lives.
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evidence used to support policy and regulatory decisions 
by government9; and (ii) focusing much of their discourse 
on uncertainty and risk with the precautionary principle (or 
approach) being seen as the policy answer to this challenge. 
Alongside this new bottom-up governance agenda, in 
technology-related areas there is still a need for regulation 
based on top-down command and control, backed up by 
sanctions and penalties to regulate the safety to human 
health and the environment of innovative products and of 
the processes used to develop them.  As the governance 
agenda was bringing in a softer, more participative approach, 
existing regulatory regimes were changing in the opposite 
direction. Each time a new form of risk has been found in 
a class of products, a new layer or branch has been added 
to the regulatory system to ensure that future products 
will be safe from that type of defect. For example, following 
the discovery of birth defects caused by thalidomide, all 
new drugs were required to be tested for teratogenicity. 
In pesticide development, the damage to wildlife caused 
by organochlorine insecticides led to the rejection from 
development pipelines of any new pesticide that was likely to
be persistent in the environment.  As a result, the products 
in use today have never been safer. However, the regulatory 
systems themselves have become more complex, more time 
consuming and considerably more costly for the companies 
that need to work with them (it now takes approximately 
10 years, and up to £300 million, to cover the regulatory 
requirements for a new GM crop variety and up to £1 billion
for a new drug). 
The shift to a new governance approach towards the end 
of the twentieth century can thus be seen as the addition 
of a new form of oversight for industry sectors that were 
already bearing a heavy and increasing regulatory burden. 
Indeed, there has been an increase in the complexity of the 
 
 
operating environment for innovators to accommodate 
the new focus on engagement and dialogue and to come to 
terms with the difficulties regulators have experienced in 
operationalizing the precautionary principle10. These issues 
are part of the background to the case study on GM crops 
in this chapter, and would be relevant to the alternative risk 
management strategy that it outlines.  A possible example 
of such an approach, bringing together evidence-based 
regulation along with a continuing emphasis on openness 
and engagement, is given in the case study in Chapter 6 on 
changes to pig inspection.
TABLE 1
The implications and outcomes related to engagement 
on the basis of interests and ideology (minds and hearts)15.
Interest-based engagement
(minds)
Ideology-based engagement
(hearts)Un
co
m
m
itted
 m
em
b
ers o
f th
e p
u
blic
Restricted to specific 
developments
Location specific, locally organized
Conflict can usually be resolved by: 
• providing information
• giving compensation
• negotiation
Giving concessions leads to mutual 
accommodation
Negative events lead to adjustments 
in products and processes
Spreads across related and 
sometimes unrelated developments
Organized nationally or internationally
Conflict is very difficult to resolve:
• information is treated as propaganda
• compensation is seen as bribery
• negotiation is seen as betrayal
Giving concessions leads to 
escalation of demands
Responses to negative events 
are disproportionate
The products in use today 
have never been safer. 
However, the regulatory 
systems themselves have 
become more complex, 
more time consuming and 
considerably more costly.
Participatory processes
Emerging from the new perspectives on risk governance 
and the emphasis on participative democracy, stakeholder 
engagement has become an essential requirement for 
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scientists undertaking innovation-related research and for 
companies developing the resulting products and processes. 
The emphasis on uncertainty and precaution among STS 
academics led, in the first decade of this century, to the 
promotion of ‘upstream engagement’ as a key component 
of the new governance agenda. The think-tank Demos, in a 
policy publication advocating upstream engagement11, made 
clear its political ambitions: “the task is to make visible the 
invisible, to expose to public scrutiny the assumptions, values 
and visions that drive science”, and “… reshape … the very 
foundations on which the scientific enterprise rests”. 
Psychologists tell us that where issues are remote from 
society (as in upstream engagement or the development of 
truly novel technologies), citizens are more likely to engage 
with an issue on the basis of values or ideology rather 
than local personal interest12. In such cases, conflict and 
polarization of views are more likely to arise and resolution 
of any conflict will be more difficult to achieve13 (see Table 
CASE STUDY
A CASE HISTORY ON GM CROPS
David Baulcombe (University of Cambridge)
The first generation of genetically modified (GM) crops has delivered diverse and well-documented benefits. They have helped to 
stabilize soil and increase the efficiency of water 
use. They have also reduced pesticide toxicity for 
farmworkers and beneficial insects, and increased the 
profitability of agriculture in regions as diverse as India 
(GM cotton) and Hawaii (GM papaya).
The potential for benefit from GM is further 
enhanced by research in universities, institutes and 
companies, which have produced an extensive range 
of additional GM traits. These traits could improve 
the sustainability of crop production, or they could 
improve the quality of the crop products for nutrition 
or industry. In the near future there are exciting 
new genome editing methodologies that will further 
reinforce the transformative potential of GM in global 
agriculture. The detailed description of these potential 
benefits is described in a report produced for the UK 
government’s Council for Science and Technology1.
A European logjam on GM
However, the full benefits of these GM traits are 
yet to be realized, especially in European 
Union, because complicated regulatory 
and approval processes have deterred 
commercial interest and excluded non-
commercial applications. Only three GM 
crops have been approved for commercial 
cultivation in Europe since 1990 (ref. 2).  
An application for a GM maize (Dupont 
Pioneer’s TC1507) was made in 2000, but is still 
in limbo even though the line is very similar to a 
previously-approved variety. In the United States, 
there have been 96 commercial GM approvals since 
1990 and a healthy stream of applications to the 
regulatory process.  Australia has approved 12 GM 
crops since 2002 (ref. 1). 
Europe has a global leadership role and our 
logjam suppresses innovation in other countries. 
These countries may model their GM approval process on 
that of Europe, or they may prohibit GM crops because they 
are concerned that their cultivation would restrict their 
opportunity to export non-GM crops to Europe3. 
Risk and hazard in the European Union’s regulatory 
process
The current EU regulation of GM crops has two stages. 
First the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assesses 
an application and expresses an opinion based on scientific 
evidence on whether a crop under evaluation is safe. If 
EFSA delivers a favourable safety opinion, the European 
Commission will then prepare a draft decision to authorise 
commercial cultivation, which is considered and voted on 
by an official EU committee of representatives from the 
Member States.
This process is expensive and time consuming, however, 
because it is based on the presumption of hazard. The 
process also has to be implemented in full for each 
application, irrespective of whether the GM trait is 
associated with any risk. The United States has a more 
streamlined regulatory process for the commercial release 
of a GM crop, but even there it can cost US$7 million 
to US$14 million (in 2007 prices)4 — an amount 
that is prohibitive for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises. In Europe the costs could be 
greater, and innovation is correspondingly less 
likely. 
The inappropriateness of the current EU 
approval process is illustrated by comparing 
GM with conventional plant breeding. There 
is great uncertainty associated with conventional 
breeding, because there is an unanticipated degree 
of genetic variation between closely related plants. 
The genomes of maize plants in a breeders cross, 
for example, may each have several hundred genes 
that are absent from the other parent5. It is difficult 
to predict the consequence of interactions between 
these genes in the hybrids produced by a conventional 
breeding programme. Further complications arise in 
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conventional breeding because there may be epigenetic 
effects on gene expression in a hybrid plant that persist 
for many generations6 after the initial hybridization event. 
GM may also involve similar genetic and epigenetic 
uncertainties, but to a much more limited extent 
because there will normally be only one or a few 
transgenes in each line. One response to this 
comparison would be to introduce additional regulation 
for conventionally bred crops. However, the past 
experience of thousands of years of breeding — 
including modern breeding for the past hundred years 
— illustrates the absurdity of that conclusion.  A more 
rational response would be to use conventional breeding 
as a benchmark: additional assessment would be 
appropriate if there is plausible additional risk associated 
with the GM trait relative to a conventionally bred 
variety. 
The inappropriate differentiation of GM and 
conventional crops is illustrated by several recent 
examples in which the crop carries a transgene that 
could have been transferred by conventional breeding7, 
albeit through a process that would take longer than 
with GM. The GM crops with the new gene would be 
subject to the EFSA/EU approval process, whereas the 
conventionally bred variety with the same gene would 
not, although the risks to health or the environment 
would be similar with both types of plant. 
An alternative risk management strategy in crop 
improvement
A revised strategy for innovation in EU crops would 
have a more risk- rather than hazard-based structure 
than the current process. It would take into account 
the evidence that there is no inherent environmental or 
nutritional hazard in the process of genetic modification, 
and it would also consider the risks associated with the 
failure to innovate. It is unlikely that small revisions to 
the current process are likely to achieve an outcome 
that promotes innovation towards a sustainable 
agriculture of crops — instead, a new process should 
be derived based on the principles of risk assessment 
as applied in other industries.  Where risks are difficult 
to quantify, it would be appropriate to implement GM-
specific procedures only if the risk is assessed as being 
greater than with an equivalent variety produced by 
conventional breeding.  
1). In essence, the more developed a particular application 
towards its end purpose, the more deliberative and 
meaningful the conversation is likely to be.  When citizens 
are unfamiliar with the issues at stake, engagement processes 
— whether upstream or downstream — can thus become 
a process of framing these unfamiliar developments, either 
favourably or unfavourably, in the public mind, potentially 
giving considerable power to those who conduct the 
engagement14. 
These points are raised in the Annual Report of the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser 2014. Innovation: 
Managing Risk, Not Avoiding It under the heading 
‘Anticipating the Challenges’, where it is noted that the 
categories of innovation likely to lead to the most heated 
discussion are (i) where the wider benefits of an innovation 
are accepted but where highly local costs and impacts are 
imposed, and (ii) where the debate is largely about values. 
Table 1 illustrates some of the characteristics of dialogue 
under these contrasting circumstances, demonstrating why 
value- or ideology-based conflicts are most difficult of all 
to resolve (as continues to be the case for GM and related 
technologies).
Despite such problems, the initial assumption of scientists 
and science funders was that upstream engagement would, 
if managed properly, improve public acceptance of new 
technologies and would not bring an end to any area of 
research16. However, as noted above, Demos17 expected 
upstream engagement to have profound implications for the 
future of science and to reshape the way that science relates 
to public decision making.  Although upstream engagement 
has been widely undertaken, for example by UK research 
councils18, 19, Demos’ ambitions have not yet been achieved. 
Also, there is not yet any evidence that better public 
acceptance of new innovative technologies will result from 
such engagement and in practice there have been reductions 
in funding for some areas of science and innovation, 
particularly in nanotechnology20 and plant biotechnology, 
arising from political influences and policy makers’ concerns 
about negative public opinion rather than evidence of 
potential or actual harm.  As noted in case study on GM 
crops, such considerations have also influenced the extent to 
which GM crops are being cultivated in Europe21.
Another presumption has been that, through the new 
governance approach, policy-makers would simultaneously 
engage with a wider range of stakeholders and also base 
their decisions on better quality evidence.  A common tactic 
among the diverse groups and networks of stakeholders 
Psychologists tell us that 
where issues are remote 
from society, citizens 
are more likely to engage 
with an issue on the basis 
of values or ideology 
rather than local personal 
interest.
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CASE STUDY
STANDARDS: SUPPORTING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
AS AN ACCELERATOR OF INNOVATION
Scott Steedman (Director of Standards, British Standards Institution)
Positioned alongside regulation, voluntary consensus standards that have been developed with full stakeholder engagement and open 
public consultation can provide an invaluable tool 
to share information and to build trust in new and 
emerging technologies.  Although the use of standards 
as an accelerator of innovation is well understood in 
other major economies (notably in Germany, where 
standards play a strong part in the activities of the 
Fraunhofer institutes), in the United Kingdom there is 
a poor understanding of the potential for standards to 
act as alternatives to regulation. This important tool is 
therefore frequently ignored in UK innovation strategy 
and planning.
Standards provide a powerful alternative to 
regulation in many areas, but can be particularly 
effective in supporting new and emerging technologies 
where public trust needs to be maintained. One 
particular case study, which shows the effectiveness of 
standards building up over time, is the emergence of 
nanotechnology (as outlined in the case 
study by Kamal Hossain in Chapter 4).
The ability to manipulate materials 
at very small length scales to create 
products with higher-value properties 
and functions was first identified as a 
potential source of significant wealth 
creation by the UK government through 
its creation of the LINK Nanotechnology 
Programme in the 1980s. 
This was followed by 
the Taylor Report on 
nanotechnology1 in 2002, 
which recommended that 
the government should 
invest in stimulating innovation and encouraging 
successful commercial exploitation of this 
technology. 
At the same time, public concern was growing 
over the potentially unknown and unquantified risks 
associated with nanomaterials, particularly in relation 
to the possible hazards they posed to humans and the 
environment. Environmental pressure groups demanded
that the technology should be subject to stronger 
regulation.
In 2004 the British Standards Institution (BSI)2, in its 
role as the UK National Standards Body, pioneered 
the development of the first international standards 
committee on nanotechnologies, as well as a UK 
standards committee to mirror this work. These 
bodies developed strategic plans that highlighted the 
three main priorities for standards development: 
• Terminology and Nomenclature
• Measurement and Characterization
• Health, Safety, and Environment
Since then the expert committees have developed 
a number of standards, including vocabularies, 
occupational health and safety guides, toxicity 
testing standards, and characterization test methods. 
Laboratories testing against these standards can be 
accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation 
Service (UKAS) to provide further confidence in 
the emerging technology. The development of these 
standards of best practice is one important factor 
that has enabled governments to avoid introducing 
any legislation specific to nanotechnologies, despite 
pressure to regulate the industry. 
Recently, BSI has been 
working closely with Innovate 
UK (formerly the government’s 
Technology Strategy Board) 
to demonstrate the value that 
timely standardization 
can bring to priority 
areas such as offshore 
renewable energy, 
assisted living (such as 
new technologies to support the elderly), 
cell therapy and synthetic biology. In each 
area, a landscape and roadmap that identifies 
priority areas for new standards was 
developed through a process of stakeholder 
engagement in a similar way to that used for 
nanomaterials ten years ago.
The success of this approach is increasingly widely 
recognized. Investment is now needed to extend 
the concept so that standards advice becomes 
permanently embedded within the Catapult 
technology and innovation centres, as well as 
research communities across the United Kingdom.
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that engage with policy decisions on risk and innovation is 
to promote exclusively the evidence that supports their 
objectives or even to manufacture such evidence22. This is 
an inevitable part of political processes but, as noted above, 
upstream engagement tends to push dialogue towards 
issues of value and ideology and in such cases there is much 
less willingness on the part of protagonists to reconsider 
evidence on the basis of its scientific merit23 (Table 1). 
Such challenges downgrade the value of research findings 
as evidence to support decision making and policymakers 
are finding that science and technology in some areas are 
becoming less governable as the evidence base for decisions 
is challenged and eroded.
Impact on innovation 
Technology foresight has contributed to government support 
for the development of innovative technologies for over 
30 years, but human capabilities in this area are notoriously 
flawed. Now, based on the new governance agenda we have 
included risk foresight (through the precautionary principle) 
and foresighting public needs and desires (through upstream 
engagement). In the case of advanced innovative technologies 
with product lead times considerably longer than five years, 
the uncertainty inherent in foresight becomes multiplied 
several-fold. The governance-based approach, promoted in a 
spirit of optimism as a means to achieve more democratic and 
more robust political processes and decisions, has distributed 
power more equitably across societal groups — but this has, 
in many cases, resulted merely in greater complexity and 
confusion, and longer delays in decision making.
There were sound reasons behind the changes in policy 
decision making outlined above. However, evidence is 
now beginning to accumulate that the complexity we 
have introduced into our governance systems through the 
upstream focus of risk-related policies and engagement, 
coupled with the increased complexity and rigidity of 
Technology foresight has 
contributed to government 
support for the 
development of innovative 
technologies for over 
30 years.
Upstream engagement 
tends to push dialogue 
towards issues of value 
and ideology, with much 
less willingness on the 
part of protagonists to 
reconsider evidence 
on the basis of its 
scientific merit.
product regulatory systems, is stifling potentially useful 
innovation in addition to the desired impact of avoiding 
potentially hazardous developments.
For example, the more complex, lengthy and expensive 
our governance systems become, the more innovation 
becomes dominated by large multinational companies24.  As 
observed in the GM crops case study, no small company 
with an innovative idea can hope to reach a market without 
doing so through a large multinational company, through 
selling the intellectual property, a straightforward buy-out 
or some other form of collaboration. Small companies 
therefore develop their business models with such outcomes 
in mind, leading to a focus on innovations that are likely to fit 
with the strategies of the large companies. These companies 
in turn will be most receptive to incremental innovations 
that will enable them to improve on their current products 
or processes by making them more efficient or more 
sustainable. Path-breaking, disruptive innovations that could 
potentially contribute to pressing societal needs will either 
meet with self-censorship by scientists and innovators or 
will fail to attract funding along their development pathway. 
The paradox here is that the domination of the agrochemical 
and pharmaceutical industry sectors by large multinational 
companies, so strongly criticized by environmental advocacy 
groups, is a direct result of the kind of regulatory system 
that they themselves have been instrumental in encouraging.
A comparison between the recent innovation experience 
of information and communication technologies (ICT), 
where there have been several waves of disruptive 
innovation over the past twenty years, and life sciences 
where innovation has been largely incremental despite 
enormous public investment in the basic science, illustrates 
this point. Likewise, failure by large multinational companies 
to develop products to meet evident human needs (new 
antibiotics to address the challenge of antibiotic resistance, 
or GM crops to control pests and diseases in non-
commodity crops) relates to the incompatibility of such 
developments with current industry business models that 
are a direct result of the regulatory systems that apply in 
these sectors.
The new governance agenda and upstream engagement 
are probably here to stay, but we have yet to learn how to 
136
accommodate their combined pressures in a way that will 
circumvent their potentially corrosive impact on innovative 
developments that could meet important societal needs. 
A more adaptive approach to the governance of risk 
and innovation
During the twentieth century, the focus of innovation 
moved from chemistry to information and communication 
technologies, and the bio-economy is now expected to be 
the growth engine of the twenty-first century. The innovation 
trajectories in each of these areas are (or will be) very 
different, but research on ‘what works’ in innovative business 
models, taking account of the complexity in the innovation 
environment arising from new governance approaches, has 
been very limited. Likewise, there has been little socio-
economic research on the interactions between risk 
regulatory systems and innovation, as opposed to the very 
large amount of research on the new governance agenda. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that our governance 
systems for advanced innovative technologies are not always 
fit for purpose. Product regulatory systems that have built 
up by a process of slow accretion over a period of years 
are now so onerous that even multinational companies are 
finding it difficult to develop new innovative products. The 
new governance agenda was intended to improve policy 
and regulatory decisions by making them more democratic. 
Instead it has led to a less democratic and less evidence-
based system, in which risk regulation and restriction of 
specific areas of scientific and innovative activity are seen 
by some governments and policy makers, particularly in the 
European Union, as valid responses to societal pressures 
or the need for public reassurance, rather than a means of 
dealing with risks for which there is an evidence base25.
Until recently, flaws in regulatory systems related to over-
regulation of innovative products and processes have not 
been a matter of great concern for governments, except 
where there has been public pressure to address such 
problems, as in the case of the accelerated development 
of drugs to treat AIDS. This is in contrast to considerable 
government attention to the need for ‘better regulation’ in 
non-risk related areas. In a state of ignorance, or at least 
insouciance, the assumption has been that this hidden tax on 
innovation processes can be accommodated by companies 
while still delivering products at an affordable price. This 
chapter has focused on the areas where the current risk 
governance deficits are greatest and where the need for 
systemic change is most pressing, for example in areas linked 
to the bio-economy, but these challenges may spread in the 
near future to other advanced innovative technologies.
Such systemic factors can mitigate against effective 
decision making in at least two ways: (i) the system can 
become so amorphous and unstructured that there is no 
clear basis for decisions and also no clearly identified locus 
for decision making; or (ii) it can become so complex, rigid 
and constrained by legal and customary precedent that it is 
incapable of adapting to new threats or opportunities. The 
bio-economy is in danger of experiencing the first of these 
threats in the context of the new governance agenda and the 
There has been little 
socio-economic research 
on the interactions 
between risk regulatory 
systems and innovation.
second in the context of conventional risk regulation.
Therefore recommendations related to the adoption 
of a precautionary approach (see the ‘NGO Perspective’ 
in Section 2’s fracking case study) should elicit a broad-
based policy response that takes account of the interests 
and values of protagonists and the costs and benefits of 
alternative options, as outlined in Chapter 4’s neonicotinoid 
pesticide case study. In a similar vein, the case study on 
bisphenol A in Chapter 3 points to the need for an increased 
focus on scientific evidence as a basis for regulatory 
decision making even, or perhaps particularly, where 
this is undertaken within the European Union’s overall 
precautionary regulatory system.
Changing the behaviour of innovation or regulatory systems 
will require finding the right policy levers that will adapt or 
re-align the relevant system components, and new smarter 
approaches to regulation and governance are the most likely 
pressure points to deliver better innovation-related value for 
money from public investment in basic science. 
The two case studies included in this chapter provide very 
interesting pointers to future directions that could be taken 
to meet these needs. Standards developed through dialogue 
between stakeholders and companies, to ensure the quality 
of products and processes and to govern health, safety and 
environmental impacts, have a much better record of being 
adaptive in the face of new technological developments than 
our current regulatory systems (see nanotechnology case 
study). This is not to suggest that standards could totally 
replace these regulatory systems, but much could be learned 
from the adaptive processes they have used so successfully. 
The alternative risk management strategy proposed for 
novel crops by David Baulcombe (see GM crops case study) 
could be a starting point for re-thinking the European 
regulatory system in a way that would be sufficiently radical 
to enable re-shaping and reinvigorating of innovation for 
European crop production. Each approach has the potential 
to complement the other, and together they could enable us 
to deploy our insights more intelligently than we have done 
to date.
The above commentary should not be seen to counsel 
against the elements of the new governance approach or 
engagement, upstream or downstream. However, we need 
to learn how to overcome these systemic threats without 
jeopardizing the safety and effectiveness of the innovative 
products and processes that we will need to meet future 
societal challenges.
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CHAPTER 12: ULTIMATELY 
A DECISION HAS TO BE MADE
A wide-ranging consultation on mitochondrial-replacement procedures offers a 
successful example of engagement with the public on a controversial innovation.
Lisa Jardine 
(University College London)
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At the end of the day, probably nothing is more illuminating and instructive for our understanding of risk in the context of scientific policy-making 
than to see how a specific example works out in practice.  
A long career as a science communicator has taught me 
that the hardest thing to explain to a lay audience is that 
evidence-based science does not deal in certainties. To 
the non-scientist, science is engaged in delivering absolute 
truth based on incontrovertible facts. Propositions based 
on anything less than this are likely to be regarded as 
questionable.  Above all, decisions based on ‘likelihood’ 
rather than ‘fact’ are perceived to involve unacceptable 
levels of risk: these are the decisions that give rise to 
‘shock horror’ headlines in the tabloid press.
The reality is that a measure of uncertainty is a defining 
characteristic of the scientific method. The scientific 
solution to a problem is inevitably provisional. The 
scientist’s goal is to arrive at the best fit between their 
findings so far and a hypothesis, or general principle.  
Fundamentally sceptical, scientists are always prepared to 
modify their outcomes in the face of additional data.
So there is inevitably a rupture between the certainty 
the lay person wants in answer to a question, and what 
the scientist is prepared to offer in response.  A familiar 
example would be climate change, where climate change 
sceptics challenge scientists to ‘prove once and for all’ that 
global warning is man-made, and make much of the voices 
of those who dissent from the majority view. The scientists 
respond that the ‘balance of probability’ points strongly 
towards man’s being the cause of climate change, and point 
out that ‘the vast majority of climate scientists’ ascribe to 
this view. They will always stop short, however, of claiming 
certainty.
I suspect that this is one of the things that originally 
attracted me to the practice of science: it eschews 
dogma. Evidence-based solutions to problems are offered 
tentatively and with circumspection, and are susceptible to 
revision in the light of further evidence.  
For example, the paradigm-changing 1953 paper in 
the journal Nature by Francis Crick and James Watson, 
which proposed the double helix structure of DNA 
and transformed genetics, opens cautiously with the 
words: “We wish to suggest a structure for the salt of 
deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA) ...”. Towards its close, it 
gestures almost diffidently to the far-reaching implications 
of their ‘suggestion’: “It has not escaped our notice that the 
specific pairing we have postulated immediately suggests a 
possible copying mechanism for the genetic material” (my 
emphases)1. 
Public communication of science to a general audience is 
often a matter of helping the lay person to come to terms 
with this provisionality. In large part it consists in teaching 
those without a scientific background how to assess the 
claims made in areas that are complex and contested, 
often by translating them into more accessible terms. 
Non-scientists have to be persuaded to accept a 
scientist’s findings as reliable in spite of his or her 
reluctance to claim certainty, otherwise they are likely to 
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find the costs of innovation based on a scientific discovery 
— and the risks involved — too high. The role of media 
commentators like myself on scientific issues in such 
cases is to be trusted explicators, presenting a specified 
scientific breakthrough in language accessible to all, to 
show both its benefits and disadvantages so that the public 
(which includes politicians) can make up their own mind 
responsibly. 
Public communication of this kind is, however, a very 
different matter from engaging directly with the public and 
experts together, to progress and implement public policy. 
When I became Chair of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) in January 2008, I quickly 
discovered that scientists’ reluctance to claim certainty 
can prove problematic, not only when one is supporting 
innovation in assisted reproduction treatment, but even 
in sustaining the advances made to date. In spite of the 
successes of in vitro fertilization (IVF), are the risks that 
will always remain when we ‘tamper’ with nature simply 
too high2? 
One of my personal goals when I took up the post was 
to develop clear and constructive lines of communication 
between the HFEA and those it regulated, and to build 
an educated conversation with the broader public. This 
quickly turned out to be a much harder aspiration than I 
had imagined. IVF stories make newspaper headlines, and 
both broadsheet and tabloid press tend to sensationalize 
their coverage for an eager readership. However 
thoughtfully the HFEA drafted its press releases, however 
careful I was in radio and TV interviews, both were all too 
often truncated or taken out of context, resulting in alarm 
rather than reassurance and education.
So when the HFEA was asked by the UK government’s 
Department of Health to conduct a wide-ranging 
consultation on a controversial new process in 2011, 
we were determined to do so as far as possible so as to 
educate at the same time as gathering the information.  A 
great deal of prior thought went into planning the stages 
of the consultation so as to produce properly informed 
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debate, which enabled the non-scientist to participate 
fully, and to avoid the kind of sensationalist responses all 
too familiar to us from press reports of previous new 
techniques3.
An extended consultation
The HFEA is the UK’s independent regulator of treatment 
using eggs and sperm, and of treatment and research 
involving human embryos. It sets standards for, and issues 
licences to, clinics and research establishments in the 
fertility sector. It provides authoritative information for 
the public, particularly those people seeking treatment, 
donor-conceived people and donors. It addresses policy 
issues relating to fertility regulation, which are sometimes 
ethically and clinically complex.
Between 2011 and 2014, the HFEA led a complex, 
extended consultation process, involving both experts 
(IVF practitioners and researchers) and the general public 
(including politicians and scientists outside the field), to 
enable ministers to decide whether a modification should 
be made to the legislation governing assisted reproduction 
(the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(amended)). This would allow a mitochondrial replacement 
procedure to eliminate faulty genetic material, which had 
been developed by researchers at Newcastle University 
and elsewhere, to be used in treatment. It involved the 
HFEA in consultations both with the expert scientific 
community and with the public at large, to determine 
(i) whether the procedure was effective and safe for 
treatment, and (ii) whether it was ethically acceptable to 
the public at large.  
The HFEA commissioned and coordinated the 
consultations, and collated the results, before passing the 
results to government ministers. It (and therefore I as 
Chair) took no position on the matter, and has remained 
resolutely impartial throughout the process. I recall 
an interview on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme in 
which John Humphrys asked me what my opinion was on 
whether mitochondrial replacement ought to be made 
legal. My firm answer was that as Chair of the HFEA I 
had no opinion. “You must have, I refuse to believe that 
you don’t have a view”, was his response, “we hear you 
on Radio 4 every week, we know you have views.” But I 
stuck to my guns. It was for ministers to make their own 
decision, based on the evidence assembled. The HFEA’s 
responsibility was to present all the available material as 
clearly, accessibly and transparently as possible.  
Over a period of three years we were gratified to watch 
the way in which large amounts of information — steadily, 
consistently and transparently presented — allowed 
our constituency groups to reach informed decisions. 
We found that the so-called ‘general public’ was willing 
and able to examine the evidence and reach a clear and 
confident decision, as long as the explanations we gave 
were well-structured and as far as possible avoided 
technical language.
Over the period of the consultation, both the expert 
groups and the general public moved from risk-averse 
anxiety to a clearly-expressed view that the benefits of 
mitochondrial replacement treatment, in allowing couples 
to avoid bearing children with devastating diseases, 
outweighed the possible risks and ethical misgivings. The 
views of special interest groups with fixed positions about 
any treatment involving human embryos came increasingly 
to look like outliers. They were not, of course, ignored, but 
were put in perspective by the increasingly steady assent 
of widely differing sectors of the community. 
The HFEA’s belief that, presented with all the available 
material, accompanied by thorough explanations and 
with ample opportunity for dialogue, consensus could be 
reached one way or the other was rewarded. The most 
clearly expressed reason given (by both scientific and 
lay constituencies) for allowing the new, as yet clinically 
untested procedure, was that there was a trusted 
regulator in place to monitor and oversee its clinical use 
on a case by case basis.  Trust, in other words, mitigated 
aversion to innovation and risk. 
I confess that I did not myself expect the consultation 
— however carefully conducted — to yield such a clearly 
supportive outcome. But at the end of the consultation 
process, the HFEA was able to advise the Secretary of 
State for Health, via the Department of Health, that there 
was public support for the clinical used of mitochondria 
replacement treatment.  As an exercise in innovating in a 
controversial area while bringing the public along with it, it 
is worthwhile to look more closely at how that outcome 
was achieved.
A tale of two techniques
Mitochondria are present in almost all human cells. They 
generate the majority of a cell’s energy supply. For any cell 
to work properly, the mitochondria need to be healthy. 
Unhealthy mitochondria can cause genetic disorders 
known as mitochondrial disease4. 
There are many different conditions that can be 
described as mitochondrial disease. They range from mild 
to severe or life threatening, and can have devastating 
effects for the families that carry them. There is no known 
cure for mitochondrial disease, and treatment options are 
limited.
Mitochondria replacement therapy currently proposes 
two methods for eliminating faulty DNA from the 
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reproductive process: maternal spindle transfer and 
pronuclear transfer.
Maternal spindle transfer involves removing the 
spindle from the mother’s egg before it is fertilized by 
the father’s sperm. The maternal spindle is a structure 
within a woman’s egg that contains the mother’s half of 
a child’s nuclear DNA. The father’s half of the nuclear 
DNA comes from the sperm. The spindle is then placed 
into a donor egg with healthy mitochondria, from which 
the donor’s spindle and, therefore, her nuclear DNA, has 
been removed. The egg — which no longer contains any 
of the mother’s faulty mitochondria — is then fertilized 
by the father’s sperm, and the resulting embryo is placed 
in the prospective mother at between 2 to 5 days of 
development.
Immediately after fertilization, an embryo has two 
pronuclei. These are the parts of the egg and sperm that 
hold the nuclear DNA. Pro-nuclear transfer involves 
removing the pronuclei from an embryo with unhealthy 
mitochondria immediately after fertilization. The pronuclei 
are then transferred into a donated early stage embryo. 
This donor embryo contains healthy mitochondria but has 
had its own original pro-nuclei removed5.
Both procedures involve genetic material from three 
parties, and both involve genetic modification. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), the 
primary legislation that governs assisted reproduction 
and embryology procedures in the United Kingdom and 
whose statutory provisions the HFEA regulates, specifically
prohibits placing any embryo in a woman if the nuclear or 
mitochondria DNA of any cell of the embryo has been 
altered. This prohibition made the use of mitochondria 
donation or replacement in treatment unlawful in the 
United Kingdom.
Following a review of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (1990) in 2008, a power was introduced in
the Act to enable the UK government to make regulations 
to allow the use in treatment of eggs and embryos which 
have had unhealthy mitochondria replaced by healthy 
mitochondria. The intention was that this technique would 
prevent the transfer of serious mitochondrial disease from 
mother to child and allow the mother to have her own 
genetically-related child.  At that time, the government of 
the day gave an assurance that such regulations would not 
be made until any proposed technique was considered to 
be effective and safe for use in treatment.
By 2010, researchers at Newcastle University working 
on mitochondria replacement were making public their 
concern that the government should begin the process of 
drafting the regulations required to allow their laboratory 
research to be transferred to IVF clinics. 
By this time, too, the press had sensationalized the 
mitochondria transfer techniques as producing ‘three-
parent babies’. Opponents voiced fears, loudly and 
publicly, that new government regulations were a ‘slippery 
slope’, opening the way to genetic manipulations and 
modifications of all kinds.  
There was also considerable pressure on the HFEA 
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from some scientific researchers.  Regulation of IVF was, 
they maintained, bureaucratic and unnecessary. It was a 
serious impediment to innovation — had there been a 
regulator in 1978, it would have blocked a high risk move 
such as returning an embryo developed in vitro to the 
mother’s womb, and there would have been no Louise 
Brown, no first baby born by in vitro fertilization at all. 
These reproaches were voiced vocally in the media, which 
I suspect anticipated violent antagonism to ‘three-parent 
IVF’ in any future public debate.
In 2011, the Secretary of State for Health and the 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills asked 
the HFEA to convene an expert advisory group to carry 
out a scientific review “to collate and summarize the 
current state of expert understanding of the safety and 
efficacy of methods to avoid mitochondrial disease through 
assisted conception”. The HFEA set up a panel of experts, 
chaired by Professor Neva Haites6.  
The panel concluded that the techniques of maternal 
spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer are potentially 
useful for a specific and defined group of patients whose 
offspring may have severe or lethal genetic disease due to 
mutations in mitochondrial DNA, and who have no other 
option if they are to have their own genetic child. 
“As in every area of medicine, moving from research into 
clinical practice always involves a degree of uncertainty. 
The evidence currently available does not suggest that the 
techniques are unsafe,” the report stated. “Nevertheless,” 
it continued, “these techniques are relatively novel, 
especially applied to human embryos, and with relative few 
data to provide robust evidence on safety.”
The panel therefore made a number of 
recommendations for further work it wished to see done 
before a decision was made to allow treatment using 
either of these techniques.
Following the release of the first report, in January 
2012, the Wellcome Trust announced the establishment of 
a new Centre for Mitochondrial Research at Newcastle 
University, with significant funding, to undertake additional 
research recommended by the HFEA’s expert group. Here, 
too, both scientific and public confidence was thereby 
strengthened. 
In March 2013, the panel of experts reconvened and 
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again concluded that there was still nothing to indicate that
the techniques were unsafe. The group also recommended 
long-term follow-up monitoring of any children born as a 
result of the use of these techniques in treatment.
The panel of experts’ report concluded that there was 
no evidence that mitochondria replacement therapy was 
unsafe. It stopped short of expressing certainty that the 
new procedures were safe, as we might expect from a 
group of responsible scientists.  Although in the short 
run this allowed the tabloid press to exaggerate the risks 
associated with the therapy, in the long run the scrupulous 
care with which the panel assessed a wide range of data 
and evidence helped build trust in the community at 
large. This was helped by the fact that the panel Chairs 
(Professor Neva Haites and Dr Andy Greenfield) were 
extremely effective communicators. 
In its own statement, the HFEA said: 
“The panel of experts convened by the HFEA to 
examine the safety and efficacy of mitochondria 
replacement carefully considered the interaction between 
nuclear and mitochondrial DNA and concluded that 
the evidence did not show cause for concern …  As in 
every area of medicine, moving from research into clinical 
practice always involves a degree of uncertainty. Experts 
should be satisfied that the results of further safety checks 
are reassuring and long term follow-up studies are crucial. 
Even then patients will need to carefully weigh up the risk 
and benefits for them.”
Here, once again, the HFEA scrupulously underlined 
the uncertainty that is part and parcel of scientific inquiry, 
while capturing the overall confidence, based on substantial
amounts of data, that the panel expressed in the safety of 
mitochondria replacement, subject to regular checks and 
follow-up studies.
Dr Andy Greenfield, chair of the final reconvening of 
the panel of experts, said: “The scientific questions that 
we examined and the research that we examined — and 
it was voluminous — will never answer all of the critical 
questions.  And, of course it won’t answer the fundamental 
question, which is are these techniques safe and efficacious 
in humans.”
 
 
Building a solid platform
Meanwhile, in January 2012, the Secretary of State for 
Health and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills asked the HFEA, with the support of the 
Sciencewise Expert Resource Centre, to carry out public 
dialogue work on the ethics and public attitudes towards 
mitochondria replacement. This work was conducted 
between July and December 2012. It involved multiple 
strategies and modes of analysis, in order to include as 
wide a range of respondents as possible.
The public consultation consisted of five strands: 
1. Deliberative workshops (held in Newcastle, Cardiff and 
London). These met twice in each location. Participants 
were recruited to represent a broad spectrum of age, 
gender, socio-economic status and family circumstances. 
Thirty people were recruited for each location. The 
aim of this strand of the consultation was to explore 
public attitudes in-depth, and to understand participant 
viewpoints as they become increasingly engaged with, 
and knowledgeable about, mitochondrial disease and 
mitochondria replacement techniques.
2. Public representative survey. Just under 1,000 face-to-
face interviews were carried out with members of the 
public across 175 random locations. For each location, 
demographic quotas were set to ensure the sample was 
representative. The aim of the survey was to benchmark 
public opinion on: general attitudes towards medical 
research and genetic treatments; awareness of IVF and 
mitochondrial disease; views on the genetic treatment of 
mitochondrial disease; and attitudes to the regulation of 
genetic treatments. 
3. Open consultation meetings. Two public meetings 
were held in November 2012, the first in London (53 
attendees) and the second in Manchester (39 attendees). 
The meetings were open to anyone wishing to attend 
and were advertised on the HFEA consultation website, 
through HFEA networks, and promoted to stakeholders 
and the public in a number of ways.  At each meeting, a 
panel of speakers shared their knowledge and views with 
audience members. Panellists were selected to reflect a 
range of different perspectives and areas of expertise, and 
to provoke discussion amongst participants.
4. Patient focus group. One focus group was held with six 
participants. The aim of the focus group was to create a 
forum where people effected by mitochondrial disease, 
either directly or indirectly, could give their in-depth views 
on mitochondria replacement techniques.
5. Open consultation questionnaire.  A public consultation 
was held between September and December 2012. 
Respondents were invited to consider a range of 
information presented on the consultation website, 
and to respond to seven questions using the online 
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questionnaire. Responses made via email or post were 
also accepted while the consultation was open.  A total 
of 1,836 responses were received, the majority of which 
were received via the consultation website. Respondents 
include stakeholder organizations, individuals with personal 
experience of mitochondrial disease, as well as a large 
number of members of the public.
Each of these strands tapped into different groups, using 
different strategies.  An enormous amount of time and 
energy was invested by HFEA staff in providing information
to support the events, much of which can still be consulted
on the HFEA website. It is noticeable that media coverage 
of the mitochondria replacement story throughout 
this period was unusually well-informed: the HFEA 
website encourages interested parties to use any text or 
illustration they like, to inform their own work, and several 
journalists incorporated graphic as well as textual material. 
The public consultation also benefited from the fact that, 
fortuitously, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics conducted 
a six-month inquiry into the ethical issues raised by 
“new techniques that aim to prevent the transmission of 
maternally-inherited mitochondrial DNA disorders” during
the same period, concluding that “if these novel techniques 
are adequately proven to be acceptably safe and effective 
as treatments, it would be ethical for families to use 
them”7.
Taken together, the expert and public consultations 
provided a solid platform on which to build the HFEA’s 
advice to ministers.  After more than three years of 
engagement with scientists, ethicists and the broader 
public on mitochondria replacement, the HFEA reported 
to the Secretary of State for Health as follows:
“It is not the task of the HFEA to advise the 
Government as to whether it should permit mitochondria 
replacement in treatment. That decision would require a 
change in the law and is, quite properly, one which only 
Parliament can take. If the Government does wish to 
take steps to change the law, it must draft Regulations as 
provided by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 (as amended).”
“Our advice to Government is that there is general 
support for permitting mitochondria replacement in the 
UK, so long as it is safe enough to offer in a treatment 
setting and is done within a regulatory framework. Despite 
the strong ethical concerns that some respondents to the 
consultation expressed, the overall view is that ethical 
concerns are outweighed by the arguments in favour of 
permitting mitochondria replacement.”8
I think this is a quite remarkable outcome for such a 
contentious piece of clinical innovation.  I believe that 
the painstaking way in which the various consultations 
were conducted was in large measure responsible for 
the unexpectedly consensual and positive outcome. 
In February 2014, the Department of Health opened 
a consultation on draft regulations for the use of 
mitochondria replacement techniques, which would 
eventually make such treatments lawful.
 
 
 
On 22 July 2014, the department published its response 
to the consultation on draft regulations, in which it 
expressed its satisfaction with the extensive process of 
the consultation overall, and announced its decision to go 
ahead with putting the regulations before Parliament:
“This consultation on proposed regulations has been 
the culmination of detailed consideration over a four year 
period, where the Government has aimed to ensure that 
full account is taken of all the available evidence on the 
science, ethics and safety of the techniques and that all 
voices are heard.”
“The Government has decided to proceed with putting 
regulations before Parliament, subject to giving further 
consideration to the Expert Panel’s recommendations, 
refining the draft regulations to take account of changes 
identified during the consultation, and discussion with 
the HFEA about an appropriate approval process. The 
Government will consider the timing of the regulations in 
the light of these actions. The regulations will be subject 
to full scrutiny by the public and Parliament through the 
affirmative procedure.”9
Risk and uncertainty again
When I began writing this chapter, the regulations which 
would govern mitochondria replacement treatment were 
expected to be put before Parliament by the end of 2014. 
Given the success of the consultation process that had 
preceded the drafting of regulations, it was assumed at the 
HFEA that the necessary changes to the statute would 
have become law by the end of 2014. But that, it turned 
out, was not the end of the story.
On 1 September 2014 a debate took place in the House 
of Commons Chamber on mitochondrial replacement 
techniques and public safety, scheduled by the Backbench 
Business Committee. The motion was moved by the 
Conservative MP Fiona Bruce, and ran as follows:
“That this House takes note of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority’s most recent scientific review 
into the safety and efficacy of mitochondrial replacement 
techniques which highlights concerns for subsequent 
generations of children born through maternal spindle 
transfer and pronuclear transfer; welcomes the recent 
comments of scientists that, prior to the introduction of 
such techniques, more research ought to be undertaken and 
a full assessment conducted of the potential risk to children 
born as a result; and calls upon the Government, in light 
of these public safety concerns, to delay bringing forward 
regulations on mitochondrial replacement.” (my emphasis)
There was, I confess, some dismay amongst those 
who had so carefully seen the matter through to this 
point, at the prospect of further delay being introduced. 
What was disappointing was that after all the careful 
consultation and explanation, there was the old issue of 
risk and uncertainty once again, raising its ugly head. Those 
supporting the motion made it clear that the issue was a 
real reluctance to introduce regulations before there was 
scientific evidence to show that mitochondria replacement 
techniques were safe and risk-free.  This was the very thing 
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we had been at such pains to educate the broader public 
to understand was something science, of its very nature, 
would always stop short of affirming absolutely, regardless 
of the amount of research conducted.
In the week leading up to the debate, the media was 
once again full of articles expressing alarm at the prospect 
of ‘three-parent families’, further suggesting that somehow 
the debate had rolled backwards, and that the good 
work done in consultation might have been undone.  
But it rapidly became apparent that those taking part in 
discussion were now markedly better informed, and had 
a clearer grasp on the science and the issues it raised, 
than three years earlier.  And whenever a non-expert 
participated in the discussion, they were clearly drawing on
the large amount of non-technical information available on 
responsible websites like that of the HFEA.
All the scientific reports were readily available on the 
HFEA website, so it was difficult for those urging delay to 
argue that not enough research had been carried out to 
guarantee the technique’s safety. On the Today programme,
on the day of the debate, Jeremy Farrar, Director of the 
Wellcome Trust, responded to the suggestion that the 
mitochondria replacement regulations were premature 
by stating firmly that the matter had had “unprecedented 
scientific scrutiny”. 
The debate itself was remarkably level-headed and 
well-informed. It confirmed the fact that discussion was 
now taking place based on real information, properly 
deliberated on and understood by all the protagonists, 
whether they supported the delaying motion or not.  And 
what swayed the argument towards proceeding with 
regulations rather than delaying was the clear evidence 
that the public had fully participated in the process.  As 
one contributor concluded: 
“We conducted a structured dialogue to consult 
members of the public on what they thought. If they 
support them, then so should we, in all parts of the 
House.”10
There is now, I think, little doubt that the new 
regulations will come into effect before the end of the 
present Parliament.  And this example of full consultation 
will be on the record as evidence that — if carried out 
with sufficient care — we can conduct a genuine dialogue 
between science, government and the broader public, so 
that fears of risk and uncertainty are properly understood 
and allayed.
 
 
The last word
Proper engagement of the non-scientific public with 
complex science, in order to obtain its consent to 
innovation which inevitably carries with it uncertainty 
and risk, is not achieved lightly. I am proud to have been 
associated with a successful example of such a process, 
one which is likely to make the United Kingdom the first 
country to carry out an IVF procedure bringing hope to 
families otherwise unable to have a healthy child. I give 
the last word to one of the members of the expert panel 
on mitochondria replacement techniques, Professor Peter 
This example of full 
consultation will be on 
the record as evidence 
that we can conduct a 
genuine dialogue between 
science, government and 
the broader public.
Braude:
“As a clinician I am aware that inherited mitochondrial 
disorders are horrible diseases that can devastate families. 
In the absence of any effective treatment, mitochondrial 
replacement therapies offer great hope to families afflicted 
by mitochondrial disorders.
Implementation of any new medical treatment is never 
wholly without risk, and genetic alteration of disease is an 
important step for society that should not be taken lightly. 
The panel has worked single-mindedly over a period of 
more than three years. It is a shining example of evidence-
based regulation.”
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HOW TO BUILD REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORKS FOR NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES
Dominique Auverlot, Marie-Françoise Chevallier - Le 
Guyader, Françoise Roure, Jean-Luc Pujol, Aude Teillant, 
Clélia Godot1
Introduction
French citizens’ vision of innovation and progress has 
deteriorated significantly: technical innovation is no longer 
synonymous with progress.  As highlighted in the final report 
of France ten years from now: Priorities for the Coming Decade2: 
“the French keep trust in science but its applications are often 
considered with suspicion. Their distrust is not expressed as 
doubt about scientific contributions but with respect to the 
ability of public and private institutions to distinguish between 
real progress for our society and those that induce excessive 
risk. Our ambivalence about scientific and technical progress 
ultimately results mainly in broader distrust and doubt about 
our collective ability to use its results in the service of human 
progress.” 
Moreover, according to public surveys conducted as part 
of the exercise France ten years from now, French citizens are 
now particularly pessimistic: in October 2013, only 5% were 
confident about the future economy of the country. Thus, 
France ranks last among the 24 countries surveyed. This 
distrust extends to politics and institutions, to their regulatory 
frameworks and to the processes for managing risks coming 
from new technologies.
In this climate of distrust, the current procedures for citizen 
participation in public decisions promote “a more active 
citizen sovereignty,” according to Pierre Rosanvallon, but they 
no longer allow for building standards recognized by society 
for the development of new technologies. Yet the industrial 
sector needs, now more than ever, a clear vision on the future 
regulatory framework in order to invest.
In short, as highlighted by the President of the National 
Commission for Public Debate (CNDP3) in an op-ed on 
July 25, 2014: “The challenge today is to invent a new model 
[of citizen participation in public decisions] that combines 
participation and efficiency”.  Applying this model for building 
a regulatory framework for new technologies, including risk 
management, is needed all the more. 
This working paper will present first the current French 
procedures for citizen contributions to infrastructure projects 
that can be seen as successful; then, with a few examples, the 
difficulties encountered in public debates on new technologies. 
In a third section, we’ll see that the deterioration of relations 
between science and society can probably explain these 
difficulties to some extent. Finally, it will outline some ways 
forward for establishing regulatory frameworks for new 
technologies based on public participation.
 
1. Public debate on infrastructure projects: a well-
functioning response to public outcry 
In 1992, following large public protests during several 
infrastructure projects (TGV Mediterranean, TGV 
Nord, motorways A14, A16, A1 bis, Nantes-Niort), an 
administrative report4 stressed that citizens should be 
recognized as key players in public decision-making and that 
it should be a necessity to involve them continuously, well 
ahead of the decision, in particular at a regional scale. 
Following its conclusions, laws adopted in 19955 and 
in 2002 created public debate procedures for local and 
regional development and infrastructure projects (roads, 
railways, power lines, and so on) and an independent 
administrative authority — the National Commission for 
Public Debate — to organize it. Some characteristics of the 
public debate procedure can be underlined:
• It lasts for four months (six in the case of additional 
expertise), and is conducted by a neutral third party — 
called a Particular Commission for Public Debate — which 
does not give any personal conclusion at the end of the 
debate. It has only to present the arguments exchanged 
during the debate for enlightening public decision-makers. It 
highlights in particular the pros and cons. 
• The (public or private) project manager is required to give 
his decision about whether the project continues or not, 
and to provide possible changes resulting from the debate 
within three months after the publication of the report on 
the debate. 
• The principle of equivalence: the same treatment is given 
to each participant in the public meeting, and more generally, 
in the public debate. Everyone, regardless of status, is 
encouraged in the same way to contribute to the debate. 
• The ‘upstream position’ in the project design: the public 
debate is especially interesting when it occurs early enough 
in the operational schedule of the project, so that its design 
and its options may be questioned and changed if necessary 
at the end of the debate. 
• An initial report, describing the project, its goals and its 
options, written by the project team (and verified by the 
Particular Commission for Public Debate), must be given to 
each participant (and is available on a dedicated website). 
This procedure leads to a double improvement for the 
projects. Even before the debate, the project team has to re-
examine its project and to present in a clear and pedagogical 
way its goals and the set of possible solutions for fulfilling 
them from a sustainable development perspective, knowing 
they will be submitted to public scrutiny. Following the 
debate, the project team is asked to reconsider its plan. 
It may well change it in the direction of the arguments 
set forth (by a majority or a minority of participants) or 
even abandon it. For instance, the debate on a new rail 
infrastructure from Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle airport to the 
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center of Paris has led to a complete reconsideration of the 
project originally planned. 
The public debate for infrastructure projects has in fact 
three different functions. Firstly, it enables a debate about 
the various general concerns that are associated with 
the project, such as its economic benefits and its harm 
to the environment or biodiversity. Secondly, it enlightens 
representative democracy on the meaning of the decision 
that must be taken, by presenting all the arguments 
and suggestions expressed during the debate. Finally, it 
contributes fully to the design and development of the 
project (whose ideal is the co-production of a number of its 
elements). 
Since the adoption of these laws, more than seventy public 
debates have been held.  Without doubt, public debate has 
now become a kind of routine, and has served its purpose. 
Fifteen years after its initiation, we can say that it is a 
success6. Public debate, rooted in the large public protests 
that took place in the early 1990s, is indeed a good tool 
to help representative democracy to make decisions: it 
makes it possible for people to express their arguments and 
provides the CNDP with a snapshot of the public opinion 
on a particular topic to inform the decision maker. 
Yet, is it possible today to apply the same procedure 
that has been proven successful for implementing new 
infrastructures to new technologies and their regulatory 
framework? The answer, as we shall see below, seems 
unfortunately to be negative. 
2. Citizen-participation procedures that have not 
succeeded in establishing regulatory frameworks for 
new technologies 
2.1. Public debates meet some difficulties when used 
for the development of new technologies 
It is tempting to apply to debates on new technologies the 
same organization as the one that is used in public debates 
for infrastructure. In fact, this procedure was already used 
twice: first for a debate in 2009 about nanotechnologies, 
and more recently, at the end of 2013, for a debate on 
radioactive waste (more precisely on the plans for a deep 
disposal center for French radioactive waste). However, 
both of those debates unfortunately suffered from the 
radicalization of the protest, leading opponents to prevent 
the debate from being held. Some people would say that 
these events have been the result of actions carried 
out by a minority of the population (in the case of both 
nanotechnologies and nuclear power, this opposition arose 
prior to the debate) and that the organization of this public 
debate has offered them an opportunity to make their 
radical opposition (to the project and to the associated 
technology) heard at a national level. Still, that opposition 
remains real and prevents the public meetings from being 
held. 
This threat may be also viewed as a result of a movement 
of distrust of institutions and their public decisions. 
The debate on nanotechnologies7
In France, the public authorities, following a national 
stakeholder debate about environmental issues organized 
by the Ministry of Environment and known as the Grenelle 
de l’environnement (2007-2008), asked the National 
Commission for Public Debate to organize a consultation 
on how to promote responsible development of 
nanotechnologies. This debate was held from October 2009 
to February 20108 and highlighted several items, although 
it was disrupted by radical opposition from some groups. 
First, public knowledge about nanotechnologies and their 
related societal challenges was very weak. Moreover, the 
vast majority of stakeholders expressed the need for more 
transparent and more open governance. 
Public debate was a first step, which needed a response 
to be useful and called for sticking to a nanotechnology 
development policy that included consultation with 
various components of civil society in its operating 
mode. The many challenges raised by nanotechnologies 
— competitiveness, risk management, ethical issues and 
social acceptability — called for an innovative form of 
governance, in which governments and components of 
society interact dynamically to collectively determine the 
desired trajectory of development for nanotechnologies. 
This approach presupposes that some popular wisdom 
can be set aside, like the belief (largely shared by public 
decision makers) that information and scientific training 
are enough to ensure the support of the general public for 
technological developments.  Actually, studies tend to show 
that laymen’s opinions are based less on understanding 
and being informed of the special characteristics of 
nanotechnologies, than on the prejudices they have about 
technologies and the institutions that manage these. 
Here we can see the full importance of transparency 
in consultation and decision-making procedures for 
obtaining informed trust from citizens: transparency on 
how decisions are made (i.e. governance), R&D funding, 
ethics, the end objectives of development, risk management, 
and so on. Citizen involvement at a very early stage, 
based on procedures that must still be developed to a 
large extent, would allow nanotechnologies to develop in 
accordance with societal expectations. In this spirit, the 
European Commission launched on 13 May 2014 a “public 
consultation on transparency measures for nanomaterials 
on the market”. If, in the short term, regulation can be 
regarded as a barrier to developing markets, there is no 
doubt that in the longer term it will be the main factor of 
companies’ competitiveness in nanotechnologies by creating 
a more stable and secure environment for investment and 
consumption.
The debate on radioactive waste
The public debate on radioactive waste (more precisely on 
the plans for a deep disposal center for French radioactive 
waste, at Bure in eastern France) was held from 15 May to 
15 December 2013. The fourteen public meetings that were 
initially planned have been all cancelled: the first two public 
meetings, in May and June, were prevented by opponents of 
the projects. The National Public Debate Commission then 
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decided to continue the debate through proximity meetings 
(in town halls, markets and high schools); to organize 
debates on the Internet; and to hold a citizen conference. 
Thanks to those measures, the National Commission for 
Public Debate has been able to give its report, presenting 
the arguments for or against the project. In contrast, the 
classical form of public participation in public meetings has 
not been possible.
2.2. The debate about genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs): a badly begun process
GMOs
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have generated 
much debate since the late 1990s. Presented by some as a 
major technological innovation, giving significant economic 
benefits to those who use it; regarded by others as an 
uncontrolled process that can lead to severe damage to 
our ecosystem, and even to human beings; regarded finally 
as a new kind of agriculture with new dependencies, new 
shares of value added and new biodiversity. However, 
despite these various consultations, the issue of GMOs in 
France appears dominated by a governance problem under 
which the various players don’t trust each other and use 
strategies that can be perceived as contrary to the rules 
imposed by parliament. This marks the failure of the attempt 
to regulate the development of a technology: crops grown 
without advertising, illegal uprooting, delays in transposition 
of European directives, and the use of GMOs in animal feed. 
However, there have been many attempts at debate:
• A citizen conference organized in 1998 by the French 
parliamentary office for evaluating scientific and 
technological choices (OPECST), held on the Danish model 
of ‘consensus conferences’.  
• A report published by the Commissariat Général du Plan, 
GMOs and agriculture: options for public policy (2001). 
This study, conducted by Bernard Chevassus-au-Louis, was 
particularly aimed at identifying “elements for a proactive 
strategy”9. 
• A conference held in 2002: this scientific study conducted 
at the request of the government established proposals for 
experimental field trials of genetically modified crops. 
• A Parliamentary mission in 2005 entrusted to OPECST and
directed by Yves Le Déaut on “the status of biotechnology in
France and Europe”.
In fact, the debate faced recurring difficulties, widening 
the distrust about GMOs themselves and about systems 
responsible for their governance. There were issues about:
• independence and objectivity of scientific experts (from 
politics, industry, etc.) 
• lack of scientific knowledge
• lack of transparency in risk management systems
• lack of public information
 
 
• usefulness of GMOs in food
• lack of credibility of the measures taken. 
GMO issues go beyond simple industrial and economic 
interests and can’t be dissociated from the vision of the 
future of our agriculture in the context of globalization. 
Considering that a consensus between actors on this 
particular issue seems clearly impossible today in France, 
a public debate appears to be useless, mainly because of 
the radicalization of the opponents of GMOs: in fact, GMO 
issues are more and more often taken to court. Yet, at the 
same time, public information on GMOs is still necessary.
The painful experience of the French National 
Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) on the 
grapevine 
Fanleaf virus transmitted to grapevines by nematodes in 
the soil may kill the vines. To overcome this disease and to 
avoid polluting the soil with conventional treatments, INRA 
has developed since the mid-1990s genetically modified 
rootstocks to withstand the virus, rootstocks on which 
traditional grapevines may grow. 
Since then, INRA has tried to conduct full-scale tests to 
verify the effectiveness of this process over time:
• A first test was begun in 1996, but the winemakers (on 
whose fields the test took place) gave up in 1999 for fear of 
a depreciation of the image of their products.
• A second test was conducted inside an INRA center in 
Colmar with a local monitoring committee for tracking 
the experiment and questioning researchers (leading to 
further research): the grapevines were uprooted in 2009 by 
individual opponents. 
• A third test to follow up the previous one was interrupted
by a new uprooting led by sixty people, including a 
winemaker. 
This experiment showed both the interest in creating a local
committee to monitor and to address all questions (even 
if it changed the research program — which is a positive 
result) and, at the same time, all the difficulties associated 
with current full-scale tests on GMOs in France within the 
existing legal framework.
 
 
2.3. The debate about shale gas, concluded even 
before it began! 
The shale gas non-debate 
The issue of shale gas — its potential and the possibility of 
exploiting it — arose in France in the first quarter of 2011, 
a year before the presidential and parliamentary elections. 
In parallel with a mission entrusted to senior officials, 
the French National Assembly asked two of its members 
to write a report on interest in and opportunities for 
exploiting unconventional hydrocarbons. They submitted 
their text on 8 June 2011. One month later, on 13 July 2011, 
a law was enacted that strictly limits exploratory drilling and 
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production of unconventional hydrocarbons by prohibiting 
the use of hydraulic fracturing. The conclusion of the report 
written by senior officials was the following: 
“The brutal and highly publicized eruption in France of 
the issue of shale gas — which has been underway for more 
than fifteen years in the United States, leading an upheaval 
in the country’s energy balances — has not allowed the 
initiation of a serene technical and democratic debate at the 
desirable pace.” 
“The techniques used have all, when considered one 
by one, long been practiced (horizontal drilling, hydraulic 
fracturing, use of chemical additives etc.). It is the 
combination of these techniques that is innovative and 
allows the possibility of an economically viable operation. 
This combination, with the prospect of large-scale 
development in areas not accustomed to oil techniques, 
clearly raises concerns with regard to the risks involved.” 
“Since spring 2011, some European states have taken a 
significant part in the debate, with different results. Due 
to a more entrenched environmental sensitivity and to 
their urban concentrations, European countries are in a 
context that is not directly comparable to that of United 
States. The development of unconventional hydrocarbons in 
our continent will never reach the scale and speed of the 
combined experience of the United States over 20 years. 
Moreover, whatever the economic interest of the subsoil 
resources, it must be balanced with the inclusion of other 
assets regarding the territory, such as agriculture, natural 
heritage, tourism, etc.”
It should be highlighted that the law was passed after a 
Parliamentary report and a Parliamentary debate, which is 
one of the best expressions of democracy. But this process 
took place before any scientific report could be written to 
clarify, from a scientific point of view, the different issues 
raised by the possibility of producing unconventional 
hydrocarbons.
Conclusion 
It is clear that French society encounters problems when 
debating regulatory frameworks for new technologies in 
order to find the conditions under which such development 
could take place, or to decide about the research necessary 
to determine whether this development is desirable or not. 
The cancellation of a number of public meetings and the 
uprooting of some GMO tests emphasize the need to invent 
other forms of public participation. More generally, it leads 
us to consider that several barriers remain in debating such 
issues, some of which are specific to French society.  
3. A deteriorating link between science and society
3.1. “The precautionary principle”: a culprit too 
quickly identified 
The precautionary principle was introduced into the 
Constitution after a vote of approval on the Environmental 
Charter by the French Parliament in Congress at Versailles 
in March 2005: 
“Art. 5 – When the occurrence of any damage, albeit 
unpredictable in the current state of scientific knowledge, 
may seriously and irreversibly harm the environment, public 
authorities shall, with due respect for the precautionary 
principle and the areas within their jurisdiction, ensure the 
implementation of procedures for risk assessment and the 
adoption of temporary measures commensurate with the 
risk involved in order to deal with the occurrence of such 
damage”.
Prior to the inclusion of the Environmental Charter in the 
Constitution, there was vigorous debate between those who 
wished to adopt some measures to avoid major damage to 
the environment, even in uncertain cases, and those who 
opposed them, arguing that they might inhibit economic 
initiative and technological innovation. Nearly ten years after 
its publication, two points need to be made:
• In legal terms, the precautionary principle has seldom been 
applied.
• Nevertheless, more and more public decisions take 
that principle as a reference.  And, by the way, some of 
them seem to be taken under emotional stress, without 
relying on scientific knowledge. Therefore, it seems logical 
to remember that public decisions must be based on 
independent and multidisciplinary scientific expertise. 
The issue at stake is not about being for or against GMOs 
or shale gas. It must be recalled that, under the current 
charter of the environment, ‘risk assessments’ must be 
implemented, temporary measures adopted and a research 
program has to be designed to resolve the possible 
uncertainties. The implementation of risk assessments 
should lead to an explicit formulation of the unresolved 
scientific issue — in a transparent way — and to the 
implementation of a research program to treat these issues 
rather than to continue discussing sterile arguments. But 
such assessments are often lacking. 
In fact, innovation is not stifled in France by the 
precautionary principle but rather by a certain mindset 
in society and a growing distrust towards technological 
progress and scientists (see also the case study on risk and 
precaution).  As a result, some technologies are de facto 
blocked, without any scientific debate on the unresolved 
questions. On the other hand, in some areas, some 
industries are tempted to continue their work without any 
transparency. 
It is clear that French 
society encounters 
problems when debating 
regulatory frameworks for 
new technologies.
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3.2. Public debate: a tool to be improved to address 
regulatory frameworks for new technologies
For more than two centuries — specifically since the 
French Revolution — French society has faced difficulties in 
inventing efficient relationships between popular sovereignty 
and the power of representative government. In his books, 
Pierre Rosanvallon shows how, through different times in its 
history, the French nation has tried to give a more accurate 
reality to the concept of popular sovereignty. Of course, 
the very essence of our democracy lies in the electoral 
vote: the fact remains, however, that “more active and more 
complex sovereignty” can lead to a government more 
faithful and attentive to the general will, without denying 
the tremendous ambiguity linked to that latter term. In a 
society increasingly disenchanted with politics, the question 
then arises of how to give shape to this “more active 
sovereignty”.
In some areas, particularly the environment, comes the 
idea that the representative of the people must be informed, 
before making any decision, by a more direct link with 
citizens, a link that can take the form of a discussion among 
citizens. 
This view could be supported by Habermas’ early works, 
in particular the theory of communicative action, in which 
he considers the possible attainment of universality through 
discussion, or rather thanks to a real discussion among 
participants during which they should achieve impartiality 
through successive adjustments that require them gradually 
to adopt the perspective of all other participants. The 
decision on the rationality of a standard shall be suspended 
to obtain not only an agreement among the participants, but 
more precisely a unanimous consensus motivated by the 
recognition of the best arguments. 
This ‘discourse ethics’ is based on a number of conditions 
that must be respected, including inter alia: 
• The condition that everyone capable of speech and action 
is entitled to participate and to make a contribution, and 
everyone is equally entitled to introduce new topics or 
express attitudes, needs or desires.
• The condition that no relevant argument is suppressed or 
excluded by the participants.
• The condition that all the participants are motivated only 
by one concern: finding the best argument.
• The condition that the debate must be free from any 
restrictions that may prevent the manifestation of a better 
argument that can determine the outcome of the discussion.
It must, however, be noted, as Habermas often wrote, 
that the rules as stated in his discourse ethics can only 
be reached in a very approximate way, and that the rules 
followed by the participants in a public meeting of 1,000 to 
1,500 people are very far from those set out. 
Public meetings are therefore only an imperfect way 
forward. From the outset, the National Commission for 
Public Debate has dropped the goal of finding a consensus in 
its debates. More fundamentally, Rosanvallon emphasizes in 
his works the great difficulty of obtaining a given expression 
of the sovereign people: its expression (except in a 
referendum) is multiple and diverse, and it varies over time. 
One of the former vice-presidents of the CNDP, Georges 
Mercadal, also points out that “it is not possible to claim 
that the meeting attendance, by the number and mode 
of recruitment, may be representative of the French 
population”. He further states that “interventions [in public 
meetings] are overwhelmingly opposed to the projects” and 
that “projects are often of national interest, while the debate 
is confined to the areas of environmental impact”. In these 
circumstances, public debate is an imperfect object that 
cannot be a representative assessment of the acceptance 
of the project and cannot be a substitute for representative 
democracy. 
Georges Mercadal then proposed to “consider the 
public debate as a criticism of the project [coming from 
the society], presumably exhaustive because exercised by 
the most concerned people. The assessment remains the 
responsibility of the representative system, which must both 
consider that criticism and distance itself to preserve its 
judgment. This makes public debate the form of reflective 
dialogue … which may fill a gap often denounced in French 
democracy”. In that sense, the main function of a public 
debate is to enlighten the representative democracy on the 
meaning of the decision it must take, by providing it with all 
the arguments and suggestions expressed during the debate. 
It also allows the public to participate to some extent in the 
decision (even if the co-construction of the decision seems 
very difficult, if not impossible). 
The previous section, however, showed us that the current 
form of public debate, applied to new technologies, was 
facing a number of difficulties that could even result in 
making it impossible for a debate to be held. The staging 
of a national debate to decide the future of a technology 
constitutes a great opportunity for the most extreme 
opponents to gain the attention of the national media by 
preventing meetings from being held.  A solution can possibly 
be found in retaining the benefits of public debate while 
trying to avoid its blockage by quite a few persons.
The current form of public 
debate, applied to new 
technologies, was facing 
a number of difficulties 
that could even result in 
making it impossible for a 
debate to be held.
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3.3. The current difficulty faced by French society in 
developing standards around socio-technical issues
The distrust of experts
The distrust, mentioned above, still applies also to the 
experts and their institutions, nurtured by several cases that 
remain in our memories:
• The contaminated blood case, in which there was a delay in 
the implementation of safety measures. 
• The radioactive clouds from the Chernobyl disaster that 
‘did not stop at the French border’, their impact being 
measurable, contrary to statements made by some French 
senior officials at the time.
More recently, it appears clear that the debate on emerging 
technologies is often brought before the courts and has 
already led to several trials. Successive judgments of various 
courts about the installation of relay antennas or the 
uprooting of INRA grapevines demonstrate different kinds 
of expertise coming not only from scientists but also from 
civil society. For their decisions, elected officials, as well as 
judges, take into account all these forms of expertise. On 
the contrary, scientists are sometimes strongly challenged 
in these debates because their analysis tends to exclude 
any reference to values or perceptions that often guide 
the expertise emanating from associations and civil society. 
Public opinion is more and more concerned by conflicts of 
interest. 
Since the 1990s, France has set up several agencies and 
dedicated expertise on risk.  A wide range of sectors are 
included:
 
• A food safety agency (founded in 1999 following the ‘mad 
cow’ case and integrated in 2010 in ANSES, the French 
Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & 
Safety)
• Medicines and health products (ANSM, the French 
National Agency for Medicines and Health Products Safety) 
• Nuclear safety (IRSN, the French national public expert in 
nuclear and radiological risks) 
• Industrial environment (INERIS, established by the French 
Government in 1990 as the National Competence Centre 
for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection). 
The action of these agencies has helped to popularize 
the notion of expertise, to highlight the role of experts, 
and to provide reports that help build trust and generate 
constructive public debates and should be a possible way 
ahead.
The development of scientific illiteracy in a context 
of rising education
In a context of rising education levels in France (70% of 
a given age group now holds the baccalauréat), scientific 
expertise is in principle (and logically) questioned and 
challenged during public debates.  A new paradox has 
however appeared: at the same time, the level of scientific 
culture remains low in a great number of countries (two out 
of five Americans do not believe in the theory of evolution; a 
large majority of members in the US Republican Party does 
not believe in the human source of climate change; most 
French citizens turn off the lights as their main step in the 
fight against climate change rather than turning down the 
heat). 
Marie-Françoise Chevallier – Le Guyader reminds us 
that the notion of scientific illiteracy, which appeared in the 
United States in the mid-1980s, is seen by some as “a social 
and political danger affecting states whose development 
is based on science and technology”.  As she points out, 
this danger may induce a new view of public debates, with 
a negative answer as to their need! This challenge is even 
greater in several cases in which some lobbies — the 
merchants of doubt — are working to discredit scientific 
messages or to delay any decision (including those of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC), focusing 
heavily on the uncertainties linked to these decisions. 
We are no longer in an information deficit model in which 
it was easy to blame the public for not being informed 
sufficiently to debate.  We are facing a new paradigm: 
scientific information is available but, in some cases, its 
appropriation and full understanding by the public cannot 
really be attained. During the debate, everyone is legitimately 
concerned and gives his opinion, but an opinion is not a skill. 
A major issue related to the issue of trust is to recognize 
the specific skills of scientists and experts. Recent polls 
show the current ambiguity of French citizen, who likes 
scientists but who is less confident about their statements 
about sensitive subjects, as well as in their institutions. They 
tend to put more trust in associations and in NGOs.
The difficulty of French society holding real debates
Add to this the difficulty of French society to hold a real 
debate, without even making reference to the “discourse 
ethics” as stated by Habermas: public meetings more often 
correspond to a succession of presentations and questions 
from the audience rather than an exchange of arguments 
on a subject which should enable a ‘co-built’ solution. Under
these conditions, Marie-Françoise Chevallier – Le Guyader 
emphasizes the current difficulty faced by French society 
in developing standards around socio-technical issues, the 
 
We are no longer in 
an information deficit 
model in which it was 
easy to blame the public 
for not being informed 
sufficiently to debate.
152
RISK  AND  PRECAUTION  
The precautionary principle is sometimes accused 
of creating an obstacle to innovation development, 
or even industrial activity. It is not so much its legal 
application that can pose problems for companies, as 
the erroneous invocation of the principle by groups 
opposed to technologies, new or otherwise, and its 
inappropriate application.
In 2013, La Fabrique   de   l’industrie set up a working 
group on this topic, comprising industrials, scientists 
and sustainable development experts. Interviews 
with numerous specialists revealed that the problem 
lies less in the precautionary principle itself than in 
an increasingly assertive demand for security from 
consumers and citizens, combined with their lack of 
trust in the institutions responsible for ensuring their 
protection. Some companies have 
successfully taken on this concern and 
responded in order to re-establish a 
more confident dialogue with their 
customers and neighbours. They have 
even managed to turn this capacity 
into a competitive advantage.
Misunderstood principle, often 
erroneously invoked
The precautionary principle fits 
in with a tradition already well 
established in some industries, such as 
air transport, drugs and the chemical 
industry.  As a principle of law, in 
cases where it is difficult to establish 
the benefits and risks of a decision, 
it obliges public powers to take 
temporary measures proportionate to
the suspected risks and to take action 
to better evaluate them. The regulator 
thus avoids the environment being 
endangered by parties against whom 
it would be difficult to seek redress in 
case of damage.
The precautionary principle 
was introduced into the French 
Constitution as a symbolic act to 
show that the President of the time 
was receptive to environmental 
concerns. To date, no laws have been 
declared unconstitutional on the basis 
of the precautionary principle, and case-law invocations 
have been prudent and limited. On the other hand, 
the precautionary principle is frequently evoked, often 
inappropriately, either by militant groups opposed to 
the use of a technology or product, or by politicians 
and civil servants keen to protect themselves against liability. 
It is not the precautionary principle in the legal sense of 
the term, but rather the concern expressed by citizens and 
consumers regarding certain technologies and the media 
coverage of this concern, that encourage politicians and the 
government to produce rules that result in constrictions and 
costs for industrials.
Is France more cautious than its partners?
These constraints are often viewed as greater in France 
than elsewhere. However, close analysis reveals that the 
situation varies depending on the subject. In domains like 
GM food and firearms, it is true that France is cautious in 
comparison to the United States. However, France comes 
across as more liberal in areas like tobacco, nuclear power 
and diesel particles. Germany, despite 
its reputed concern to maintain the 
competitiveness of its industry, has decided 
to pull out of nuclear power and opt for 
less controversial energy sources.
In France, studies show that society 
is split into groups with very different 
attitudes towards technological innovations 
and faith in progress. Surveys also show 
that these groups tend to diverge over 
time.
The frequently virulent statements made 
by concerned sections of the public mainly 
stem from a lack of trust in the institutions 
responsible for ensuring the security of 
people and the environment. This mistrust, 
which results from an accumulation of ill-
managed crises, illustrates public powers’   
difficulty in organizing helpful dialogue 
and taking appropriate measures when 
uncertain situations arise.
Managing uncertainty
Managing major risks, particularly in 
situations of scientific uncertainty, poses 
considerable problems to public authorities.
• How can we establish the appropriate 
“considered  action” for a situation, when 
we do not know its benefits and risks, 
or when those benefits and risks affect 
different sectors of the public?
• How can we put across messages that are scientifically 
rigorous, useable by public powers and comprehensible to 
non-specialists?
• How can we take on non-experts’ concerns and make  
them part of the debate?
Group members
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• How can we give entrepreneurs sufficient visibility so 
that they can invest and still be capable of reacting to new 
information?
• How can we guarantee European consumers decent 
protection, under international trade rules, without putting 
European producers at a disadvantage?
Answering these complex questions requires setting up 
the appropriate procedures, structures and instruments. It 
involves reviewing the way that public powers operate in 
contemporary societies in which uncertain situations are 
increasingly common and non-expert sectors of the public 
are increasingly keen to participate in decision-making. 
This calls for better organization of expertise on available 
knowledge and improved debate  on  what  “considered   
action” involves,  including participation from non-experts. 
The next step is to organize coherent, monitored, effective 
action that is responsive and capable of taking on board new 
information on risks.
Public authorities’ current difficulty in adapting to this new 
context can lead them to making questionable or incoherent
decisions, or even no decisions. Take for example the threat 
of an epidemic, prompting a vaccination campaign, during 
which time the threat dissipates as the disease evolves. Is it 
best to cancel the campaign, which no longer seems useful? 
Will people look back and criticize the government for 
having wasted money because it chose to buy vaccines at 
a time when the decision seemed appropriate? Will ill-
intentioned commentators paint a retrospective view of 
the risk, exaggerating the probability of the scenario that 
ultimately occurred? Decision-makers will continue to be 
accused of either culpable negligence or excessive caution as
long as people do not trust the institutions responsible for 
protecting them.
This lack of consensus on how to manage uncertain risks 
is maintained on the one side by “merchants of doubt”, 
who play on the lack of certainty to refute  the  possibility 
of danger and stand up to objectively reasonable action, 
and on the other side by activists who contest dialogue 
arrangements and even sabotage debates, e.g. the cases of 
nanotechnologies and underground storage of radioactive 
waste.  At times, the media add to the confusion and lack 
of trust by putting opposing opinions on the same level 
without indicating the often very different  nature  and  
weight  of  their  arguments. The desire for a sensational  
storyline sometimes encourages alarmist messages.
To sum up, public powers are confronted with urgent 
demands from concerned members of the public, but they 
are ill equipped to adopt relevant, accepted measures. They 
generate a sometimes disordered accumulation of rules that 
constrict individuals or economic activity without always 
producing the anticipated security.
 
 
How some industrials tackle the demand for 
precaution
Public demand for precaution and the difficulties 
experienced by authorities in creating the appropriate 
measures result in a context that industrials need to 
deal with.
Most companies have long-standing expertise in 
managing the risks of their procedures and products. In 
addition, given that a proportion of the public remains 
concerned despite multiple protective regulations, 
some industrials have developed dialogue arrangements 
in order to take concerns on board, illustrate their 
ability to control risks, and restore stakeholder 
confidence.
The demand from society to reduce risks linked 
to production and consumption can also be a source 
of innovation and offer a competitive advantage to 
companies that respond better than their rivals. 
Strict regulations can even drive out less credible 
competitors.
To sum up, society’s demand for security is growing, 
independently from any legal expression. Industrials 
can respond and benefit from it. Public powers need to 
show that they are capable of dealing with uncertain 
risks and re-establish a good level of trust, while 
making sure that the regulations they produce for 
application are effective and do not needlessly hinder 
economic activity or innovation.
About La Fabrique de l’industrie
La Fabrique de l’industrie is a think tank created in 
October 2011 by UIMM, the Cercle de l’Industrie 
and the GFI, with the aim of boosting and improving 
collective debate on industrial challenges. Its Chairmen 
are Louis Gallois and Denis Ranque.  As a centre of 
thinking and debate, La Fabrique takes an in-depth, 
multi-disciplinary approach to the current situation 
and perspectives of industry in France and Europe, 
the attractiveness of its professions, its relationships 
with different stakeholders, and the opportunities 
and challenges brought about by globalization. It 
organizes exchanges of opinion and analyses to shed 
light on complex, subtly different situations. It readily 
works with any institution that can help it accomplish 
its missions. La Fabrique de l’industrie is a resource 
centre for all those involved in debates on industry: it 
gathers information, creates new spaces for dialogue, 
and produces critical reviews that decode the multiple 
points of view.
Access the entire output of La Fabrique de l’industrie 
on its website: www.la-fabrique.fr
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regulation of the development of new technologies being 
only one example. 
4. Conclusion: Some ways forward
This section gives some possible solutions for a new 
model of citizen participation in establishing regulatory 
frameworks for new technologies. They involve public 
decisions at different scales: firstly in the long term, but also 
in the shorter term, and finally for on-going commercial 
negotiations.
The rejection of non-transparency 
In the development of innovation and new technologies, 
the first possible solution — and unfortunately the easiest 
one — would be to say as little as possible and to avoid 
presenting and debating the risks. This solution may be 
tempting for some. But, for us, this is a losing strategy in 
the long run: the first incident associated with a given new 
technology would spark a media campaign that could stop 
its development.  We shall therefore take for granted that 
the participation of civil society (public and all stakeholders) 
is necessary in the definition and treatment of a regulatory 
framework for new technologies. 
Long-term solutions
(i) In the long run, it seems absolutely necessary to try 
to rehabilitate scientific culture and to learn to discuss 
and exchange views on — in other words, to debate — 
technical issues. 
Another way forward is to strengthen the level of scientific 
culture and ethical approaches: the ability to explain major 
ethical questions and to create common rules in order to 
live together. Many such actions already exist in research 
and cultural institutions. However, these approaches must 
be embedded into the different communities by creating 
new audiences and facilitating multicultural dialogue and 
exchanges of expertise. For instance, in-depth discussions 
with lawyers are also needed to develop innovation.
(ii) According to surveys, two kinds of structures are 
considered trustworthy by French people:
• Multi-actor structures (grouping politicians, industrialists, 
experts, associations, policemen, firemen and general 
practitioners), which are considered particularly reliable.
• Independent authorities on food safety.
Using these bodies in public debates may be a way forward.
Some shorter-term solutions 
In the shorter term, the public debate on a regulatory 
framework for the development of new technologies (or for 
a moratorium on them):
• can no longer be conceived as a one-time debate of four 
or six months, but rather as a continuous process which will 
last several years. In her policy brief about nanotechnologies, 
Aude Teillant points out that “it seems essential to set up 
permanent forums that are open to all stakeholders and 
whose objective is not to reach a consensus on a given 
issue but to express diverging points of view freely. Such 
a framework would help identify the scientific, ethical and 
social issues raised by these new technologies”. In fact, some 
long-term structures for exchange and debate are needed 
to support the development of a new technology (or a 
moratorium).
• should rely on international scientific knowledge — as 
rigorous as possible — about the questions involved: it is 
absolutely essential to understand what science is able and 
is not able to say on a given topic. The IPCC is probably the 
best example. It is clear, however, that these results must 
not be the only basis on which the policy maker will take 
his decision: it is necessary to add, country by country, the 
outcome of debates with citizens. It should be stressed that 
if this scientific step seems absolutely necessary for the 
decision-making process, it should not be considered as 
sufficient: the participation of civil society is the following 
step, as essential as the scientific assessment. (In the best 
process, there would be interactions and issues coming 
from the public that would be dealt by scientific experts). 
• would train leaders (political, industrial, social, etc.) about 
decision making in a social and political environment marked 
by the increasing complexity of the relationship between 
science, society and innovation environments and by public 
debate10.
• would, before a public decision is taken, multiply (for 
instance under the authority of the CNDP) the forms of 
debate by holding meetings open to the public but also 
by asking other groups (public structures, associations) to 
organize their own debate on a given subject. There are, 
however, some necessary conditions for a good debate: its 
goal must be clearly defined, like the issues on which the 
government wishes further enlightenment; the public must 
not feel that the decision has already been made before its 
participation; in its commentaries on the final decision, the 
Government must clearly indicate how it has taken account 
of the main arguments presented in the debate.
• would find some legitimacy on the World Wide Web, 
where the experts’ assumptions and assertions will be 
scrutinized and challenged. Since the start of the twenty-
first century, a widely interconnected global society has 
emerged. Time and space will now never be managed as 
they used to be. ‘ATAWAD’ — connected at any time, 
anywhere, with any device — is the synthesis, and the 
symbol, of this trend. Digital natives themselves will probably 
feel outdated compared to the ‘immersive technologies’ 
natives who will be raised and educated between now and 
2050. 
In the shortest term, a novel scheme for high stakes/
high risk ongoing commercial negotiations
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As experienced by the World Trade Organization in the field 
of GMOs, trade disputes concerning innovation in the field 
of agriculture and food will without any doubt be part of 
the potential obstacles for the conclusion of Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership agreements (TTIP 
between the EU and the USA, and CERA between the EU 
and Canada). 
Under the negotiations scheme, the Sustainability Impact 
Assessment (SIA), a mandatory mechanism, must be applied 
to each domain of the agreements (energy, food, agriculture, 
ICTs, mining, pharmaceuticals, materials and so on) and 
agreed before the agreement is concluded.  When the US 
Congress voted in favor of opening negotiations with the 
EU on the TTIP (with the European Commission, which has 
an exclusive competence, the European Parliament being 
only consulted for advice), it expressed the will that the 
agreement should be founded upon a common set of values 
supporting the whole edifice. For a SIA, we are aware of the 
fact that the so-called ‘precautionary principle’ will not be 
shared as the “common set of values” called for by the US 
Congress. This means that the opportunities for innovation 
in risky domains will be missed if the agreements (TTIP and 
CERA) go into a deadlock. 
The stakes are about one trillion dollars in annual 
value added , according to the TTIP economic impact 
analysis prepared before the opening of the transatlantic 
negotiations. So what is left in terms of potential core 
values to be shared, in order to secure trust in innovations 
perceived as risky, and thereby characterized by a 
potential societal risk leading to a political rejection of the 
agreement? 
The European Commission has been working on the 
concept of Responsible Research and Innovation, and 
published in 2013 a report exploring the different options 
for its adoption and implementation at the European Union 
level. The European Commissioner Michel Barnier adds the 
concept of responsible investment, which includes long-term 
systemic effects, and the ability to finance those investments 
for purposes of general interest (the safety of food and 
energy supplies, for instance).
So, with a reasonable expectation of success, we can 
forge the concept of responsible research, innovation and 
investment (R2I2), as the potential foundational shared 
value to be proposed as a trade-off for the SIA framework, 
in the event of difficulties (we are pretty confident those 
difficulties must not be denied but addressed properly as 
soon as reasonably possible, otherwise they will pop up at 
the worst moment of the negotiation agenda). Should the 
potential of this concept be understood in time, it would 
have a great positive impact.
OPTIMISM OF THE WILL: 
IN DEFENCE OF A MODERN STOICISM
Jesper Poulsen-Hansen (Co-Founder and Partner, Gemeinschaft consultancy)
From the fickle beginning of human existence we have found ways to explain and understand the uncertainty of our world.  We have populated 
our collective imaginations with gods, sciences, 
superstitions, causalities, anxieties and rituals in order 
to impose a fleeting sense of stability on an otherwise 
volatile existence.
But why do we combat this uncertainty so 
ardently? The answer is fear.  We fear the things we 
can’t control or the things that we have difficulty 
understanding. This is also the main reason for our 
time’s fixation with transparency, which again takes 
the shape of increased levels of surveillance and 
much new public-management logic. In short, we fear 
ambiguity and uncertainty, despite uncertainty being 
the prime mover of the progress of our species. 
This has affected something of a shared pessimism 
when it comes to risk and innovations.  We seem 
to associate uncertainty almost entirely with the 
bad things that could happen. But we seem to have 
forgotten that uncertainty is not only the source of 
dire news. It can also produce wonderful innovations 
and technological progress; indeed, historically it has. 
Perhaps it is time to revisit the motto coined by 
the Italian political theorist and philosopher Antonio 
Gramsci: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the 
will”. It was his way of describing these dual forces, 
which have always beleaguered mankind. Simply put, it 
means that we know things can go wrong but we have 
faith that it won’t. 
These dual forces of pessimism and optimism, 
intellect and will, are also the ground on which 
the relationship of risk and innovation is built. The 
pessimism suggested is not a bleak cynicism but 
rather a constructive scepticism. The optimism 
suggested (and much needed) is not a happy-go-lucky 
recklessness but rather a historically-founded faith 
in a modern humanism.  What we need is a modern 
stoicism of the twenty-first century. Humanity is 
underrated!
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